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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates accountability of the judiciary for its role in 
authoritarianism as an integral part of accountability in transitions. It argues this is 
an important but relatively neglected aspect of transitional justice theory and state 
practice. The thesis of the research is that the judicial institution, as the third 
branch of government ought to be held accountable for its role in past governance 
in transitional societies. This is particularly important to obtain comprehensive 
accountability. It is also relevant to the crucial task of institutional transformation 
which is a key objective of transitional justice. 
   The paucity of critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s 
troubled period would appear to be because of the view that it lacks a distinct role 
in governance. This suggests that the judicial function was inconsequential or 
judicial outcomes were invariably imposed. In view of the acknowledged 
important role of the judiciary in both liberal and democratising polities all over 
the world, it is argued that the purview of transitional justice mechanisms should, 
as a matter of policy, be extended to scrutiny of the judicial role in the past.  
   There is the need to publicly scrutinise the course of judicial governance in post-
authoritarian societies as a cardinal measure of institutional transformation. 
Following on the recognition that the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts will 
be faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution, restoration of the rule of 
law, as well as a key role in policy determination and governance, its institutional 
transformation following a period of siege is critical to the survival of democracy 
and the rule of law.  
   The mechanism of choice identified in this research for scrutiny of the judicial 
function in transitional societies is the truth commission. The research proposes 
extending the purview of truth-telling processes as a measure of public 
accountability to the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts. The research adopts 
a comparative perspective but to contextualise the argument, it focuses 
specifically on judicial governance and accountability for the past in Nigeria’s 
transition to democracy after three decades of authoritarian rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE 
OF LAW - A Nigerian Case Study 
 
   This research investigates accountability of the judiciary for the past in political 
transitions from authoritarian rule. The inquiry into the role of the judicial 
function sets out to demonstrate the relevance of incorporating accountability of 
the judiciary for the past into the transitional justice project through a public 
mechanism; the truth-seeking process. This study advances a robust argument that 
comprehensive accountability in the transition to democracy and the rule of law 
should be a key objective in transitional societies. It argues that scrutiny of the 
role of the judiciary for past governance is an important but relatively neglected 
area of transitional justice theory and state practice. Such scrutiny of the judicial 
role in the past ought to be pursued as a matter of public accountability. To 
contextualize the research, it focuses on judicial governance and accountability in 
Nigeria’s transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.  
   The thesis of this research is that the judicial institution, as the third branch of 
government ought to be held accountable for its role in governance during the 
period of authoritarianism. This is particularly important to obtain comprehensive 
accountability. It is also relevant to the crucial task of institutional transformation 
which is a key objective of transitional justice. 
   The research argues that critical scrutiny of the judicial function for its previous 
exercise of power, specifically in an authoritarian context, is made all the more 
important by the critical role the judiciary plays in post-authoritarian societies all 
over the world. This is especially the case with the growing incidence of 
judicialisation of politics and the increasing visibility of the judicial function in 
governance.  
   The paucity of critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s 
experience of authoritarian rule may be because of the view that it lacks a distinct 
role in governance. The lack of focus on accountability for the judicial role during 
an authoritarian period of a society’s history suggests that the judicial function 
was inconsequential, non-definitive or judicial outcomes were invariably imposed 
at the time. Yet, in view of the acknowledged central role of the judiciary in both 
liberal and democratising polities all over the world, it is argued that the purview 
of transitional justice mechanisms should, as a matter of principle and policy, be 
extended to scrutiny of the judicial role in the past.  
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   In particular, it will be argued that there is the need in post-authoritarian 
societies to publicly scrutinise the course of past judicial governance as a cardinal 
measure of institutional transformation. Such institutional transformation is 
particularly important because the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts will be 
faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution, restoration of the rule of 
law, participation in policy determination and governance. In other words, 
transformation of the judiciary following a period of authoritarian rule is critical 
to the survival of democracy and the rule of law. The mechanism of choice 
identified in this research for scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional 
societies is the truth commission which has become an important feature of most 
transitional justice processes in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies.  
RESEARCH AIMS 
   The following are the aims of this research: 
 
 To demonstrate the relevance of incorporating accountability for the 
judicial role in governance during an authoritarian period into transitional 
justice processes at times of political change.  
 To show that the role of the judiciary in transitional societies is of a nature 
that can not and should not be ignored. 
  To demonstrate that public accountability of the judiciary in transitional 
societies through the mechanism of the truth-seeking process provides 
opportunity for securing comprehensive accountability of governance in a 
society’s authoritarian period. 
 To demonstrate that across-the-board transformation of state institutions, 
an important aspiration of transitional processes, would be virtually 
impossible without incorporating the third branch of government, the 
judiciary, into the accountability process. 
 To make an original contribution to the fledgling but multi-dimensional 
field of transitional justice and the rule of law.  
STRUCTURE 
   Considering the various meanings the concept of transition evokes, it is germane 
to clarify what this thesis will not be doing. This thesis is not concerned with 
transitional justice in the abstract. Rather, it is concerned with evaluating what it 
means to engage with the judiciary as the third and vital branch of government in 
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societies experiencing political change. In other words, this study explores the 
nature of transitions through concrete and time-bound analysis of specific 
institutional dynamics and social expectations with particular reference to the 
judiciary.  Proceeding on this approach, this study emphasises the point that the 
judiciary wields considerable power and is an integral part of government in the 
modern state.  
   Similarly, it is relevant to clarify the sense in which this study explores 
accountability of the judiciary. In this regard, it is important to state from the 
outset that while the relevance of traditional mechanisms for accountability of the 
judiciary (including congressional hearings, parliamentary sovereignty, appellate 
jurisdiction, removal of judges, etc) are important to foster the proper functioning 
of the judiciary, they are not the route explored here. Rather, this thesis proposes a 
fundamental departure from these institutionalised forms principally on the 
argument that transitional societies are not normal societies. In any event, a major 
premise of the thesis is that these traditional mechanisms for accountability of the 
judiciary (for any of a myriad of reasons) did not, at the time of authoritarian rule, 
do what they were designed to do. Thus, there is the need to reach beyond them 
for an effective accountability mechanism in the context of political transition 
from authoritarian rule.  
   In similar vein, this thesis will not subscribe to the current transitional justice 
approach to judicial transformation. This approach, reflected in the attitude of 
international agencies’ to judicial transformation in post-authoritarian and post-
conflict societies emphasises training of old and new judges, provision of support 
infrastructure for courts (human and material), passing of laws and constitutional 
provisions for judicial integrity and so on characteristic of. It is not the argument 
that these measures are irrelevant to attaining the objective of institutional 
transformation. They clearly are required depending on the particular 
circumstances of the relevant society.  
   However, the argument pursued here is that the objective of institutional 
transformation of the judiciary can only be achieved where there has been public 
accountability, in the first instance, for the specific role the judiciary played as a 
branch of government in the pre-transition period. Public accountability for the 
judicial role in governance during the authoritarian period (offered through the 
truth-seeking mechanism), it is contended, provides opportunity to obtain clarity 
on the nature of judicial governance in the past. Acknowledgement of the 
propriety or otherwise of the overall exercise of judicial power, provided through 
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the truth-seeking process, is a critical step towards institutional transformation in 
the way it ventilates what went wrong in the past.  
   The preferred approach of this study is to provide a context to ground the 
arguments advanced on the salience of accountability of the judiciary in 
transitional societies for past governance. This approach is adopted because of the 
position taken in the study that the current attitude to accountability of the 
judiciary (for the past) in transitional societies is based on traditional notions on 
the judicial function in liberal democratic systems. Thus, there is a need to draw 
attention to a specific societal context in which to embed the arguments for the 
validity of a more critical approach to the judicial role in governance at all times 
and especially during periods of political change. It is anticipated that the 
contextual approach draws attention to the needs and expectations of the 
transitional society which existing paradigms in democratic societies may fail to 
capture. 
   In line with the above-stated approach, Chapter One opens with the historical, 
political, social and economic factors that set the stage for political change in 
Nigeria. The chapter traces the circumstances that led to the truth-seeking process 
as part of the transition from military to civil democratic rule in the country.  The 
focus here is on the work of the Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Commission, (the Oputa Panel) established by the government of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo shortly after his inauguration in 1999. The chapter examines 
the formation, mandate and legislation of the truth-commission, the Oputa Panel. 
The Oputa Panel was established as the main transitional justice mechanism to 
recover the truth and obtain redress for victims of almost three decades of gross 
human rights violations committed by successive military regimes in the country. 
There is specific reference to the role of the press, the conduct of public hearings 
and the recommendations of the Panel. There is also reference to the Oputa Panel 
Case. 
   The case challenged the legality and powers of the Oputa Panel as a truth-
seeking process. It played a significant part in the eventual refusal of the initiating 
administration not to implement the Panel’s recommendations is highlighted here 
though dealt with in greater detail later in the study. The chapter also describes the 
problems that the truth-seeking process contended with as well as the aftermath. 
Specifically, it speaks to the public reaction to the non-publication and non-
implementation of the Oputa Panel’s Report. It emerges that the Oputa Panel, in 
as much as it attempted to establish accountability for gross violations of human 
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rights in the country, to make recommendations for avoiding a recurrence and to 
propose important institutional reforms for creating a new society, did a 
commendable job and was well-received in the country.  
   However, a significant issue that emerges, and with which there is substantive 
engagement in this study, is the critical gap in the work of the Oputa Panel. In 
particular, like virtually every other truth-commission before it (with the notable 
exception of the South Africa TRC), it failed to engage directly and specifically 
with the role of the judiciary in the suffering that military rule brought on the 
Nigerian society. This was despite the fact that the judicial institution was at all 
times an active participant in governance in the country and the only one with a 
continuous and unabridged institutional memory or existence in the country’s 
post-independence history which is of temporal relevance in this research. 
   Ironically, the Oputa Panel itself as a transitional justice mechanism did not get 
away lightly with its perpetuation of neglecting accountability of the judiciary for 
the past. The judiciary provided (presumably unwittingly) the excuse for the non-
implementation of the Oputa Panel’s otherwise laudable work. Thus, critical 
evaluation of the Oputa Panel’s work provides an essential context for the need 
for new thinking on the significance of integrating accountability for the judicial 
role in the past into transitional justice processes. Such integration is required to 
achieve comprehensive accountability and vindicate the right of society to truth.        
   In Chapter Two, the study moves from the contextual examination of the truth-
seeking process in the Nigerian experience to the normative and theoretical 
consideration of the central theme of the research, accountability of the judiciary 
for the past. It examines the accountability gap stemming from the lack of focus 
on the role of the judiciary in the past. The chapter lays out the theoretical basis 
for the main argument on accountability of the judiciary for its role in past 
governance in transitional societies. It argues a case for extending the purview of 
truth-seeking processes to the judiciary in post-authoritarian contexts.  
   The discussion in the chapter highlights the existence of a tension in the 
interface between the truth-seeking process and efforts to call the judiciary to 
account. The tension originates from the view that such accountability 
normatively undermines the integrity of the judiciary as a key institution of the 
state (particularly in transitional societies), while the path of non-accountability 
challenges the viability of the truth-seeking mechanism in achieving transitional 
justice. It is argued that the adoption of an approach that accords proper 
appreciation of the transitional context and fundamental principles of international 
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law (specifically in the area of human rights and humanitarian law) significantly 
eases the tension. More importantly, the chapter further contends that inherent in 
this approach is the potential for institutional transformation and relegitimisation 
of the judiciary which had become delegitimised by years of acquiescence to 
authoritarianism.  
   The chapter goes on to challenge arguments based on traditional notions of 
judicial independence and allied principles (designed for the proper conduct of the 
judicial function), advanced to repel the case for accountability of the judiciary for 
the past. While conceding the relevance of the principle of judicial independence, 
it is argued this principle (or any other for that matter) should not constitute a 
shield against accountability of the judiciary in any social milieu. It is further 
advanced that the principle is especially not sufficient to ward off accountability 
of the judiciary for its role in governance in formerly authoritarian societies. This 
is because governance during the authoritarian period brought untold suffering on 
the society for which full institutional accounts are required at the time of political 
transition to achieve institutional transformation.  
   Utilising the earlier stated contextual approach, Chapter Three seeks to embed 
the theoretical framework for accountability of the judiciary for the past (set up in 
Chapter Two) in the transition experience of Nigeria. The chapter introduces an 
additional foundational argument for accountability of the judiciary for its role in 
a period of authoritarianism by suggesting a constitutional premise for it. This 
additional premise is principally informed by the deliberate adoption of a written 
constitution as the fundamental instrument for delimiting the institutional 
infrastructure of the heterogeneous post-colonial state. Chapter Three also 
presents critical analysis of the bi-dimensional issues that necessitate 
accountability of the transition judiciary in the context of Nigeria’s political 
transition. These are of a legal-jurisprudential and sociological nature. The chapter 
concludes that the accountability gap with respect to the role of the judiciary 
saddles the transitioning society with an untransformed judiciary. The absence of 
transformation in the wake of political transition in the country threatens not only 
the rule of law, but also the transition project as a whole. 
   Chapter Four reflects an important shift in the focus of this thesis. Up to this 
point, the focus is on the past. A major premise for the imperative of 
accountability of the judiciary for the past, it is argued, is the need for 
comprehensible accountability. The existence and functioning of the judiciary as 
the third arm of government when accountability for governance is in issue makes 
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it an indispensable candidate for scrutiny.  However, from here onwards, attention 
is directed to another compelling reason for demanding accountability of the 
judiciary for the past, namely the effect of unaccountability on the judicial 
function in the present. To demonstrate the claim in this research that the judiciary 
plays a critical role in governance, there is an analysis of the role of the Nigerian 
courts in mediating tensions that have emerged in the post-authoritarian transition 
period.  
   The significance of the post-authoritarian role of the judiciary is explored 
through the analysis of its mediation of crucial constitutional issues attached to the 
process of political change. Specifically, the chapter examines the jurisprudence 
emanating from the courts on some serious inter-governmental disputes as well as 
decisions that touch upon individual and collective rights particularly connected to 
the transition process. It finds that the judiciary has recently been the focus of 
both national and international attention as a forum that offers hope for the 
resolution of ongoing disputes and contestations in the public arena. Has the 
judiciary been instrumental to furthering or impeding the transition to democratic 
rule, and respect for human rights and upholding the rule of law? What has been 
the nature of judicial intervention in ongoing tensions that emerge from the 
interplay of a centrifugal federalism and dynamics of political transition in a 
heterogeneous, resource-rich but impoverished polity? These questions constitute 
the foci of Chapter Four. 
   There is an incremental resort, by the political branches of government as well 
as individuals, to the judiciary for the resolution of administrative and policy 
disputes as well as rights claims in post- authoritarian transitions. The 
examination of this phenomenon is the focus of Chapter Five. Progressing on the 
foregoing theme, it is argued that the increasing incidence of direct judicial 
participation in policy-making, in transitioning polities in particular, further 
validates the case for institutional accountability of the judiciary (along with other 
institutions of the state) in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian polity. The 
argument is made that accountability of the judiciary for the past in transitions is 
crucial, in view of the increasingly decisive role the exercise of judicial power 
tends to play in policy-formulation and governance in the present.  
   Chapter Six presents a critical evaluation of the prevalence of the judicialisation 
of politics in Nigeria. The chapter highlights public as well as institutional 
responses to this phenomenon as it takes centre-stage in the country’s transition to 
democratic rule. The Nigerian experience, it is argued, provides contextual 
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foundation for suggesting the need for more attention by legal theorists to the 
relevance of public opinion in theoretical analyses of the judicial function. Such 
closer attention, it is contended, can only enrich the legal academy. This account 
of the Nigerian experience also suggests that a number of situational dynamics, 
prominent among which is the ceding of power to the judicial branch by political 
actors for strategic reasons situate the judiciary as a powerful force for social 
reconstruction, entrenchment and stabilization of democratic ethos in post-
authoritarian transitions.  
   It is important to make clear that this study does not generally take issue with 
the propriety of the judiciary taking on overly political questions, as does the work 
of some leading legal, political and constitutional theorists. If anything, it supports 
it particularly in the context of transitional societies. What it challenges is the 
narrower issue of the propriety of the judiciary taking on such a critical role in 
governance where it bears complicity for the authoritarian aspect of a society’s 
history for which it is not held accountable. As the preceding overview of the 
research suggests, the challenge derives from moral as well as transformative 
perspectives. The Nigerian experience of the pre- and post- authoritarian judicial 
role in governance strongly commends the view that accountability of the 
judiciary for the past at times of political change ought to form a critical and 
integral aspect of transitional justice processes. Such incorporation is crucial both 
for comprehensive institutional accountability and transformation. 
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Chapter One 
THE OPUTA PANEL: TRANSITION, TRUTH AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
THE JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA 
 
1.    INTRODUCTION 
   In many ways, Nigeria typifies the legacy of British colonialism in sub-Sahara 
Africa. In the region, the country’s heterogeneity, deriving from its colonial 
founding, is unique.  Nigeria’s huge natural resources have not been translated 
into development for its teeming population. Despite being one of the first 
countries to gain independence in West Africa, it has had a severely chequered 
history of sustained development and democratic governance.  Most of its post-
independence experience of statehood has been under authoritarian military (mis) 
rule. Successive military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions 
of state and generally directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of 
the people. 1 
    At the dawn of its transition to civil rule, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
attempted to engage with this past. The main mechanism for this purpose was the 
establishment of the Oputa Panel. A substantive overview of the state of Nigerian 
society and institutions is required for setting out a situational context for the 
thesis on the salience of accountability of the judiciary for the past in societies in 
transition. An examination of the truth-seeking process provides a composite 
overview of governance in the pre-transition period.    
   This chapter introduces the background to the truth-seeking process in Nigeria. 
The discussion draws attention to the formation, mandate and legislation of the 
Oputa Panel and its work. Special mention is made of the petition on the murder 
of Dele Giwa. This petition resonated during the life of the Oputa Panel and the 
litigation that arose from it played a central role in the non-release and non-
implementation of its recommendations. The focus then turns to an analysis of the 
problems that challenged the work of the Oputa Panel. The chapter also provides 
an evaluation of the aftermath of the truth-seeking process. The discussion 
concludes that the truth-seeking process, like many others in transitioning polities, 
did not extend its focus to accountability of the judiciary for its role in past 
governance. The process thus left a significant gap in the accountability process 
for which truth-seeking was commissioned. 
                                                 
1
 Foreword by the Chairman, Synoptic Overview Oputa Panel Report: Summary, Conclusions and   
Recommendations (2004) available at:  http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/oputa/ (13 
July 2008). The site also has the full report. 
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 2.   THE CONTEXT 
   It has been recognised that complexities of the environment which led to the 
establishment of any Truth Commission will impact on how that commission 
addresses its mandate. Andrew argues that Truth Commissions not only produce, 
but are also products of ‘grand national narratives’ in the first place.2 On this 
view, it is germane to examine the background to the establishment of any truth-
seeking process. In the context of this research, an examination of the context of 
the work of the Oputa Panel facilitates an understanding of the dynamics of the 
environment within which it carried out its assignment. This understanding is 
important to the case this research makes for the relevance of the inquiry into 
accountability of the judiciary for the past in transitioning polities.  
   Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country. 3 It achieved independence 
from British colonial rule on 1 October 1960. On 15 January 1966, the country 
experienced a military take over that was followed by another, six months later. 
The events that followed the second military coup led to a thirty-month civil war 
from 1967 to 1970. Subsequently, the country was subjected to nearly thirty years 
of authoritarian rule under seven military regimes and numerous failed coup 
attempts. Military regimes in Nigeria commonly imposed emergency rule. Human 
rights abuses were prevalent.4 The population suffered repression, state-sponsored 
murder, restrictions on civil liberties and other forms of human rights violations. 
There was widespread use of lethal force by security agents and the police against 
the civilian populace. Cases of public execution in defiance of due process 
included that of Ogoni Rights activist and renowned author, Kenule Saro-Wiwa 
and some other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) referred to as the ‘Ogoni nine.’5  
                                                 
2
 M Andrews “Grand National Narratives and the Project of Truth Commissions: A Comparative 
Analysis” (2003) 25.1 Media, Culture and Society 46. 
3
 There are reputedly over 250 ethnic groups in the country. See for example J Morris “Nigeria” 
available at: http://www.redress.org/studies/Nigeria.pdf (10 January 2006), United Nations 
Development Programme “General Information: Nigeria” available at: 
http://www.ng.undp.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25 (14 March 2006) and C 
Obiagwu and C A Odinkalu “Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism and Militarism” in A A 
An-Naim Human Rights under African Constitutions: Realizing the Promise for Ourselves 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2003) 211 at 212.   
4
 See generally note 2  supra.   
5
 Amnesty International “Nigeria: Time for Justice and Accountability”. Available at: 
http://www.amnestyinternational.org/library/print/ENGAFR440142000 (10 February 2006). For a 
more detailed account of the judicial murder of the Ken Saro-Wiwa and some members of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) see A Maja-Pearce From Khaki to 
Agbada: A Handbook for the February 1999 Elections in Nigeria (Civil Liberties Organisation 
Lagos 1999) 12-17. 
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   The Hobbesian dialectic of the pre-social contract period appeared to have 
found expression in the country in not a few instances. The rule of law took flight 
in the emergent breakdown of law and order. The administration of General 
Abacha (November 1993-June 1998) gained notoriety for been the most brutish.6 
The rule of law had become so severely compromised that Justice Olajide 
Olatawura whose judicial career was largely spent under military authoritarian 
rule, observed that                 
               During the Military regime, the law became weak as a result of ouster  
               and suspensions of the constitution and existing laws which gave us  
               liberty and freedom. The constitutional duty to protect the liberty and  
               freedom of the citizens by the state was regularly breached by those  
   entrusted with that sacred duty…The rights of citizens were not only   
   ignored but trampled on.7 
 
Significantly, he made this observation in his capacity as the Administrator of the 
National Judicial Institute, the body responsible for the continuing professional 
education of judges in the country shortly after the transition to civil rule in the 
country. The occasion was the most important annual convocation of Nigerian 
judges. Thus, the judiciary, as one of those ‘entrusted with that sacred duty,’ as 
would be argued in this research, was much implicated in and bears complicity for 
the violation of human rights and misgovernance in the country.  
   A number of issues call for accountability of the judiciary for its role in 
governance during the authoritarian period. Thousands of citizens languished in 
prisons awaiting trials for years on remand warrants signed by judges. The 
criminal justice administration system, of which the judiciary formed an important 
part, was in shambles. As will be seen in the admission of the judiciary in some of 
the cases discussed later in this thesis, civil matters sometimes took decades to get 
to conclusion. 8 Many died awaiting justice without official acknowledgment or 
compensation. Military legislation made in violation of due process and human 
rights were validated by the judiciary. The military subverted and subjugated the 
                                                 
6
 P C Aka “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights 
Violations in Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego International Law 
Journal 209, 223. 
7
 Justice Olajide Olatawura, retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria and erstwhile 
administrator of the National Judicial Institute, Welcome Address at the 1999 All Nigeria 
Conference of /Judges’ Conference (1 November 1999) in National Judicial Institute, 1999 All 
Judges Conference xxv (2000) quoted in O Oko “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An 
Analysis of the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria” (2006) 9 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 10, 11.    
8
 See Oputa Panel Report Vol.3 Chapter 7, Oko supra at 39 and O Osinbajo “Lessons Learned 
about Fighting Judicial Corruption” in Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial 
Systems. (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2007) 146, 147. 
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constitution and received judicial sanction in many cases. Thus, the judiciary was 
meant to respond to these and other allegations bearing on human rights violations 
and misgovernance. Significantly, the findings of the Oputa Panel supported the 
jurist’s observations yet the former neglected accountability of the judiciary for 
the past in the truth-seeking process.  
   On the economic front, the country’s dependence on oil had not helped matters. 
The country’s 35.9 billion barrels of proven reserves places it at the vantage 
position of being the largest producer of oil in Africa and tenth largest in the 
world.9 Seizing on soaring oil prices in the late 1960s and early 1970s, successive 
military regimes quickly shifted emphasis from agriculture to crude oil 
exploitation. The government replaced agriculture as the leading foreign exchange 
earner; a situation which has persisted since then. Crude oil has come to account 
for over 90% of the country’s total foreign earnings.10 Most of the oil reserves are 
located within the country’s Niger Delta area, in the south. But most of the area 
lacked basic infrastructure.11 It struggled with a myriad of problems.  In order to 
contain expressions of social discontent, successive military regimes in Nigeria 
militarised the Niger Delta. Ethnic and regional militia sprung up and have 
remained in this area especially and the country as a whole. The ethnic militias 
mainly demand more autonomy for their respective areas in the virtually military 
unitarised federal polity. 
   The military hegemony regarded the country as ‘conquered territory,’ and its 
vast resources as ‘spoils of war.’12 Under their reckless governance, the country 
transformed rapidly from one of the richest nations, to one of the poorest.13 
Although military incursions into power were proclaimed to be in pursuit of 
economic rectitude, unity and peace of the country,14 arguably none of these was 
achieved by the numerous military regimes.15 Rather, as will be discussed further 
                                                 
9
 Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Briefs: Nigeria available at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf   (13 July 2008) 4. 
10
 World Bank  Nigeria Country Brief  available at:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/NIGERIAEXTN/0,
,menuPK:368906~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368896,00.html (13 July 2008).   
11
 UNDP- Nigeria Niger Delta Human Development Report p.14 (United Nations Development 
Programme Abuja 2006) available at: http://hdr.undp.org/. (7 November 2006).  
12
 Foreword by the Chairman note 1 supra at 2-3. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 See for example the Coup speech that heralded the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida on 27  
August 1985 available at Againstbabangida.org: http://againstbabangida.com/docs/ibb_coup-
speech.htm (7 November 2006) and G N K Vukor-Quarshie “Criminal Justice Administration in 
Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review (1997) 8 Criminal Law Forum 87, 104. 
15
 T I Ogowewo “Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative to the 
Survival of Nigeria’s Democracy” (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 135, 141 
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in subsequent chapters, corruption was institutionalised by the military16 and has 
remained a formidable challenge to development and good governance in the 
country.  
   Quite apart from these internal factors, the Oputa Panel also had an 
‘international dimension’ to its establishment.17 The violations of human rights in 
the country were incompatible with various international human rights covenants 
and instruments to which Nigeria was a party. During the military era, the country 
had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)18 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Other international human rights instruments the country had signed 
up to and ratified included the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the Slavery 
Convention of 1926 and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.  
   The country’s obligations to investigate and compensate victims of gross 
violations of human rights derived from the foregoing instruments and others, like 
the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers and UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. At the regional 
level, the country was one of the first to sign and ratify the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (African Charter).19 Nigeria had signed the African 
Charter in 1982 and enacted it as municipal legislation in 1983.  In their combined 
effects, these instruments require that the country observes the highest standards 
of respect for individual, child, gender, solidarity and group rights among others. 
This contrasted sharply with the wanton disregard and violations of human rights 
that was a permanent feature of successive military regimes in the country.   
   At various times, the country came under international censure for its appalling 
human rights record. The UN Commission on Human Rights found ‘fundamental 
inconsistencies between the obligations undertaken by Nigeria under the covenant 
                                                 
16
 The country ranked as the fifth most corrupt country in a worldwide survey of 85 countries in 
1998 during the last few months of military rule. Transparency International: Transparency 
International Corruption Index 1998 available at:  
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/1998/1998_09_22_cpi  (7  
November 2006). 
17Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission Report (Oputa Panel Report) Volume 2. 
18
 Adopted 16 December 1966 and entered into force 23 March 1976 (1966) 999 UNTS 171.  
19
 Adopted 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986 21 International Legal 
Materials (1982) 58.   
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to respect, promote, protect and ensure the rights guaranteed under the covenant 
and the implementation of those rights in Nigeria.’20 From the prevailing state of 
affairs, the country acquired pariah status with attendant negative economic, 
social and political consequences. 
   It is thus understandable that a groundswell of discontent developed against 
military regimes in the country particularly in the 1990s. In the summary of its 
Report, the Oputa Panel rightly noted that  
               It is in the struggle against military rule that the more immediate origin  
               of the Commission is to be sought, for the democratic struggle kept the  
               issue of arbitrary rule and state-sponsored violence, exemplified in many  
               cases by gross violations and abuses of human rights, on the agenda of  
               political discourse in the country…the military leadership and culpable  
               state functionaries must ultimately be held accountable…the transition  
               would be incomplete…if the past was not confronted.21   
 
 3. THE OPUTA PANEL: FORMATION, LEGISLATION AND MANDATE 
   The mysterious death of General Sanni Abacha (then military Head of State) in 
June 1998, translated into a fortuitous opportunity for new beginnings in the 
country. It led to the emergence of Abacha’s Chief of Defence, General 
Abdusalam Abubakar as the Head of State. The latter was unequivocal in his plan 
to return the country to civil rule without further delay. As an important part of the 
process, General Abubakar retired some prominent members of the military who 
had held political office and repealed a number of military decrees. The country 
also adopted a new constitution. 
   Nigeria returned to civil rule on 29 May 1999, following the successful 
completion of the transition program initiated by General Abdusalam Abubakar in 
his less than one year in office. The handover ended years of authoritarian military 
rule and several aborted civil transition programmes. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a 
retired general and former head of state emerged as President. His election was 
accepted internationally, though largely criticized at home. It was felt that he was 
a candidate of the old guard in the military. The election was marred in some 
cases by fraud and it received knocks from local observer groups and few 
international ones too. His opponents headed for the courts though his victory was 
                                                 
20
 Oputa Panel Report note 17 supra. Chapter 3, p. 12. Chapter 6 of the same volume provides 
concise details of various international human rights over-sight bodies’ findings and 
recommendations on flagrant human rights violations in the country (at 21-58).  See also 
Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Fifty-third session Items 8 and 10 of 
the provisional agenda E/CN.4/1997/62 (4 February 1997). 
21
 Oputa Panel Report Volume 1 Chapter 2, 24 
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upheld by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. It would appear the world was however 
relieved the military was on its way out and thus the relatively high support for 
the flawed elections. 
   With the advent of civil governance and democracy, it was only natural that 
some measures would be required to redress the serious feelings of social 
discontent in the country. The truth-seeking process was the principal mechanism, 
the only other measure been the largely symbolic lustration of ‘political’ military 
officers. One of the very first executive declarations made by President Olusegun 
Obasanjo was his decision to set up a truth and reconciliation commission. The 
Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (the Oputa Panel)22 was 
established by Statutory Instrument No.8 of 199923 under the hand of President 
Obasanjo. The statutory instrument was made pursuant to Tribunals of Inquiry 
Act (TIA).24 The Oputa Panel’s mandate as amended was to: 
a) ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of 
human rights committed in Nigeria between the 15th day of  January 1966 and 
the 28th day of May 1996; 
b)  identify the person or persons, authorities institutions or organizations which 
may be held accountable for such gross violations of human rights and 
determine the motives for the violations or abuses, the victims and 
circumstances thereof and the effect on such victims and the society 
generally; 
c)  determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate 
state policy or the policy of any of its organs or institutions or whether they 
arose from abuses by state officials of their office or whether they were the 
acts of any political organization, liberation movement or other groups or 
individuals; 
d) recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall 
future violations or abuses of human rights; 
                                                 
22
 This is the official title adopted by the body and under which its report was submitted. Initially 
styled “The Human Rights Investigation Panel”, it was later renamed “The Judicial Commission 
for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Nigeria”. See Oputa Panel Report, note 17 
supra at 19.  
23
 As amended by Statutory Instrument No.13 of 1999. 
24
 No. 447, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.  
 23 
e) make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence; 
f) receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from whatever source 
which may aid and facilitate the realisation of its objectives. 25       
   The Oputa Panel was initially to investigate human rights abuses from 1983 to 
1998. This initial mandate was viewed as limited and was strongly criticised by 
the human rights community, politicians and the public at large. It was viewed as 
been unduly restrictive for a number of reasons. These included the fact the 
mandate did not cover the period of Nigerian Civil War. It also excluded several 
periods of military rule. The Oputa Panel’s mandate was extended to cover the 
period from 15 January 1966 (when the first military coup took place) and 28 May 
1999 (the eve of the inauguration of the current civilian administration) itself. 
Further, the Oputa Panel also requested for the amendment to the original terms of 
reference that restricted its purview to ‘…all known or suspected cases of 
mysterious deaths and assassinations.’ The inclusion of paragraphs (e) and (f) 
above were also at the request of the Oputa Panel. These were with a view to 
ensuring that it acquired the full-fledged status of a truth and reconciliation 
commission.26  
   One important feature of the enabling statute of the Oputa Panel, the TIA, is that 
it gave the Oputa Panel coercive powers to subpoena witnesses and documents. 
The Oputa Panel also had powers to order the arrest of any individual it 
determined was or had acted in contempt of the Oputa Panel. These powers, as 
will be highlighted below and further discussed in Chapter Four, led to 
contentious litigation against the Panel by former military rulers wary of the 
accountability process.  
3.1   A Truth Commission and Interpretation of its Mandate 
      At the inauguration of the Oputa Panel on 14 June 1999, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo declared that it was established to demonstrate his administration’s 
‘determination to heal the wounds of the past… for complete reconciliation based 
on truth and knowledge of the truth in our land.’ He went on to affirm that the 
government will do ‘everything possible to address all issues that tend to bring 
                                                 
25
 Statutory Instrument No.8 1999 as amended by Statutory Instrument 9 of 1999. 
26
 Oputa Panel Report, note 17 supra at 29-31. 
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our country into dispute, or perpetuate injustice, conflict and the violation of 
human rights.’ 27  
   On its part, there is little doubt that the Oputa Panel viewed its status as one 
beyond a Commission of Inquiry though it was established pursuant to the 
Tribunals of Inquiry Act. Thus, while addressing the issue of reparation and 
compensation for victims, it expressly referred to itself as a ‘truth commission.’28 
It is to be expected that the mandate of any commission will be pursued in 
accordance with the perception or interpretation of it by the members. The Oputa 
Panel viewed its key mandate as Reconciliation. In the words of the Chairman, 
‘Our quo warranto is the search for this reconciliation.’29   
   Perhaps as a result of the primacy placed on this reconciliatory posture, the 
Oputa Panel never invoked its power to order the arrest of any witnesses. It 
maintained this position even when faced with the defiance of three past military 
rulers and some of their security chiefs to attend on its summons, a development 
that tested the will, if not the credibility of the Oputa Panel in the public eye. 
Ironically reconciliation was not a formal part of the Oputa Panel’s mandate. In its 
narrow pursuit of reconciliation, the Oputa Panel essentially allowed contempt for 
it own authority. Commendable as the approach may have been in principle, in 
practice, it left the process open to criticism regarding its effectiveness and 
brought to the fore a tension between reconciliation and accountability that 
plagued the work of the body. The emphasis of the Oputa Panel on reconciliation 
notwithstanding, its terms of reference clearly required it to play a pivotal role in 
achieving truth and accountability for victims of gross human rights violations 
during the decades of military authoritarian rule. This aspect of its mandate, in 
spite of its reconciliatory posture was not lost on the Oputa Panel as reflected in 
the summary of its report.30  
   The Oputa panel was expected to suggest measures for deterrence of future 
violations and foster restoration of the rule of law which had been violently 
displaced during the years of military dictatorship. This can be ascertained from 
the broad terms of reference that mandated the Oputa Panel to ‘recommend 
                                                 
27
 “Address by His Excellency the President, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo, G.C.F.R at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Human Rights Violations 
Investigations Panel on Monday 14 June 1999”.available at:  
http://ww.nopa.net/Useful_Information/Presidential_Speeches/14june99.html (26 February 2006)  
Emphasis mine.    
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 Oputa Panel Report, Volume 6, Chapter 1, 1.  
29
 Synoptic Overview note 1 supra at 8. 
30
 Oputa Panel Report note 12 supra  
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measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, legislative or 
institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall future violations 
or abuses of human rights.’ In this way, the framers of the mandate expected the 
Oputa Panel to recommend further investigations of alleged violations, as well as 
outright prosecution of alleged perpetrators of criminal violations of human rights. 
It did both, though more of the former than the latter. An analysis of the findings 
and recommendations of the Panel suggests it was caught between the desire to 
foster reconciliation - between persecutors and the persecuted - and the desire to 
achieve justice for victims of impunity, through recommendations of 
compensation and in some cases, criminal trials. 
   Expectations were high that the Oputa Panel would contribute extensively to 
social reconstruction in Nigeria. This was reflected in the Oputa Panel’s mandate 
which urged it to ‘make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of 
the Judicial Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the 
evidence.’ In pursuit of this, the Oputa Panel’s recommendations went beyond 
investigations of alleged violations of human rights to setting an agenda for 
transformation of Nigerian society.  
   The foregoing suggests the truth-seeking process was expected to make 
substantial contributions to the restoration and promotion of the rule of law in 
Nigeria following years of due process and human rights violations. The Oputa 
Panel on its part approached its mandate from a perspective that emphasised a 
broad and flexible conception of its terms of reference. The Oputa Panel 
proceeded on the premise that the truth-seeking process provided an opportunity 
to lay the foundations for social reconstruction and reconciliation. But as would 
become obvious later, this aspiration was hardly met. With the notable exception 
of its lack of engagement with the issue of accountability of the judiciary for past 
(mis) conduct, the most decisive factor for this failure was a lack of sincerity on 
the part of the initiating regime in setting up the Oputa Panel.   
4. THE WORK AND FINDINGS OF THE OPUTA PANEL 
   The South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission,31 by the Oputa Panel’s 
admission, constituted the model for the Oputa Panel.32 But there were 
                                                 
31
 The South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established by the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act (PNURA) No.34 of 1995.  For the view that the Oputa 
Panel was modelled after the South Africa TRC see for example Guardian Editorial, ‘Oputa Panel: 
Matters Arising,’ The Guardian on Sunday Online Edition (Lagos, Nigeria, December 19, 2004) 
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fundamental differences in their structures. The Oputa Panel did not have the 
specialised units provided for by the law establishing the TRC, and through which 
it operated. It also worked as a ‘general purpose’ commission without the benefit 
of specialised committees. The Oputa Panel was not institutionally designed to 
play a critical role in the rehabilitation of victims either, though a liberal 
interpretation of the Oputa Panel’s mandate would have allowed for this. Nor was 
it granted the power of amnesty. However, a significant feature it did share with 
the South Africa TRC is the naming of alleged perpetrators of gross violations of 
human rights. 
  The Oputa Panel received over 10,000 petitions within a few months of its 
establishment; evidence, perhaps, not just of the level of rights violations 
committed during the period of military rule but also of the need of the Nigerian 
people for a truth-seeking process which would serve as a means for obtaining 
justice and redress for gross violations of human rights by the state. It also 
demonstrated the widespread confidence with which people welcomed the Oputa 
Penal. The nature of the violations disclosed in the petitions centred principally on 
the right to life, the right to personal liberty and the right to human dignity.33 In 
line with these criteria, petitions were further scrutinised to determine whether the 
alleged infringement was ‘gross.’ What constituted ‘gross violations’ of human 
rights was nowhere defined in the terms of reference or legislation which 
established the Oputa Panel. The Oputa Panel had recourse among others to the 
definition of the term in section 1 of the South Africa TRC Act, international 
human rights instruments and the Nigerian constitution which guaranteed the 
rights identified by the Oputa Panel as been in issue.  
   Constrained by factors like limited personnel, time and financial resources, the 
Oputa Panel decided to hear only 200 petitions at its public hearings. According to 
the Oputa Panel, the criteria for hearing the chosen petitions were consideration of 
the nature of the rights involved and the extent or degree of the infringement(s) 
alleged.34 There was thus a great disparity between the petitions submitted to the 
Oputa Panel and those actually heard in public. While the number of cases 
                                                                                                                                     
and L Odion “Reconciliation: Between Substance and Symbolism” This Day Online (16 
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selected for the public hearings was limited, the Oputa Panel heard testimony 
from some 2,000 witnesses and received 1,750 exhibits related to these selected 
cases.35 
   One of the ways the Oputa Panel sought to deal with the large number of 
violations that occurred during the period of authoritarian rule, was to commission 
research reports by experts. The rationale for the research reports was the 
limitations of public hearings as a forum to ventilate the scale of the gross 
violations of human rights that had taken place in the country in a period covering 
over three decades. The research work by experts was also expected to provide a 
valuable background of human rights violations in the country and thus assist the 
Oputa Panel to contextualise its work. The research reports played an important 
part in the work of the Oputa Panel. We consider them in some detail below.36 
   However, it is important to observe that virtually all Truth Commissions in the 
past and present have been inundated by thousands of petitions through which 
they sift and most drastically prune down the number they actually take on. The 
need to eliminate repetitive petitions for more representative and ‘serious’ ones 
are cited in justification of the process of ‘scaling down.’ Thus discretion, a 
feature of every criminal justice system in the world rears its head in the truth 
telling process as well. However, not much of an issue has been made of it by 
proponents of the latter mechanism.37  In the discharge of its mandate, the Oputa 
Panel organised public hearings, as the platform for ventilation of various 
violations of human rights and the misuse of state powers in the years of military 
rule in Nigeria. It is to these that we should now turn.  
4.1   Public Hearings: General  
   The public hearings of the Oputa Panel were of two types. There was the 
general or ‘zonal’ public hearing which was geared towards giving a voice to 
victims of rights violations who may otherwise remain voiceless. These were held 
in five notable zonal capitals and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.38 There 
were also the special or ‘institutional’ hearings. The sessions of the Oputa Panel 
                                                 
35
 ‘Oputa Panel Submits Report, Recommends Compensation’ This Day (Lagos Nigeria 
Wednesday 22 May 2002). 
36
 See Section 4.4 infra. 
37
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were held in public between 24 October 2000 and 9 November 200139 (its work 
lasted three years, three weeks and 6 days in total).40 There was considerable 
national coverage of the public hearings of the Oputa Panel by the media. The 
most popular public and private television stations in the country provided daily 
coverage of the public hearings shortly after they began. The public hearings 
acquired the status of a popular national ‘soap,’ generating intense public interest. 
Nigerians were ‘glued to their television sets five nights a week, stunned by their 
country’s sordid past dragged before the commission.’41 Suffice to say that the 
press coverage was acknowledged and strongly commended by the Chairman as a 
major contributor to the ‘success’ of the Panel.42  
   Although the findings of the Oputa Panel on the petitions it heard were 
contained in its final report, it also made some preliminary findings at its public 
hearings. These were usually in cases where it demanded further investigations 
into violations of human rights bordering on criminal culpability of security 
agencies. Remarkably however, not in one instance did the Oputa Panel engage 
with accountability of the judiciary in this way. 
   President Olusegun Obasanjo appeared twice before the Oputa Panel. His first 
appearance was as a victim. The second was on the summons of the Oputa Panel. 
He was required to respond to allegations of human rights violations during his 
tenure as military Head of State. His obvious discomfiture on the latter occasion 
not withstanding, it gave impetus to the proceedings of the Oputa Panel.  
   Victims of rights violations included the first executive president of the country, 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari. He ruled the country between October 1979 and December 
1983.43 It is noteworthy that he was not summoned to appear before the Oputa 
Panel as no petition was filed against him.44 The visibility of the Oputa Panel 
grew with petitions and testimonies of leading lawyers, former political officer 
holders (who fell into the bad books of the military), and civil society leaders. 
Others who came before the Oputa Panel included human rights advocates, 
leaders of workers unions and students, all of whom were active in the movement 
against military rule. Many had one experience of gross human rights violations to 
share.  
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   According to the Oputa Panel, the causes of the human rights violations were 
neither ‘simple’ nor ‘straightforward.’45 The violations were allegedly perpetrated 
by the army, the security agencies and the police.46 There were some instances of 
corporate or individual violations of rights too. In some cases, unpopular 
economic policies precipitated the deprivation of the right to life. This was 
manifested in the shooting and killing of demonstrators at public protests, a 
common incidence in the 1990s, when military rule was at its most atrocious in 
the country. By the time it left office, the military establishment had instituted a 
‘vicious cycle’ of violence exhibited in domestic violence, armed robbery, 
brigandage, religious riots, impunity and lawlessness in the polity.   
4.2   Public Hearings: Special and Institutional 
   Paragraphs b and c of the terms of reference of the Oputa Panel provided ample 
basis for institutional hearings along with public hearings that centred on 
individual complaints. Thus, there were also ‘special’ hearings organised for civil 
society, human rights groups and specialised professional organisations.47 The 
special and institutional public hearings featured submissions from the National 
Human Rights Commission, the Armed Forces, the Police, State Security Service, 
the Nigeria Prisons, about ten civil society and human rights organisations and a 
few individuals.48  
   The choice of state institutions, with the notable exception of the National 
Human Rights Commission, may have been informed by the popular view that 
they constitute notorious sources of human rights violations. The National Human 
Rights Commission for its part was set up precisely to monitor human rights 
implementation in various aspects of national life, ironically by the Abacha junta 
noted for its record of gross human rights violations. In view of their close 
connection with the judiciary, particularly, the criminal justice system, it is 
instructive to examine the special hearings on the prisons and the police.   
4.2.1   The Prisons 
 The Oputa Panel’s special hearings on the Nigerian Prisons were based on 
submissions made by the Prisons Service and non-governmental organisations. 
The major sources and nature of human rights violations in Nigerian Prisons are 
succinctly articulated in the submission of the Nigerian Prison Service to the 
Oputa Panel  
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               …under the conditions of chronic prison congestion, perennial neglect  
               of the services and delay in justice delivery, certain basic rights of  
               prisoners are violated. The right to life and integrity of the person, to  
               health and respect for human dignity are largely un-guaranteed.49 
     
The Nigeria Prisons Service, like many other civil institutions of the Nigerian 
society, suffered serious neglect during the period of military rule. New prisons 
were not built for decades. Yet, as mentioned earlier, there was a phenomenal 
increase in the number of inmates, especially suspects awaiting trial. Prison 
authorities lacked medical facilities and were required to seek leave of the military 
authorities before obtaining medical attention for inmates. On many occasions, 
inmates died before such clearances were obtained.50 
   Illegal detention was the order of the day. Suspects awaiting trial not only out-
numbered convicts, but many had to wait for over ten years for trial.51 Detained 
persons lacked practically every basic necessity required for day-to-day living.52 
In addition, juveniles were lumped with adult detainees and suffered similar 
deprivations.53 The special needs of female detainees were not met. Their 
reproductive rights were violated in addition to the violations suffered by their 
male counterparts. Some female inmates had babies in custody. Some were 
sexually assaulted.54 
4.2.2    The Police 
   In similar vein, the special public hearings on violations of human rights by the 
Police formed an important aspect of the Panel’s work. The Oputa Panel found 
that there is an historical perspective to human rights violations by the Nigerian 
Police.  The Nigeria Police Force was a creation of colonial hegemony. It was 
designed as an agent of repression and coercion. The research report on the Police 
found that in furtherance of the colonial divide and rule system, the recruitment 
policy was to employ individuals to police ethnic groups whose language the 
policemen did not understand and who were in fact historically hostile to the 
latter’s places of origin.  
   The inherited recruitment strategy effectively secured the loyalty of the Police 
as an occupational force, rather than one for social service. At independence, the 
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national government found it expedient to maintain the status quo.55 This 
impacted negatively on police-public relations. The Police had continued to act as 
an imperial force. A careful audit of the petitions on violations of human rights by 
the Police, notably on extra-judicial killings, revealed that most policemen alleged 
to have been involved, were indeed from ethnic groups different from those of 
victims.  
   Further, the incorporation of some police officers by the early military 
administrations into governance, as a matter of political expedience, also played a 
notable role in police violations of human rights. However, the relationship 
between the military and the Police went awry, with the latter becoming the 
under-dogs. The Police as an institution was neglected by successive military 
regimes just as its officers were no longer included in the distribution of plum 
political positions. The Police was starved of funds, training, promotions and 
development. In frustration, the Police took vengeance against the civil 
populace.56  
   Violations of rights by the Police included illegal arrests, detention without 
trial,57 and various forms of torture in the course of investigations to elicit 
‘confessions.’58 Extra-judicial killings of suspects in custody, hapless motorists, 
passengers and pedestrians on the roads, were also common.59 In the course of the 
public hearings, the Oputa Panel found the Police were in the habit of killing 
people unlawfully and in the bid to cover up, they usually alleged such victims 
were armed robbers.60 The Oputa Panel identified several structural factors that 
predisposed the Nigerian Police to gross violations of human rights.61 Notable 
among them were laws which precluded judicial review of executive action, 
corruption, low qualification requirements for enrolment and deficient training. 
4.2.3   Mind the Gap: Whither Accountability of the Judiciary? 
  As stated earlier, the absence of accountability of the judiciary for the past was a 
marked feature of the truth-seeking process in Nigeria. Despite the close working 
relationship between the institutions which were subjects of the special hearings 
of the Oputa Panel, it did not advert to the need for including the judiciary in 
those hearings. It is important to note in this regard that there were obvious 
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references to the judicial role by the respective institutions involved in the special 
hearings.  
   It was impossible for example to discuss the work of the prisons and the police 
without reference to the role of the judiciary in the criminal justice system. In fact, 
as stated above with reference to the Prisons, the hearings revealed that delays in 
the criminal trial process were implicated in the congestion of the prisons. 
Awaiting-Trial inmates (in their tens of thousands), far out-numbered convicts 
and were all remanded on the orders of judges and magistrates. This was largely 
responsible for prison congestion and in turn, the deplorable state of custodial 
facilities. It was also a notorious and acknowledged fact that criminal and civil 
trials (and appeals) went on in many cases for years and sometimes decades, a fact 
that was readily acknowledged by the judiciary and to which reference will be 
made later in this research.62  
   Apart from the foregoing, there are the more fundamental matters of judicial 
acquiescence to and legitimation of military usurpation of power, constitutional 
distortions, gross misgovernance and violation of human rights also discussed 
later in this research.63 Thus, it was logical to expect that the truth-seeking 
process, on what went wrong in the polity, could only be regarded as complete 
and objective if it focused on the judiciary as an important institution of 
governance during the authoritarian period under review.  
   However, the Oputa Panel scarcely made reference to the role of the courts in 
the violations of human rights in the country. It failed to engage with the judicial 
function in governance during the decades of authoritarian military rule. As will 
be argued later, the judiciary wielded considerable and continues to exercise 
immense powers in governance as the third arm of government. The lack of 
reference to, or engagement with the judicial institution in the period of 
authoritarian rule in Nigeria created a glaring accountability gap with regards to 
that key institution of state. It is a neglect which has become (with few 
exceptions), a recurring feature of transitional justice processes. In the Nigerian 
context, the failure of the Oputa Panel in this regard, in virtually karmic style, has 
continued to haunt the Oputa Panel itself.  
   Specifically, it is a major factor that has ensured the report of the Oputa Panel 
remains suspended in an undesirable and undeserved limbo. How this has worked 
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out will be discussed briefly below64 and in further detail in the course of this 
research.65 Beyond the later uncomfortable interaction between the truth-seeking 
process and the judiciary, it will be argued that the deficit in accountability of the 
judiciary has continued to haunt the judicial function and its attempts at self-
redemption in particular, and the post-authoritarian governance and 
democratisation in general.66 
4.3.   The Three ‘Rs’: Reparation, Restitution and Reconciliation 
   Justice Oputa made the important observation that while establishing the Oputa 
Panel the government appeared to have been more interested in finding out the 
truth and facilitating reconciliation. At least, President Obasanjo emphasised 
reconciliation in his speech at the inauguration of the Oputa Panel. A close 
reading of the Oputa Panel’s mandate clearly envisaged it would focus on 
discovering the truth and it can be imputed that the remit did not rule out 
reconciliation measures too. The Oputa Panel however noted that the demands by 
almost all the victims at the public hearings made it imperative that the 
government  should allocate some resources to the three ‘Rs,’ Reparation, 
Restitution and Reconciliation.67  
   In the Panel’s opinion, it was not possible to achieve national reconciliation in 
the complete absence of some measure of reparation. It found that in the aftermath 
of widespread gross violations of human rights, victims usually demand 
reparations to assist them to get on with their lives.68 A ‘modest payment’ at least, 
represents a form of ‘acknowledgement’ and ‘official apology’.69 While 
acknowledging the difficulties associated with achieving reconciliation at the 
individual level, the Panel outlined at least ten steps that are relevant to the 
process: 
               i. Revealing the truth 
               ii. Acknowledging the harm done 
               iii. Showing remorse for the pain suffered by the victim                
               iv. Apologising for the wrongs done 
               v. Holding perpetrators accountable 
               vi. Healing the injuries caused 
               vii. Rehabilitating those with disabilities 
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               vii. Restitution and rehabilitation for wrongs that can not be replaced 
               ix. Forgiveness and closure by victims 
               x. Preventing future occurrences through establishing institutional 
reforms.70 
   According to the Oputa Panel, the relationship between reparation and 
reconciliation is so important that the latter can not be achieved without the 
former.71 Beyond this utilitarian function of reparations, the dictates of justice for 
victims require it.72 The Oputa Panel noted that reparation is ‘part of what needs 
to be done to earn justice.’73 It may involve restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances. Another 
dimension to it is what the panel termed ‘Non-Monetary Reparation’ which is 
essentially ‘satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition.’74 
   The Panel examined the law and practice of the right to reparations in several 
countries.75 In affirming the need for reparations, the Panel cited the fact that it is 
a right recognised and imposed on the state for victims of gross human rights 
violations under international law. Nigeria had acceded to various international 
treaties which provide for the right to reparations and is bound to fulfil its 
contractual obligations under them.76 The Panel considered the nature and scope 
of the duty.77 It also noted that Nigerian municipal law (especially torts) and the 
constitution similarly provide for the prevention, abatement of, and damages for 
rights violations.78  
   The Oputa Panel presented a ‘policy framework’ for Nigeria’s reparation 
programme. For the Panel, the wishes of victims ought to be a guide on the form 
reparations should take. However, while many petitioners stated the relief they 
sought, a significant number did not.79 The Panel further considered whether 
violators of human rights should be made to pay reparations to victims of gross 
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violations of human rights.80 It however, only recommended that the government 
should compensate victims.  
   The work of the Oputa Panel saw it traverse the length and breadth of the 
country to investigate gross violations. Its activities centred on establishing the 
truth about the people’s lives under the military jackboot. During its public 
hearings, the Oputa Panel actually accepted invitations to mediate in on-going 
conflicts in the country, achieving some remarkable success in the endeavour. The 
reconciliation brought by the Oputa Panel to the hitherto intractable, almost 
century old, internecine dispute between the people of Ife and Modakeke 
communities in the South-West of the country stands out in this regard. The 
‘Ogoni Peace Accord’ between the two factions in Ogoniland which was widely 
reported and commended as a ‘landmark achievement,’ was another good 
example of this aspect of the Oputa Panel’s work.81  
   As stated above, the Oputa Panel was greatly assisted by the work of 
commissioned experts in its bid to obtain a fuller picture of the extent of human 
rights violations in the country. The reports of the research offer a composite 
picture of the spread and nature of human rights abuses in relation to specific 
geographical areas of the country. Their relatively wider reach than the public 
hearings of the Oputa Panel offered more comprehensive insights into the extent 
of gross violations of human rights during the authoritarian period in Nigeria. It is 
thus germane to consider this aspect of the truth-seeking process for the way it 
strengthens the case for accountability of the judiciary for past governance in 
Nigeria’s transition experience. 
4.4   The Research Reports: Giving Voice to the Voiceless 
  For purposes of the research, the country was divided into geo-political zones. 
The six zones, North-East, North-Central, North-West, South-East, South- South 
and South-West (each comprising six states), have since acquired semi-official 
recognition in the Nigerian polity.  
4.4.1   The North-East and North-West 
   The research report on the North-West and the North-East showed that the 
nature and pattern of gross human rights violations in the two zones were 
similar.82 There were common incidence of compulsory acquisition of land from 
individuals and communities by the state and ‘powerful’ individuals, without 
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consultation or compensation. Unlawful arrests, detentions and extra-judicial 
killings by the Police and other security agencies of the state constituted the 
predominant features of rights violations in the two zones.     
   Arbitrary dismissal and retirement of workers by government without 
appropriate compensation, discrimination against ‘non-indigenes’ and extortion of 
peasant farmers by traditional rulers were also frequent.83 The Oputa Panel 
emphasised the need to thoroughly investigate the cases to establish ‘who played 
what role’ and the need to either restore illegally acquired land or ensure payment 
of adequate compensation.84  
4.4.2. The South-South 
   The South-South zone covers the states of the Niger Delta. As noted above, the 
zone produces the oil that constitutes about 90% of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings. But it lacked basic infrastructure like electricity, health care 
facilities, potable water, roads and unemployment was high. As noted by the 
Oputa Panel, ‘it is this paradox and apparent tragedy that forms the political 
economy of human rights violations in the area.’85 The nature of gross violations 
of rights in the area varied from the right to life, social rights, cultural rights, to 
environmental rights. But most human rights violations in the Niger Delta 
involved communities.86 A classic example is the environmental degradation of 
Ogoniland and violation of group rights in the oil producing community. The 
situation in Ogoniland attracted international attention and was subject of The 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria87 a communication to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. The applicants alleged that the oil exploration activities of Shell have 
caused environmental degradation and health problems resulting from the 
contamination of the environment among the Ogoni People.88 
   The research also identified multinational oil corporations as one of the major 
culprits for the deplorable state of affairs in the Niger Delta. This is especially 
with regard to ecological devastation and degradation occasioned by their neglect 
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of international standards in oil exploration activities.89 Deep-seated feelings of 
alienation and neglect led to the emergence of ethnic and minority groups 
agitating for the rights of the peoples of the area. The response of the Nigerian 
military-dominated political scene was to unleash repression on the leaders and 
members of such groups.  
   The Oputa Panel concluded that the extent of the crisis and human rights 
violations in the Niger Delta was so profound that it ‘touches on the moral 
conscience of the Nigerian state.’90 Despite the damning situation, researchers 
confronted apathy from some respondents. There was the preference in some 
quarters to forget the past. The Oputa Panel’s researchers also confronted the 
challenge of bureaucratic responses from government agencies and officials and 
inadequate information in respect of rights violations during the Nigerian civil 
war.91  
4.4.3   The North-Central  
   The research conducted on human rights violations in the North-Central zone 
revealed that contestations over traditional institutions and practices, land, 
resources, systemic deprivation and discrimination, feelings of marginalisation 
(indigene, non-indigene dichotomy) and neglect were the major sources of human 
rights violations. So were the excesses of law enforcement agents and partisanship 
on the part of public office holders in the discharge of their duties.92  
   It emerged that strong attachments to traditional institutions and practices were 
at the root of violent riots and conflict across religious and ethnic divides. There 
were also numerous cases of discrimination against women, deprivation of child 
rights, ethnic and tribal minorities as well as other vulnerable groups in various 
communities in the zone. The researchers also found that due to the dearth of civil 
society and pro-democracy groups in the zone (agitating for human rights) in 
comparison with others, there were few cases of state sponsored extra-judicial 
killings.  
   However, the zone had its ‘fair share’ of ‘state terrorism’ in the number of 
military officers and civilians executed for alleged coup plots.93 Uniquely, one of 
the states in the zone, Kogi, submitted a memorandum to the Panel alleging 
deliberate neglect and marginalisation by the federal authorities. It demanded a 
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ten-year ‘federal equalization development plan’ to redress the situation.94 There 
were many instances of overzealousness and abuse of office by public-office 
holders in the zone too. A curious instance was the state-ordered arrest of 27 
school children for jubilation at the reported death of the country’s most notorious 
ruler.95  
4.4.4    The South-West 
   In the South-West, the research reviewed 568 cases of human rights violations. 
The research report on the zone relied substantially on data garnered from 
secondary sources. These included media reports, annual reports of official bodies 
and non-governmental organisations. It also benefited from informal sessions with 
some human rights organisations.  
   Violations of the right to life and respect for human dignity, freedom of 
expression, social and economic rights all featured prominently in the report. 
Extra-judicial killings and alleged state-sponsored, politically motivated 
assassinations were markedly common in the zone from 1984 to1999, the second 
spell of military rule in the country. Extra-judicial killings were allegedly 
perpetrated largely by the police and other security agencies in the course of 
official engagements or otherwise. Politically motivated murder was directed at 
various leading political figures.96 Virtually all such cases remain unresolved to 
date. In some cases perpetrators have not been identified. In others, they have not 
been prosecuted, despite identification. In yet others, the prosecutions have been 
stalled. Notable in this last category is the trial of some very high-ranking military 
officers for murder and attempted murder of some leading political figures in the 
zone.97 
   Cases of unlawful arrest and detention as well as inhuman treatment, brutality, 
torture (sometimes resulting in death) and extortion were also recorded. In the 
zone, renowned for its vibrant media, freedom of expression came under severe 
attack during the long years of military rule. The violations in this regard ranged 
from arrests and detention of journalists, arraignment for serious but unfounded 
offences, arson attacks on media houses, to proscription of publications.  
                                                 
94
 Ibid. at 94-95 
95
 Ibid. at 104 
96
  Oputa Panel Report note 51 supra Chapter 5, 124-126. 
97
 The State v. Lt.General Ishaya Baimayi& 4Ors (Un reported Suit No. ID78/C/99), Criminal 
Division High Court of Lagos State. The accused on trial are a former chief of army staff, an ex-
state military administrator, a retired state commissioner of police, chief security officer to General 
Abacha and the head of the late dictator’s mobile police team. In a separate trial following 
severance of the charge, the former Chief of Army Staff was recently acquitted. K Ketefe “Court 
Sets Bamaiyi Free after Nine Years in Detention” The Punch on the Web (Lagos Friday 4 April 
2008). 
 39 
   Periods of military organised political transition programmes were particularly 
traumatic in the zone. A crisis was engendered by the death of Chief MKO Abiola 
in custody in 1998 following the annulment of the presidential election he had 
won.98 
   On the economic and social fronts, workers were victimised for their 
membership of workers’ unions and some were illegally dismissed. Also, the 
introduction of high school fees, violations of academic freedom, deterioration in 
educational facilities, forceful evictions as well as demolition of homes and 
shelter of the poor without alternative accommodation or compensation, all made 
the list of violations of human rights in the zone. As in some other parts of the 
country, many cases of rights violations were not reported for fear of reprisals. 
This was also due to ignorance, poverty, or sheer apathy.  
4.4.5   The South-East 
   The report on the relatively homogenous South-East zone cited the Nigerian 
civil war as the major ‘backdrop’ for analyzing human rights violations in the 
country in general and the zone in particular. The Oputa Panel noted that the 
research report on the zone relied mainly on secondary sources (books and panel 
of enquiry reports), a fact that raised some concerns on its objectivity.99 
   The principal complaints on gross violations of rights in the South-East zone 
were essentially of a group nature. They were either in connection with the 
conduct of the civil war, to which the zone was theatre, or the aftermath. A 
common complaint was that of marginalisation. It was alleged that the federal 
government actively pursued a programme of exclusion and marginalisation of the 
zone, in virtually every aspect of national life and socio-economic development.  
   At the individual level, violations of the right to life and fair hearing were 
reportedly the most common. On this score, the complaints followed the pattern in 
the other five zones of the country, principally the South-West. Thus, the report 
cited a number of cases of extra-judicial killings, unlawful arrests and detentions, 
extortion and labour related violations.100 
   It is important to note that the report of the research experts that worked for the 
Oputa Panel as incorporated into its recommendations, as well as those arising 
from the public hearings, have however, hardly been subject of positive 
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government action. This is connected with the Dele Giwa petition which led to 
litigation that seriously challenged the work of the truth commission in Nigeria. 
 
5. THE DELE GIWA PETITION: TRUTH-SEEKING AND THE JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA’S 
TRANSITION 
   It is relevant to comment briefly on the petition on the murder of Dele Giwa at 
this point. An analysis of the litigation it generated constitutes a case study of a 
tension that exists between truth-seeking processes, the judiciary, and judicial 
accountability for the past in transitions. These are issues at the core of our 
research and will be more fully examined later.101 However, it is germane to 
examine the public hearing of the petition at the Oputa Panel in as much as it 
relates to laying out the context of the research. Of all the petitions heard at the 
public hearings, the Dele Giwa murder-petition was the most controversial. Dele 
Giwa was a prominent and fearless journalist, editor and publisher of Newswatch, 
a leading newsmagazine in Lagos. He was allegedly murdered by military 
intelligence through a letter-bomb on the orders of the General Ibrahim Babangida 
then Head of state, on 19 October, 1986. Efforts by his solicitor, Gani Fawehinmi, 
to investigate and prosecute those responsible were frustrated by the military.102 
   The struggle to establish the truth about the murder shifted to the Oputa Panel 
following the inauguration of the Oputa Panel. Fawehinmi submitted a petition 
against General Babangida and his two security chiefs in which he made a case 
for the matter to be reopened. The Oputa Panel issued summons for the 
appearance of the ex-Military ruler and his two security chiefs accused of 
complicity in the matter. None obeyed. Rather, the trio went to the High Court 
with an ex parte application to restrain the Oputa Panel from summoning them.  
   This led to the case, Gani Fawehinmi, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and 
Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission v General Ibrahim 
Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun (the Oputa Panel 
Case).103 The generals sought, among other things, a declaration that the President 
lacked the powers to act under the existing law to establish a body like the Oputa 
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Panel for the whole country. They also asked the court to stop the Oputa Panel 
from exercising the power to summon them. They claimed it contravened their 
right to liberty. 
   Meanwhile, a legal team applied to represent the generals at the Oputa Panel’s 
public hearing. That did not go down well with the Oputa Panel. Fawehinmi and 
other counsel also opposed their appearance. The contentious issue was whether 
the Oputa Panel, acting under Section 5 of the TIA, had the power to issue and 
serve summonses on three ex-military rulers. Could a summoned witness who 
failed to appear give evidence by proxy, namely through legal counsel? Whether 
having disobeyed the summons to appear in person, could they be allowed to 
cross examine witnesses of the Oputa Panel? The foregoing questions tasked the 
Oputa Panel. The TIA did not provide for proxy representation of witnesses.  
   If the settled position of the law (at least in common law jurisdictions) on 
witnesses in civil and criminal litigation can be extrapolated, legal counsel can not 
take the place of witnesses. In other words, testimony is a personal issue that can 
not be delegated and stands apart from the right to legal representation. This 
position is consistent with practice elsewhere. For example Legal Notice No.5 of 
1986 in Uganda which created the country’s second Truth Commission provides 
that ‘…any person desiring to give evidence to the Commission shall do so in 
person’.104 Not only would it have undermined the rule of law to hold otherwise, 
it arguably would have amounted to a fundamental contradiction in terms in a 
truth telling process for alleged perpetrators of rights violations to testify by 
proxy. 
   In addressing the matter, the Panel framed a single issue to be addressed: 
whether proceedings before a truth commission constituted a suit at law or a 
judicial proceeding? The Oputa Panel decided that personal attendance of the 
summoned generals was required for the proper fulfilment of the Oputa Panel’s 
mandate.  Specifically, the Panel in its ‘ruling’ insisted that witnesses were bound 
to attend in person in order to be entitled to the rights of legal representation, and 
(cross) examination.  
   Although many petitioners or witnesses were represented by counsel, they were 
in attendance to be examined themselves. Justice Oputa emphasised that military 
officers were not above the law. The Oputa Panel also took the position that a 
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proceeding before a commission of its nature did not constitute adversarial 
proceedings. For failing to appear, the Oputa Panel recommended that the 
generals be deemed to have forfeited their right to govern the country in future.105 
The strong determination of the generals not to appear before the Oputa Panel 
introduced a twist to the truth-seeking process in Nigeria from which it never 
recovered.  
   Contestations around the legality of the Oputa Panel in various suits and appeals 
on them, instigated by the generals in their attempt at self preservation, introduced 
another dimension to the operation of Truth Commissions in transitional societies. 
They brought to the fore the tensions that may arise between the truth-seeking 
process and the judiciary in transition. They also offer valuable insights on some 
of the consequences of the accountability gap for the conduct of its role in the past 
on the part of the transitional judiciary. The Supreme Court decision in the matter, 
delivered well after the submission of the Panel’s Report, forms the bedrock of 
government’s decision not to implement the recommendations of the Oputa Panel.  
   The Supreme Court held that the President lacked the powers to set up a body 
like the Oputa Panel with a remit that extended to the whole country to enquire 
into human rights violations. Further, it held that the powers of the Panel to 
summon the Plaintiffs were a violation of their right to liberty. As will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this study, the decision of the Supreme Court 
placed premium on the rights of the generals to liberty. This was to the detriment 
of and disregard for the wider rights of victims of gross human rights violations to 
truth and acknowledgement of their suffering under the country’s laws and its 
treaty obligations under international law referred to earlier.   
 
6.    PERCEPTIONS: THE OPUTA PANEL AND THE PUBLIC 
   The Nigerian public seemed to have viewed the Oputa Panel as more of a 
juridical forum, than an unencumbered avenue for investigating the past. This is 
reflected in the fact that so many petitioners, respondents and witnesses, were 
represented by legal practitioners at the public hearings. The ‘crème de la crème’ 
of the Nigerian legal profession attended the proceedings on behalf of clients.  
   Thirty three Senior Advocates of Nigeria are on record to have represented 
petitioners and witnesses at the public hearings. The list included the foremost 
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legal practitioner in the country at the time, Chief Frederick Rotimi Williams. 
Over four hundred lawyers also appeared before the Panel. Although a few 
attended on summons of the Panel (some law officers) most appeared on behalf of 
clients. 106 Even those who took serious exception to participating in the public 
hearings (sections of the elite who felt threatened by the truth) ensured appearance 
by legal proxy. Prominent in that category were three former military Heads of 
State and some key military security functionaries.107 This juridicalisation of the 
truth-seeking process in Nigeria may not be unconnected with the composition of 
the Panel itself. Not only was it headed by one of the most brilliant and well 
respected jurists in the country, almost half of its membership were legal 
practitioners. One of these was a reputable Senior Advocate of Nigeria. 
   But an overt juridicalisation in appointment to the membership of a truth-
seeking process fosters a sense of adversarial contestation. This does little to 
advance the core function of the truth-seeking process, a search for the truth. If 
anything, it may detract from it. In recognition of the heavy presence of legal 
practitioners at the public hearings, lead counsel to one of the former military 
rulers (General Ibrahim Babangida, who defied the summons of the Panel thrice 
over), observed that ‘the atmosphere at the panel was too adversarial.’108 This is 
despite the fact that he did himself appear with a battery of lawyers and made a 
case to cross examine witnesses, while not presenting his client for similar 
purpose. Notwithstanding the juridicalisation of the Oputa Panel, it made far 
reaching recommendations for achieving justice for victims of gross human rights 
violations, reconstructing the society and restoring the rule of law in Nigeria.    
 
7.    RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OPUTA PANEL 
   The general tenor of the Oputa Panel’s recommendation was for institutional 
transformation. This was with particular reference to the Prisons, Police, the 
security agencies and the Armed Forces. Law enforcement and state security 
services should be given a re-orientation to recognise and accord citizens their 
human rights as a matter of course. It called for the introduction of human rights 
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awareness training for the Police and other security agencies. To combat the 
appalling human rights record of the Nigerian Police, the Oputa Panel 
recommended structural reforms in the nation as a whole. As part of the initiative 
towards institutional transformation, it called on the National Assembly to repeal 
all obnoxious legislation in the country and facilitate law reform.  It advocated 
institutional reform of the Police and legislative initiative to ‘promote police 
effectiveness, civility and accountability, and reduce police violation of human 
rights.’109  
   Disturbed by the spate of deaths in custody, the Oputa Panel recommended the 
establishment of an autonomous inquest system to investigate deaths in custody. 
This is presently still missing in the prison system. It proposed the establishment 
or designation of separate detention facilities for persons waiting trial and a 
powerful autonomous monitoring agency to oversight all custodial centres. The 
Panel called for a viable prison decongestion programme and provision of 
adequate medical facilities in the prisons. It concluded that the reformation of the 
criminal justice system as a whole was the only way to secure the rights of 
detainees.110      
   It suggested lustration and disbarment from public office, of those found 
culpable of gross violations of human rights.111 The state should take steps to 
compensate victims of rights violations, and investigation and prosecution of 
culpable officials should be undertaken where appropriate. Apart from financial 
and material reparations, it also recommended that government carries out 
symbolic reparations for victims. These could take the form of public holidays 
and establishment of monuments in recognition of the violations they suffered.  
   The Panel specifically recommended demilitarization of the South-South zone, 
compensation for victims of rights abuses including families of victims of the civil 
war and review of the regulatory framework for the oil industry. This was in 
addition to its advocacy for a ‘locally driven’ comprehensive plan to develop the 
zone.112 
   One of the general recommendations of the Oputa Panel was the need to 
integrate human rights education into the academic curricula at all levels of 
education in the country. It called for the promotion of human rights studies to 
promote inter-ethnic harmony. The Oputa Panel also recommended measures to 
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address the imbalance in Igbo representation at all levels of national life. This was 
necessary to assuage feelings of discrimination and marginalisation of the zone. 
    The Oputa Panel further recommended a re-conceptualisation of what 
constitutes human rights violations in the country. In apparent reference to 
political and civil rights, it criticised what it viewed as an over-emphasis on 
‘elitist- driven’ notions of rights like freedom of speech, association and so on, on 
the part of rights advocates and activists.113 It called on human rights activists to 
devote reasonable attention to the advocacy and defence of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The call was important considering that social, economic and 
cultural rights unlike civil and political rights are still non-justiciable in Nigeria.   
It is relevant to note at this point that apart from the Oputa Panel Case, the truth-
seeking process in Nigeria, like others, did not go without its fair share of 
challenges and problems. It would have been unusual otherwise, given its terms of 
reference on the one hand, and on the other, the tendency for virtually every 
human endeavour to be subject to challenge.  
 
8.    CHALLENGES TO TRUTH 
   The task of truth commissions involves an interrogation of the past and making 
value judgments. This expectedly attracts challenges of various types. In the case 
of the Oputa Panel however, there were some avoidable problems thrown in its 
way from its inception. This part will examine the challenges faced by the Truth 
Commission in Nigeria other than the litigation on its legality and powers which 
will be considered later. 
 8.1. Composition of the Panel 
   As stated earlier, the seven-member panel was headed by Chukwudifu Oputa, a 
retired and respected Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. That from the onset 
gave the panel much credibility amongst a highly sceptical populace as to the true 
intentions of the new government. However, the composition of the panel was 
strongly challenged for been unrepresentative of the heterogeneous nature of the 
country. Some segments of the country, specifically the Muslims (North and 
South) felt alienated by the constitution of the membership. Although Rev. 
Matthew Kukah, a Catholic priest, is a minority Christian from the North, he was 
viewed as a vociferous, anti-establishment, anti-Muslim socio-political 
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commentator and opinion leader. Oputa himself is a Catholic from the South East 
and four of the other five members were Christians. The secretary, though not 
regarded as a member, was a Christian. Only one member was confirmed to be a 
Muslim.   In a country where more than half the population is Muslim, and where 
religion is a sensitive and divisive issue, that was problematic. Moreover, 
considering the size of the country, the scope of the mandate and the 
heterogeneous nature of its population, a seven-member panel was rather 
restrictive. It was not sufficient to effectively cover the shades of interests in the 
country.  
It is important to note that the Oputa Panel, following pre-commencement 
deliberations with civil society groups, specifically requested an increase in the 
number of its Commissioners but this was not implemented.114 Voicing the 
feelings of the northern Muslim elite, Mohammed Haruna, a seasoned journalist, 
media and public affairs commentator, faulted the lopsided composition of the 
Oputa Panel. He dismissed the Oputa Panel as a witch-hunt. The Panel’s 
‘unrepresentative composition,’ Haruna argued, was responsible for its 
highlighting the complaint of some petitioners while neglecting others.115 The 
Nigerian government did not pay any serious heed to the concerns expressed 
about the composition of the Oputa Panel.  
8.2   Timing, Commencement and Resource Constraints 
   The Oputa Panel was established by President Olusegun Obasanjo in June 1999 
barely two weeks after he had assumed office. This was similar to the Truth 
Commission in Argentina set up by President Raul Alfonsin a few days after he 
assumed office in December 1982.116 At the time, President Obasanjo was highly 
commended by one of his otherwise ardent critics, humanist, playwright and 
Nobel Laureate, Prof. Wole Soyinka who enthused 
   Obasanjo has got this one right. Its timing is laudable – human rights 
               commission, truth tribunal or whatever it is as we have repeatedly  
               stressed, is the priority of priorities after the experience under recent  
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               dictatorships.117 
  
  With the benefit of hindsight, such optimism now seems misplaced and this 
early promise by the Nigerian government to facilitate justice and reconciliation 
through a truth commission now appears suspect. By comparative standards the 
Nigerian truth commission was a modest undertaking, yet the Oputa Panel was 
poorly funded. As such, it took over a year before the Oputa Panel began sitting, 
and at one point it was forced to practically suspend its work because of financial 
difficulties. 118 In fact, it was only able to commence work with a take-off grant of 
$400, 000 by the Ford Foundation as the Federal Government failed to make any 
budgetary allocation for it in its first year of operation.119 
   Haruna contends that there was deliberate financial strangulation in order to 
ensure the Panel became a political weapon in the hands of the President against 
potential contenders for the presidency in the 2003 elections. 120 Whether the 
under-funding of the Oputa Panel occurred with deliberate political motives in 
mind is impossible to establish, however, largely as a result of this lack of funds 
the Oputa Panel was unable to submit its report until May 2002; barely ten months 
before the 2003 elections. There may therefore be some substance in Haruna’s 
charge that ‘Obasanjo created [the] Oputa [Panel] essentially for politics and 
vengeance.’ 121 The submission of the Panel’s report was effected only ten months 
to the 2003 general elections for which the incumbent had signified his intention 
to re-contest.  At least two notable ex-military rulers had also openly declared 
their interest in the presidency. These were Generals Buhari and Babangida who 
had openly contested attempts to have them testify before the Oputa Panel.  
      Subsequent events in the Nigerian polity seem to support the view that the 
truth-seeking process was set up essentially as a talk-shop. The Oputa Panel for its 
part did a commendable and largely well received job. While it is important to 
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note that the work of the Panel assisted the bid to legitimise the post-authoritarian 
civilian administration, any other successes recorded by the process would appear 
to have been overshadowed by the failure of the Obasanjo administration to 
implement its recommendations.  
8.3 Doubtful Legal Basis  
   Unwillingness to cooperate with the Oputa Panel by alleged violators ought to 
have been anticipated. It has been recognised in any case that prosecuting the 
military for past human rights violations is fraught with serious difficulties. The 
associates of the slain journalist, the press and the Nigerian public in general, have 
insisted on the implementation of the recommendation that the truth on the 
circumstances of Dele Giwa’s death be established, and those involved in the 
murder brought to justice. Their position has remained fortified by the fact that 
over two decades after the dastardly act, the witnesses and suspects are all 
alive.122  
   Truth Commissions have, as in this case, been known to recommend the 
prosecution of former military leaders for human rights violations. Such 
recommendations resulted in the prosecution of erstwhile military officers of 
juntas in Latin America. This reality has obviously remained stark in the minds of 
General Babangida, other ex-military leaders in Nigeria and their cohorts hence 
the resistance to an already shaky attempt to call them to account.  
   On this issue of shaky legal foundations of the truth-seeking process, it is 
significant that Justice Oputa made a demand following the inauguration of the 
Oputa Panel for a tailor-made legislation for the HRIVC. His call went unheeded. 
It is not clear why he back-tracked on the issue and proceeded on what turned out 
to be a shaky foundation for such a crucial engagement. The work of the Oputa 
Panel was affected by the fact that it was not established pursuant to a tailor-made 
law by the post-authoritarian parliament. Rather, it was established under existing 
legislation designed essentially for specialised inquiries and which stopped short 
of the more extensive remit of Truth Commissions. This was probably a trap. The 
lesson to be learnt is not to proceed with the delicate process of truth-seeking 
without specific ‘made-to-fit’ legislation. Such legislation is required to clearly 
spell out the powers and limits of the process.  
  8.4   Feeble International Support 
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   The Oputa Panel did not generate much international interest. While there may 
have been some international attention in the initial stages of the Oputa Panel, this 
did not translate into positive advantage for the Panel’s work and was certainly 
not sustained during its most crucial stages. For example, the non-implementation 
of the final report and recommendations, including reparations for victims, has 
hardly attracted international censure. Likewise, the Oputa Panel received neither 
the attention nor support of the official organs of the United Nations, unlike 
previous domestic truth-seeking initiatives elsewhere. The exception to this 
international ‘blackout’ was the financial lifeline extended by the Ford 
Foundation, which provided the Oputa Panel with a start-up grant when funding 
from the government was not forthcoming. 
   Although now a matter for conjecture, it is quite plausible that international 
attention, monitoring and support for the truth-seeking process in Nigeria may 
well have changed the course of its work. If the international spotlight had been 
focused on the work of the Oputa Panel and its constraints, all arms of 
government, particularly the executive and judiciary, would likely have been more 
proactive in ensuring the Oputa Panel’s success, knowing that it would constitute 
a litmus test for the commitment and sincerity of the Obasanjo regime to 
democratic values and the rule of law. Unfortunately, the important moment of 
transition now appears irretrievably lost. 
 
9.   THE AFTERMATH: TRUTH IN LIMBO 
   The Obasanjo administration garnered positive public acclaim when it set up the 
Oputa Panel. The work of the Panel has been described as ‘so thorough, so 
profound, so well-conducted, so conclusive and so painstaking that it probably 
had no rival in the country’s history’.123 In similar vein, President Obasanjo 
commended the Oputa Panel for its job well done, noting that the public hearings 
had the strong potential to serve as a deterrent to the violations of human rights in 
the country.124  
   However, till the end of its tenure, the Obasanjo administration refused to 
publish or implement the Oputa Panel Report. Victims have remained 
uncompensated. The Obasanjo administration anchored its decision on the 
Supreme Court in the Oputa Panel case mentioned above. The issue of 
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implementation of the recommendations of truth-seeking processes is multi-
layered and complex. Nonetheless, the refusal of the government to publish the 
report of the Oputa Panel (which it had in fact accepted and set up a review 
committee to work on before the Supreme Court decision) is a singularly 
significant one. Although the government maintained that it was constrained from 
taking the Report further as a result of the judgement125 it failed to provide a basis 
for its decision from any part of the judgement. Thus, the premise for the 
government’s position remains vague.  
   The administration’s refusal to publish and implement the Report and 
recommendations of the Panel attracted widespread condemnation. The action of 
the government has been described as ‘one of the most unfortunate actions’ of the 
regime.126 It has also been cited as one of the country’s attempts at political 
reform that has been dumped midstream.127 Many groups and individuals have 
made repeated requests for the release and or implementation of the Report.128 
The calls for positive action by the government have however been consistently 
ignored. Critics of the government position have noted that the Supreme Court did 
not ‘bar’ the government from releasing the Report.129  
   There is no unanimity on the effect of the Supreme Court judgement on 
enforceability of the recommendations. While some agree that the decision may 
have rendered nugatory aspects of the recommendations that related to the 
plaintiffs, they contend that the Supreme Court judgement was no excuse to 
‘suppress the truth.’130 Others, including the President of the West Africa Bar 
Association, insist the Supreme Court in fact endorsed the Panel and that its 
creation was in any case valid under international conventions to which the 
country is party.131 Thus the government ought to implement the 
recommendations. The latter view would appear to be strengthened by the failure 
of the government to offer an explanation on the specific aspects of the judgement 
which prohibited it from publishing and implementing the decision. The failure of 
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the Obasanjo administration and the continued silence of the successor 
government on the matter has been telling. The non release of the Report has been 
viewed as one of the cardinal reasons for the continued agitation by some 
segments of the country on a number of issues.132   
   In the face of government refusal to publish the Report, some civil society 
groups, including one which consulted for the Oputa Panel, proceeded to publish 
it on the internet.133 Another coalition known as Civil Society Forum has 
commenced the publication in bound form with the publication of ‘The Executive 
Summary, Recommendations and Conclusions.’ The group observes that in all 
events, the Supreme Court judgement does not bar publication of the Report.134 
They consider that the people can find other ways of getting the recommendations 
of the Panel implemented, despite the intransigence of government. Organising a 
referendum on them is one such way. This informs their determination to ensure 
the full publication of the Report for mass education and action.135 
   Since 1999, there has been an upsurge in violent property crimes and inter-
communal and ethnic conflicts in the country. The view has been expressed in 
some quarters that not only has the transition to democracy failed to deliver on 
justice and restoration of the rule of law, but that impunity and state-sponsored 
violence have remained unchecked, if not increased, in the country. 136 Hopes for a 
new dawn in the wake of the transition have gone largely unfulfilled.137 The 
Nigerian government, in jettisoning the Oputa Panel Report with its wide-ranging 
recommendations for accountability and institutional reforms, has likely 
contributed to the current state of affairs. 
   On the whole, it can nonetheless be fairly asserted that in the pursuit of its 
mandate, the Oputa Panel did a commendable job of seeking to establish the truth 
about the course of executive and legislative governance in the pre-transition 
period in the country.  The aftermath of the truth-seeking-process in Nigeria, 
particularly as it relates to the non-implementation of the recommendations of the 
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Panel, strikes an observer as an inherent defect that undermined its well-received 
work.  
 
CONCLUSION 
   The work of the Oputa Panel provides ample justification for its establishment. 
The popular acclaim it received testifies to its relevance and acceptability as an 
apposite transitional justice measure in post-authoritarian Nigeria. However, a 
combination of factors, including poor planning and deficit of sincerity on the part 
of the government that established it, as well as lack of political will, played out to 
frustrate transitional justice efforts in the country.   
   It has been argued that Truth Commissions face two types of challenges: 
avoidable and inherent. The former derive from issues surrounding their 
establishment, conduct and follow up, while the latter has to do with the very 
nature of the enterprise.138 The search for truth and reconciliation in Nigeria 
through the Oputa Panel suffered a fundamental set back in its lack of tailor-made 
legislation.  
   One of the crucial issues that ought to be addressed by such legislation, as the 
legal challenge to the Oputa Panel showed, is the jurisdictional scope of the 
process within a federal polity like Nigeria. The incident of power-sharing 
between the central and state governments dictated the need for legislation that 
validly defined the scope of the powers of a truth commission.  This is critical 
where the truth commission is established by a central government with limited 
territorial and issue-jurisdiction, characteristic of federal polities. It is significant 
to note in this respect for instance, that state governments had powers similar to 
that of the president to establish a commission along the lines of the Oputa Panel 
in their states under various (though similar) Tribunals of Inquiry Laws.   
   It will be argued, essentially on consequentialist grounds, that the neglect of 
accountability of a public nature for the judicial role in the period of authoritarian 
rule is fatal to the transitional polity. It will be contended later on, that neglecting 
accountability of the judiciary as an integral part of the transition process is 
largely responsible for the ensuing state of judicial insensitivity to the dynamics of 
law and adjudication in such societies. As will become obvious from this study, 
the seeming faux pas in the conduct of the Nigerian truth-seeking process in this 
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regard, has serious implications for the important role the judiciary plays in a 
transitioning polity.  
   The negative impact of the unaccountability of the judiciary for past governance 
as part of a transitional justice process is more conspicuous in a society seriously 
challenged by a legacy of dysfunctional institutions. The fragile institutional 
structures that characterise societies in transition engender substantial reliance on 
the judiciary as the major force to stabilise and foster the democratisation process 
and uphold rule of law. Such critical functions can only be appropriately taken up 
by an accountable and transformed judiciary. It is thus to the case for 
accountability of the judiciary in transitions that we should now turn.   
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Chapter Two 
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN TRANSITIONS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   The discussion in Chapter One highlighted how the Oputa Panel as a truth-
seeking process in the context of Nigeria’s transition failed to address the role of 
the judiciary in the period of military rule. The otherwise laudable work of the 
Oputa Panel left a critical gap in accountability for misgovernance. While the 
Panel conducted a laudable enquiry into the activities of the executive and 
legislature as constituted at various times by a number of successive military 
regimes, it failed to engage with the role of the judiciary in governance in almost 
three decades of authoritarian rule. It was almost as if the judicial branch was in 
complete abeyance or indeed, non-existent in the country during the period. But, 
even as the special or institutional hearings of the Oputa Panel revealed, this was 
factually not the case. The current chapter argues a case for the judiciary to be 
made to give an account of its role in governance in the period of authoritarian 
rule through a truth-seeking process as part of transitional justice measures. This 
is based on the position that the judiciary as the third branch of government, 
participates in governance at all times. 
   The gap in the conduct of the Oputa Panel earlier discussed raises the relevance 
of accountability for the judicial role in past governance at times of political 
change. I intend to critically examine the salience of such institutional 
accountability in this study. This is partly because the Oputa Panel, as a 
transitional justice measure, more specifically, truth-seeking process in a post-
authoritarian context, is not alone. There is an existing gap in transitional justice 
research on the role of the judicial institution in governance in post-authoritarian 
societies. The present inquiry seeks to generate scholarly interest in an otherwise 
neglected aspect of transitional justice theory and state practice. The paucity of 
critical perspectives on the role of the judiciary during a society’s authoritarian 
period could lead to the view that it lacks a distinct role in governance. In the 
alternative, it suggests that the judicial function was inconsequential or judicial 
outcomes were invariably imposed during the relevant period. The chapter 
attempts to address the gap in existing transitional justice research on judicial 
governance in authoritarian societies. It presents a general case for judicial 
accountability for the past in transitions. Thus, this chapter is conceived as a 
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theoretical framework for the case for accountability of the judiciary for past 
governance. The framework developed here will be applied to the analysis of the 
Nigerian context in Chapter Three. 
    Historically, Nigeria started out its post-independence existence as a 
Westminster-type political arrangement but subsequently translated into an 
American-styled federation. The course of governance (including the judicial) in 
the country has been shaped not only by its current political leanings, but also, 
historical antecedents. In view of these factors, comparative insights from both the 
British and American legal and political experiences are germane to a discussion 
of Nigeria’s judicial institution. Thus, I draw on Anglo-American judicial 
traditions and experiences in articulating the case for accountability of the 
judiciary for the past in the context of the country’s transition. In this regard it is 
relevant to add that later parts of this thesis equally benefit from comparative 
insights. 
   In articulating a theoretical framework, the chapter considers two critical issues 
framed as queries. First, to what extent ought the role of the judiciary to be held 
up to public scrutiny as part of the transitional justice process? In the alternative, 
should it not be the case that the judiciary is held to account for its role in societal 
experience of gross violations of human rights and impunity? Secondly, what is 
the relevance of such inquiry? It is anticipated that the inquiry will unearth the 
significance of the role played by the judiciary in post-authoritarian societies in 
particular and rifted societies in general. Further, it should also throw some light 
on the circumstances underlying judicial choices in the task of adjudication. 
   The chapter locates uneasiness in the interaction of the truth-seeking process 
with the initiative to bring the judiciary to account for its role in governance 
through a public mechanism. The uneasy relationship derives from reconciling the 
imperative of judicial accountability for the past with the important doctrine of 
judicial independence. There is the view that public accountability of this nature 
inherently challenges, if not critically subvert the integrity of the judiciary, one of 
the important institutions of the state (particularly in transitional societies). On the 
other hand, there is the position that non-accountability of any institution that was 
involved in governance, including the judiciary, weakens the viability of the truth-
seeking mechanism which in some instances (like the Nigerian situation), is the 
main agent for achieving transitional justice.  
   I advance the argument that the adoption of a course of action which takes 
cognisance of the context of societal transition is the appropriate approach. The 
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strategy must also incorporate relevant principles of international law, especially 
rights and humanitarian law. This course of action will smoothen, to a large 
extent, the rough edges of the uneasy interaction between accountability and 
institutional independence. Perhaps more importantly, the approach offers 
opportunity to transform and secure new legitimacy for the judiciary which has 
become complicit for misgovernance through quiescence to authoritarian military 
misrule.  
   Section II examines the nature of state powers and the role of the judiciary in 
governance. Section III focuses on the implications of accountability of the 
judiciary for the rule of law. Section IV argues the view that judicial governance 
constitutes a distinct mode of exercise of power and this provides justification for 
the imperative of accountability of the judiciary. It advances a case for 
accountability of the judiciary for its past role in governance in transitional 
contexts with particular reference to post-authoritarian societies. The analyses 
brings to the fore that public accountability of the judiciary for the past is a key 
factor in the aspiration for transformed and sustainable institutions of the state.  
 
2. STATE POWERS AND THE JUDICIARY  
   Governance has become one of the most complex problems of human existence 
in modern times. Wesson’s view that the complexities of governance constitute ‘a 
monumental short-coming’ that threatens all advancement in human development1 
could be regarded as an overstatement of the dilemmas of power-politics. It is 
nonetheless a view that signposts the intricacies of the phenomenon of power in 
modern society. 
  State powers in legal and political conceptions are divided between the three 
institutions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.2 According to one 
prominent way of thinking, government as delegated powers are vested by a 
collective (the people) in the modern state. Thus, government is custodian of the 
common interest. The people however retain ‘popular sovereignty’ and demand 
accountability from rulers.3  
   Any institution or group that has the capacity to influence how others 
experience the ‘vulnerabilities’ of existence, both as individuals and groups, Poggi 
                                                 
1
 R Wesson Modern Government, Democracy and Authoritarianism (Prentice Hall Incorporated 
New Jersey 1985) ix 
2
 M J C Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Clarendon Press Oxford 1967)  
3
 J G March and J P Olsen Democratic Governance (The Free Press New York 1995) 151 
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notes, wield ‘social power.’ 4 This ability to change an existing state of affairs is 
the cardinal feature of power. It entails the capacity to have others act or refrain 
from acting in a particular manner. Power in our context is what MacCormick 
refers to as ‘power-in-fact’ as opposed to mechanical power that inheres in nature 
like the power of gravity or interpersonal power that is of a more esoteric nature, 
like charisma.5 In the power game, there are different groups in active contest for 
dominance each utilising specific inherent advantages to achieve supremacy. 
However, the different power bases in the struggle to undermine the influence of 
others become constrained in that quest by certain self-limiting factors.6  
   Notwithstanding the ‘self-limiting’ factor of the judiciary, namely that it does 
not initiate the process for the exercise of its power, contemporary social 
experience clearly shows it is endowed with the resources with which it can and 
does influence society. Two contemporary examples lend credence to this view. 
One is the significant decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore7 that proved decisive in the election to the coveted position of the US 
president in rather controversial circumstances. The other is the same court’s 
decision in Hamdan v Rumsfeld, Secretary of State for Defense8 in which (by a 
slim majority of 5 to 4), it decried the Bush administration’s detention of ‘terror 
suspects’ in Guantanamo Bay. The US Supreme Court declared illegal, the plan to 
prosecute them before military commissions under the Presidential Military 
Orders 2001. The first secured George Bush’s entry into the White House on an 
otherwise shaky electoral victory. The other gave judicial fillip to international 
clamours for the release of the detainees in ‘Camp Delta,’ Guantanamo Bay. The 
US Supreme Court’s decision was acknowledged as an important national 
complement to the finding of the UN Commission on Human Rights that the 
detention facility was illegal and should be closed.9  
                                                 
4
 G Poggi Forms of Power (Polity Press Cambridge 2001) 203-204. 
5
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6
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 531 U.S 98 [2000] the decision was heavily criticised in the media. But the criticism that also 
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8
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9
 United Nations Press Release “UN Experts Ask International Community to Aid with 
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   It is pertinent to acknowledge that the Bush administration continued the 
detentions under the Military Commissions Act 2006 (clearly following the lead 
of the dissenting justices) that substantially validates the actions of the executive 
in Guantanamo Bay. But, quite apart from ongoing litigation challenging trials 
under the Act, it is noteworthy that the judiciary left the executive with no choice 
but to have recourse to the legislature in conformity with democratic principles 
and the rule of law. Many commentators have hailed Hamdan as a victory for the 
rule of law.10   
   Nor are Bush and Hamdan isolated instantiations of the influence of judicial 
decisions on the course of societal action or power of the judiciary on society. 
There are other precedents perhaps with more resonance within American legal 
tradition in the same direction. Take Dred Scott v Sandford for instance.11 The 
decision has been identified as one of the major precipitators of the civil war in 
that country, with significant historic consequences.12 Another is Roe v Wade. 13 It 
has been noted that support for or opposition to the decision in Roe continues to 
influence, if not define, the political fortunes of aspiring public office holders in 
the United States.14  
   The foregoing highlights the fact that judicial decisions in specific cases affect 
not only the parties in litigation before the courts. They impact on others in the 
wider society who, in most instances, will never subject themselves to direct 
jurisdiction of the courts by way of litigation. Judicial determinations affect civil 
rights, individual freedoms and property rights (at the micro-level) and influence, 
or in some cases, dictate outright, the course of political, social, cultural and 
economic development (at the macro-level). It has been recognised that when 
judges ‘whisper,’ their voices are ‘transmitted through a thousand amplifiers 
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throughout the system.’15 In that way the judiciary perforce plays a significant 
role in governance. It follows that the subversion of the judicial institution by 
incidence of social dislocations of conflict or authoritarianism, justifies public 
scrutiny in post-authoritarian contexts not so much as an indictment on the 
institution, but more importantly, to draw out relevant lessons for desired 
transformation.  
   It hardly stands to contest that the executive and legislature exercise political 
power. In similar vein however, the judiciary, in furtherance of its interpretational 
role mediates political power. In the mediatory function, the judiciary stands 
between the executive and the citizen in resolving conflicts in the same way it 
adjudicates between individuals. The judiciary is empowered to review the actions 
of the executive to determine their legality.16 For the most part however, 
transitional justice research, particularly with reference to institutional 
accountability, has focused on the role of the executive and the legislature in 
societies that have witnessed gross violations of human rights and impunity with 
scarce attention paid to the judicial function. Yet, so critical is the role of the 
judiciary in the exercise of powers in the modern state that ‘…a government is not 
a government without courts.’17 
   Law, along with politics, according to Loughlin, constitute ‘critical aspects of 
the normative world that we have assembled for the purpose of living a relatively 
ordered existence and through which we are able to manage our differences.’18 It 
follows that the institution charged with the interpretation of law plays a critical 
role in society. The nature of the role constitutes the judiciary as a major element 
in the machinery of the state. In that vantage position, Griffith notes, the judiciary 
‘can not avoid the making of political decisions.’19 
   In the contemporary period, the judiciary is constitutionally established as a 
bulwark against executive arbitrariness and legislative excess.20 The powers of 
judicial review of executive and legislative actions may however be limited by the 
historical and political specificities of the state. Thus, the normative jurisprudence 
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of judicial review of executive and parliamentary actions in the federal political 
context of the United States contrasts with the more restricted approach to judicial 
review of legislative action in the unitary system of the United Kingdom. The 
attitude of the courts in the United Kingdom is conditioned by its deference to the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. There is thus, some variation in the extent 
of judicial policy-making powers or what I choose to refer to as ‘judicial 
governance’21deriving from historical and political factors.  
   Judicial power has been defined as the power which every sovereign authority    
must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between 
itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property.22 
Judicial powers are conferred to effect peaceful resolution of disputes and 
adjudication of rights infringement, public and private. Conflict, with its positive 
and negative aspects, is endemic in human society23 and so its resolution is of 
primary concern. So critical is the role of the judicial institution to society that it 
has rightly been argued that society ‘can not function’ in the absence of a dispute-
resolution institution.24  
   In recent times, the powers of the judiciary have become incrementally visible, 
owing particularly to the ‘rights revolution of the twentieth century.’ ‘Courts’ 
Loughlin affirms, ‘are becoming increasingly more important…their power has 
increased dramatically.’ The situation has led to concerns about ‘the emergence of 
government by judiciary.’25 The growth of judicial powers in relation to the other 
arms of government has become more noticeable in the post-second world war 
period.26 The growing importance of the judiciary should be expected granted that 
it is one of the institutions of the state; wielding some of the powers of the state in 
the task of ensuring ‘effective public regulation, equal liberty and social justice.’27 
Such considerable powers impact on all aspects of societal development and 
interaction. It ought not to be left unaccounted for in the context of transitions.    
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    Ogowewo advocates that the process of development of a state devolves not 
only on the executive and legislature, but also the judiciary. The executive and the 
legislature (even if with differing emphasis) have been viewed as prime movers of 
the process of development and assessed along those lines. But the role of the 
judicial institution as an integral part of and key contributor to governance and 
development has been largely unacknowledged and ignored.28 This may be due in 
part to the contestable notion that it is the least ‘dangerous branch of 
government.’29 The lack of initiative to exercise its institutional power unless 
moved by an aggrieved party may be another contributory factor.30 Yet, 
dependent on socio-political factors, the powers wielded by the courts31 may 
expand in dimensions that substantially ‘diminishes’ powers exercised by the 
other two branches of government.32  
   In a democracy, a correlate of the exercise of powers by any institution is the 
requirement of accountability. As Theberge argues with reference to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the immense powers wielded by the judiciary 
necessitates its been subjected to similar objective and informed scrutiny 
applicable to the executive and the legislative branches. This is more particularly 
pertinent in jurisdictions where judicial tenure is for life.33 
   The exercise of power in democratic societies involves a measure of developing 
accounts. Such accounts serve to define the past and choices made in the course of 
it. An important utilitarian function of democratic accounting is the promise it 
holds for establishing trust between the people and the government.34 Governance 
through authoritarianism (with the attendant incidence of egregious violations of 
human rights and the rule of law) results in social displacement and distortions 
between the government and the governed. It is accordingly arguable that 
comprehensive accountability in the transition to democracy and the rule of law is 
a key requisite for addressing the resultant disequilibrium in society. 
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   Pound’s35 concise but incisive contribution on the concept of judicial power is 
as apt today as it was over eight decades ago when it was made. For him, the 
principle of separation of powers does not require a water-tight 
compartmentalisation of the three arms of government, even in a federation like 
the United States. In spite of this, commenting on what the role of judges ought to 
be in society, he insisted that ‘Courts cannot be made tame cats either of the 
executive or the legislative power except as they themselves yearn for a warm 
place by the fire.’36 Such ‘yearning’, even where reasonably suspected, ought to 
be subject of some accounting, much as executive and legislative (mis) actions 
are.   
   In discussing judicial accountability, the system of appeals to superior courts no 
doubt constitutes a form of accountability of the judiciary, and some argue an 
adequate one at that.37 Appeals as a form of accountability may be sufficient in 
societies where the rule of law is entrenched with a well developed democratic 
culture. This is particularly the case in view of the existence of other forms of 
public accountability like congressional hearings, professional censor and critical 
media focus. All of the foregoing no doubt play crucial roles in ensuring public 
engagement with the judiciary in particular and government in general in 
advanced and stable democracies.38 
   Some factors may however militate against appeals as an adequate form of 
judicial accountability. The complex web of legal processes, social and economic 
costs of litigation,39 absence or inadequacy of legal aid, and the limitations of 
educational development in developing countries in general (by and large the sites 
of transitional justice processes) and Nigeria, in particular suggest the need for an 
alternative system of checks directly and easily accessible to the public at 
transitional moments. Further, it is plausible to argue that the fundamental 
premise of the appeal paradigm as well as the other forms of judicial 
accountability referred to above above, is the presumption of democracy and good 
governance, the absence of which is precisely in issue in post-authoritarian 
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societies. Authoritarian rule is not noted for tolerating such refined and 
sophisticated mechanisms for accountability. Mechanisms for the accountability 
of state institutions were either muted, barely in existence or completely absent. 
Given that state of affairs, it is apposite in the context of transition to adopt other 
mechanisms like the truth-seeking process to secure accountability for the judicial 
role in the past. 
 
3. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
   The ability of citizens to enforce their rights against the state (as well as other 
individuals) is critical to the modern conception of the rule of law.40 The case for 
accountability of the judiciary is reinforced by this need since the judicial function 
is central to the realisation of the right. There must be no doubts as to the integrity 
and commitment of the judicial institution to ensuring the rule of law in 
furtherance of the public interest and popular sovereignty. 
   Under the concept of popular sovereignty, the three arms of government hold 
power as agents of the people.41 The US Supreme Court in the classic formulation 
of this view of sovereignty in Marbury v Madison, Secretary of State of the 
United States42 asserted that the people possess an incontestable right to determine 
the course of their future governance.43 The will of the people is not only supreme 
but dictates the powers of the different arms of government and delineates the 
limits of those respective powers.44 The foregoing understanding of the rule of 
law adopted in this study, as against other contending views,45 assumes a more 
relevant position in societies in transition from an authoritarian past, where there 
is predictably, a common aspiration for societal rebirth. There is usually an urgent 
need for across-the-board reconfiguration of state institutions and public 
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participation in social reconstruction to forestall a return to authoritarianism or 
even conflict.  
   Transformation of the judicial agency is central to the repositioning of rule of 
law as a beneficial rather than exploitative principle for the organisation of society 
as a whole. It is certainly the case that some understandings of the rule of law 
were deployed by erstwhile tyrannical regimes in the exercise of power. This was 
certainly the case in Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa and authoritarian 
military regimes in Africa and Latin America. In each case, specific instrumental 
understandings of law were deployed to foster morally and democratically 
unacceptable policies of discrimination and gross violations of human rights. 
Discrimination laws for example were institutionalised in Nazi Germany and 
apartheid South Africa and held out as legitimate.    
   It would appear that a conception of the rule of law that emphasises or relies on 
‘people-power’ or in more formal terms, popular sovereignty holds strong 
promise for enduring fundamental changes aspired for in transitioning societies. 
The American transition from colonialism, struggle for independence and the 
pivotal role of the people in its constitutional development in the late 18th century 
in particular, provide strong precedent for societies seeking to assert popular 
power in transitioning states. 46  
   Proceeding on our adopted view of the rule of law, a publicly accessible process 
of scrutiny offered by the truth-seeking mechanism, can be expected to restore 
some measure of judicial credibility and public confidence in the judiciary in such 
post-authoritarian contexts. To insist otherwise namely that any institution is 
beyond public scrutiny conducted in a plainly public manner afforded by a truth-
seeking process amounts to conceding to the judiciary ‘a real omnipotence.’47 
This is precisely a privilege the judiciary has been all too ready to deny the 
political branches of government through the instrumentality of judicial review. 
More crucially, such a proposition is tantamount to a direct inversion of popular 
sovereignty and the imposition of ‘judicial supremacy.’48 
 
4. THE CASE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE JUDICIARY IN TRANSITIONS 
   Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, while discussing the theme of 
public confidence in and criticism of the judiciary observed that 
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               …we live in an age when the attitude of the general community towards  
               authority, and institutions, is more consistently questioning, and even  
               challenging, than the past. This is a good thing. It is better that people  
               who exercise authority feel uncomfortable than they feel complacent.49 
 
Implicit in Murray’s position is the recognition of judicial governance. His 
observation on current trends on accountability is even more apposite in 
transitional contexts where there is explicit recognition that there has been a 
systemic dysfunction in society. Yet, this imperative faces the challenge of an 
extant tension between it and the principle of judicial independence, another 
imperative of the rule of law.50  
   In setting a normative framework for reckoning with the past in transitional 
contexts, Crocker rightly identifies unveiling truth, accountability and 
punishment, pursuing institutional reform and long-term development as well as 
providing the opportunity for public deliberation as some of the central goals of 
transitional justice.51 But as Oko has noted, democratic transitions usually focus 
on establishment of formal structures with scarce attention to ridding transition 
societies of ‘anti-democratic’ attitudes that had taken root during years of 
authoritarian rule. This neglect threatens the whole transition process.52  
   The commonly articulated transition reform agenda focused on the political 
branches of government at the expense of attention to the judicial situation in 
transitioning polities, is one of the marked failures of the current transition 
paradigm.53 It can be argued that institutional accountability for past misconduct 
with a view to strengthening weak or transforming derelict state structures is one 
of the fundamental ways to foster the viability of democracy and the rule of law. 
Such accountability facilitates acknowledgement of institutional shortcomings 
crucial to achieving transformation of state institutions. It also constitutes a 
definitive progression to democratic governance and movement away from 
repression.54 
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   In general terms, an accountability relationship exists where a group or other 
entity demands an agent to report on the agent’s activities.55 It has also been 
considered to be the right to hold an agent ‘to answer for performance that 
involves some delegation of power.’56 Accountability issues commonly evolve 
from the delegation of power in the public context by virtue of legislation. Both 
public and private actors are similarly obliged, through various instrumentalities, 
including contractual agreements, to render accounts.57 Political accountability 
proceeds on the precept that individual or institutional actors who act on behalf of 
the community and are funded from public resources, be accountable to the 
ordinary citizens.  
   The democratic accountability process requires a record of not only individual 
and institutional roles in governance, but also, responsibility for the results 
achieved and the means deployed in the process.58 The judiciary as one of a tripod 
of state institutions can not be excused from accountability. This is certainly the 
case if it is conceded that the judicial function is exercised in a general sense as a 
form of delegated power from the people. But while accountability in the case of 
the political branches may be individual as well as collective, what is been 
advocated in this study is institutional (or collective) accountability of the 
judiciary.  
   A number of mundane objections may be canvassed for the futility of a case for 
accountability of the judiciary, especially considering the level of education in 
developing countries that form the bulk of transitional societies, particularly in 
Africa. One is that a sizeable number of the population are excluded by a legal 
system that is at once culturally alien and commonly conducted in a foreign 
language. Related to this is the fact that the intricacies of the merits of the 
jurisprudence to which the judiciary subscribed in particular cases is typically 
beyond the grasp of the generality of the people (even those who have an 
appreciable level of education). Thus, the outcome of the accountability process 
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may only be accessible to a privileged class of, largely, legally trained 
technocrats. 59  
   In response, it can be posited that avenues for public education and 
enlightenment by those who can access the information to overcome the barrier 
can be created to further the course of the fundamental objectives of transitional 
justice and accountability. In any case, it can not be the argument that the 
incidence of language barriers should be allowed to deprive a people of their 
rights. On the contrary, the opposite may be the more plausible argument- namely 
that the existence of language barriers is reflective of the denial of such rights.  
   Another possible objection is the perspective that the judiciary was itself victim 
of the socio-political system that disempowered the institution in the face of a 
sovereign parliament. I will deal with this below in the context of what I consider 
to be institutional objections. A further objection is the need to maintain and 
protect the collegiality of the judiciary in the period of transition. At the heart of 
the collegiality argument is the need to maintain a rancour-free atmosphere for 
judicial officers who had served in the old order (and are, at the least, tainted with 
complicity for human rights violations) and those newly appointed by the post-
authoritarian government following transition to ensure institutional cohesion and 
stability.  
   In countering this objection, it is possible to argue that the narrow objective of 
individual collegiality ought not to be allowed to frustrate the wider claims of the 
society at large to institutional rectitude and transformation that accountability is 
expected to foster. If anything, the need for such accountability becomes acute 
when it is considered that untransformed elements of the old order can negatively 
impact on the new and expectedly, progressive elements appointed as part of the 
transition process. Having disposed of what I refer to above as mundane 
objections, it is relevant to examine in some detail, the institutional objections to 
the case for accountability of the judiciary in transitional contexts.  
4.1    Judicial Independence60 
   The need for judicial independence constitutes a potent argument for critics of a 
call for public accountability of the judicial role. However, the call is based on 
what can be regarded as an overarching and implied legitimate political 
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expectation of the people within the legal and political paradigm of popular 
sovereignty as developed by Locke.61 The people are empowered to demand an 
account from their agent as constituted by the government of which the judiciary 
forms a part. In any event, as Karlan notes, ‘Judicial independence is… not an end 
in itself;’62 rather, as one of the most renowned English jurists admitted, it confers 
great responsibility on judges.63  
   It is conceded that the principle of judicial independence is crucial to the judicial 
function. The principle is enshrined in most modern constitutions and in countries 
with unwritten constitutions, like Britain, the principle has by convention been 
entrenched sometimes over centuries of practice.64 The nature of judicial 
independence, it has been asserted, sets it ‘a place apart’ in the scheme of state 
institutions. The principle is supported by ‘a solid historical foundation and a fine 
edifice.’65 The critical question however is whether that privileged position and 
strong foundation ought to shield the institution (or even individual judges) from 
public scrutiny? The principle, in all of its importance for the adjudicatory role, 
and dispensation of justice, ought not to be allowed to override the need for 
accountability for powers conferred on any institution of state in terms of the 
process and outcomes of the exercise of such powers. 
   Justification for the foregoing position includes the fact that judicial 
independence is not a perquisite of judicial office. It is commonly recognised that 
respect for courts is essentially directed at the institution and not the person of the 
individual judge. In its conception, the principle is, like judicial power itself, 
designed for the benefit of citizens.66   
   Respect for and compliance with judicial decisions is fostered by the belief in 
the impartiality of the judiciary. It is not designed to cast a sanctimonious cloak 
around individual judges. This is central to any power the judiciary can aspire to 
have in society. It accords with the warning of the late Thurgood Marshall of the 
                                                 
61
 Loughlin note 18 supra at 162-175: ‘Locke makes an important innovation in asserting that 
political power rests in individuals and that this power is delegated through their consent to an 
institution (whether monarch or parliament or both) which, in some form or the other, can be taken 
to be representative of the people.’ (at 165)  
62
 P S Karlan “Two Concepts of Judicial Independence” (1999) 72 Southern California Law 
Review 535, 536. 
63
 Denning L J “The Independence of Judges” in B W Harvey The Lawyer and Justice (Sweet and 
Maxwell London 1978) 55, 63 
64
 Ibid.at 55-102. 
65
 M L Friedland “Judicial Independence and Accountability-A Canadian Perspective” (1996) 7(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 605, 637. 
66
 Gleeson note 22 supra at 1 
 69 
U.S Supreme Court to the judiciary that ‘We must never forget that the only real 
source of power we as judges can tap is the respect of the people.’67 
   The fundamental doctrinal basis of the principle of judicial independence is the 
desire to obviate potential constraints to the exercise of the judicial function. 
Institutional independence is necessary to secure the role of the judiciary as the 
institution charged with protection of the individual from oppression.  
   So profound is the consensus on the need for judicial independence that it has 
become ‘all but universally recognised as a necessary feature of the rule of 
law.’68The principle, guaranteed not only by national but also a considerable 
number of significant international human rights instruments,69 entails both 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ aspects. The negative conception of the principle turns 
on the need to pre-empt all sources of coercion that may interfere in the 
adjudicatory process and are by nature beyond the individual judge’s control. 
Judicial officers in the course of their duties are to be protected from all external 
constraints that may constrain or influence the judicial function. Such protection 
includes measures to secure their physical safety, freedom from pecuniary 
worries, apprehensions on career advancement and job security. It further includes 
freedom from political considerations in systems where judicial office is elective. 
   The positive aspect relates to the facilitation of the judicial officer’s ability to 
freely come to a decision based on personal conviction about and understanding 
of the law.70 The main constraints to judicial independence on the positive view of 
the matter are jurisdictional doctrine and judicial precedent; products of the 
judicial system itself. Thus, it is of an internal nature. Both principles help to 
ensure certainty in the law in some way but could also constrain lower courts in 
the proper exercise of their discretion.71 Thus the two sides consist of measures 
designed to afford the judge ‘freedoms from’72 external constraints and ‘freedoms 
to’73 follow their conscience in their just adjudication of disputes. 74 
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   Delgado’s sceptical appraisal of judicial independence75 similarly fortifies the 
argument for non-immutability of the concept and advances a case for judicial 
accountability of a public nature advocated here. He argues that there is a sense in 
which exponents of judicial independence have sought to weave an impenetrable 
mesh around judges to the detriment of other professions, groups and 
organisations in society. This is not only unfair but essentially to the purpose of 
‘legitimizing a myth.’76 He raises several challenges to the normative view of 
judicial independence as a sacrosanct doctrine for the preservation of the judiciary 
in a democracy.  
    Delgado contends that judicial independence has been utilised to distract 
attention from many other inbuilt factors (within the judicial institution) that 
detracts from a purist perspective of the doctrine. Some of these factors, including 
race, class and gender, influence to some extent, the decisions of individual 
judges, a fact he contends, has attracted little attention. He further argues that 
‘[T]he entire structure of the legal system, from stare decisis to judicial 
demography to judicial ethics and socialization’77 prevents judges from acting 
independently. He notes that the concept may be viewed as a ‘platitude’ and (like 
all platitudes) can be ‘perfectly indeterminate.’ Whereas ‘real judicial 
independence’ provides judges the latitude to decide cases outside of what may be 
considered as the conventional, or what Delgado refers to as ‘structural due 
process’, they rarely do. 78    
   In another assessment of judicial independence within the context of 
contemporary American society, Zemans makes the point that traditional notions 
of judicial independence that precludes judges from public accountability have 
been and continues to be progressively eroded. ‘Political scrutiny of judges’ he 
confidently asserts ‘will also continue if not increase, at least in the immediate 
future.’ 79  While his specific focus was on elected state judges, he considered the 
arguments as largely apposite to the situation of non-elected (federal) judicial 
officers. He affirms that accountability of the individual judge and the judiciary 
constitute the best guarantee for (rather than an affront to) judicial independence.  
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   Judges, in order to assure society they are ‘appropriately accountable’ and 
worthy of independence required for fostering the rule of law, have to take on a 
pro-active and public role in performance of the judicial function.80 Zemans 
further makes the crucial point that while public accountability of the judiciary 
may carry with it some form of institutional restraint (and this is not altogether 
undesirable), it does not necessarily interfere with decisional independence that 
has to be maintained in the interest of judicial integrity.81   
   In his reflections on the situation in England, Stevens draws similar conclusions. 
He argues that judicial independence, much like academic freedom, is not 
absolute. It must ‘defer to judicial accountability.’ Public accountability of the 
judicial function he notes has been increased by various administrative reforms.82 
There is thus recognition of the need for continued scrutiny of the role and 
legitimacy of judicial action in democratic societies (with the marked absence of 
serious social upheaval) and calls for reform. The need for scrutiny for the judicial 
function is even more so in transitional societies.  
   The implication of the right to accountability as belonging to citizens is that it is 
in the nature of a public right. There is judicial support for the proposition that 
public rights, unlike private rights, provided for in the constitution can-not be 
waived. R. Ariori & Ors. v Muraino B O Elemo & Ors.83 a Nigerian case provides 
judicial support for this proposition. In the case, parties purported to waive their 
right to speedy hearing of the title to land, which was in issue in the matter. The 
Nigerian Supreme Court held that speedy trial, a component of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing, was in the nature of a public 
right. It rejected claims of waiver by consent of the litigating parties on the 
premise that it fell outside the ambit of their private rights or prerogatives.  
   The position of the law on public rights as stated above was recently reaffirmed 
in the decision in Rt. Hon. Rotimi Chibuike Amaechi v Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) & 2 Ors.84 Citing Ariori with approval, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that  
               A right that inures to the benefit of the entire public can never be   
               waived. Nobody, not even the state can waive the right entrenched in  
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               statutory or constitutional provisions which have been made in favour of  
               the whole country. It is clearly not Pro Publico, but Contra Publico to  
               introduce the doctrine of waiver to such right.  
 
In the same way, the right to public scrutiny or demand for accountability of the 
judiciary being in the nature of a public right, can not be interfered with nor 
waived. It is a right vested in society at all times and arguably ought to come into 
sharper focus in transitional contexts. The right to accountability being a public 
one, any institutional attempt at, or claim to waiver of the right is not only 
counterintuitive but ought to be rejected for being patently unconstitutional and in 
violation of the rule of law. 
   The security of tenure, a near-universal feature of appointive judicial office (and 
thus the exercise of judicial power), save in the cases of lustration of judicial 
officers (as witnessed in Bosnia Herzegovina and the German Democratic 
Republic post-reunification),85 ensures the continuance in office of judges who 
have been part of an old order with which there is much dissatisfaction. This 
unique feature of judicial power reinforces the imperative for accountability of the 
judiciary to ensure judicial transition and that the third realm of the estate moves 
along the lines of societal aspirations. Notwithstanding transition to democratic 
rule, the judiciary may in practice remain static and in the state of injudicious 
ineptitude where deliberate and far-reaching efforts are not instituted to set it on 
the part of rectitude through an accounting of its role in the period of conflict or 
authoritarian rule.  
   The Nigerian judiciary, in which judicial offices normally hold office until a 
constitutionally stipulated retirement, is again a reference point. The adoption of 
the pre-transition constitutional arrangements coupled with the absence of an 
interim constitution (which could have stipulated otherwise) ensured that judges 
appointed in the period of authoritarian rule continued in office by default. One 
consequence of this has been that the judiciary has been criticised for a 
jurisprudential outlook that continues to accord an instinctive, ‘spurious and 
simplistic’ recognition and validation of authoritarian rule and the legacy of 
decrees made by the military despite the transition to civil rule and in spite of the 
untold suffering and distortion authoritarian rule has foisted on the country. 86  
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   Law as a tool of ‘social engineering,’87 constitutes a medium for the 
achievement of other social goals. On this view of the role of law, the judiciary is 
required to dissociate itself from the formalist interpretation of judicial 
independence as an impregnable fortress that sets the institution on a pedestal 
beyond the reach of society. The normative account of judicial independence that 
seeks to oust the judiciary from public accountability for its role in 
authoritarianism should be rejected. Such an approach to the function or purpose 
of the principle runs contrary to transparency in governance, an essential 
democratic value. 
   Barak argues that while it is pertinent the judiciary earn and retain public 
confidence that objective is not to be pursued through the type of accountability 
process required of the legislative and executive branches of government. It is to 
be achieved through - to use Dyzenhaus’ terminology, ‘fidelity to the law’88 rather 
than seeking to ‘bring about a result the public desires.’89 Premised on the distinct 
character of the judicial function and the manner of composition of its offices 
which advises more circumspection in matters (including accountability) relating 
to the judiciary, Barak’s observation is well made. However, Barak fails to 
articulate what constitutes law that the judiciary is expected to uphold. Would the 
judiciary be in breach of its duty when it refuses to apply law lacking 
substantively in morality though enacted in compliance with procedural 
requirements?  It can be argued that law would only be law if it reflects the moral 
conscience of society.  
   In the pursuit of judicial accountability, it is useful to approach the matter on the 
premise that the institutions of state are bound by law which stands outside of and 
above all institutions. The political branches are to be held up to scrutiny through 
the instrumentality of democratic accountability. The judicial branch on the other 
hand is to be held up to scrutiny through its allegiance to law. This is what the 
judicial oaths of office require. This comes through in the insight offered by 
Dyzenhaus on the legal hearings of the TRC in South Africa. What is to be 
considered as law and fidelity, to which judges are bound, is an approach that 
accords recognition to reciprocity between the rulers and the ruled.’90  
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   Law must be in accord with the will of society and the judge can only be true to 
the discharge of his duty if he is not withdrawn from society while maintaining an 
objective distance from it in his judicial determinations. Again, Barak seems to 
have conceded this point (albeit in a limited sense) when he states that ‘there 
should be no wall between the judge and the society in which he operates.’91 The 
challenge would appear to be what constitutes appropriate distance.  
   The point then is that judicial independence ought not to serve as a shield 
against giving public accountability of the judicial role for its conduct during an 
authoritarian period. An account of the judicial role during the period provides 
opportunity for an assessment of whether the judiciary did maintain its 
independence at the relevant time. In other words, was the judicial function 
performed in a manner that accorded primacy to law as required by judicial (oath 
of) office? Or, in the converse (and this is the crux of the matter), did any 
extraneous but contextual factor intervene to compromise judicial independence 
properly conceived? The necessity for this would appear self-evident. 
   Judicial immunity is closely tied to the independence of the judiciary and is 
usually regarded as an integral part of the latter. I consider it separately to allow 
for more focus on why it should not stand in the way of judicial scrutiny in 
transitions.  
4.2   Judicial Immunity 
   Judicial immunity from suit probably represents the boldest measure for 
securing the independence of judicial officers. Although judges are not the only 
officers of state invested with immunity from suit for official acts, the 
ramifications for judges are the most extensive taking into consideration their near 
permanent and all embracing dimensions. The nature of judicial immunity from 
suit has led to the view in some quarters that it is in tension with the rule of law.92 
This may well be an overstatement of the matter. However, there is cause for 
certain concern underlying the position.  
   In this regard, it serves to recall that members of the executive and legislature 
are almost always liable to prosecution (at least on expiry of their electoral 
mandate) for corrupt practices in office. But judges are usually permanently 
immune from prosecution or civil suits in the conduct of their office and exercise 
of their judicial powers. This is attributed to the need to extinguish any threat of 
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litigation on the judge for performing the normal functions of the office. The 
position is based on the proposition that the appropriate remedies for judicial 
misconduct are ‘structural,’ namely through appeals and in extreme cases, 
dismissal from office.93  
   In essence, the nature of the judicial function confers a duty on judges that 
requires an independence of ‘mind’ that addresses itself to ensuring justice 
according to law. It rises above the whims of individuals as well as institutions 
and particularly one that trumps the common weal. However, the allegation that 
the judiciary has been complicit in the violations of human rights by the state (to 
which I return later) under an illiberal regime, supports a case for accountability 
for what could well amount to judicial abdication of its role. By this is meant a 
situation where the judges had deviated from keeping fate with their judicial oaths 
of office which required the discharge of the functions of their high office in a 
manner that upheld the constitutional values of the country as against the wishes 
of authoritarian rulers. Whether this is factually the case or otherwise has to be 
tested through a process of public accounting, at the least, to set the records 
straight.  
   Scrutiny of the judiciary through a truth-seeking process during a period of 
fundamental political change as proposed in this study is distinct from subjecting 
individual judges to the indignity of civil suits for their judgements. The positive 
values of judicial immunity (and more broadly, independence) notwithstanding, 
an absolutist interpretation of it could seriously undermine other equally important 
societal values.94 
   Accountability for the role of the judiciary in governance during an authoritarian 
period is also relevant because of certain standards and societal expectations of 
the institution. Where such expectations are not met, it leads to the lack of public 
trust and confidence in the judicial system which is fatal to societal cohesion, 
peace and development. Since the judiciary commands neither the money 
controlled by the legislature nor the force at the service of the executive, public 
confidence is at the heart of obedience to judicial decisions.95 In particular, the 
dynamics of transitional justice lends itself to Karlan’s argument that the claim to 
judicial independence must be balanced against actual judicial outcomes.96 In the 
event there is some measure of consensus that the judicial function has been 
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conducted in some inappropriate manner, the need to reach beyond the shield of 
judicial immunity assumes an imperative. It is hardly a task undertaken to 
establish such a state of affairs in transitional societies that had laboured under 
authoritarian rule, war, institutionalised discrimination like apartheid or other 
forms of substantial social displacement.  
   The jurisprudence of transitional justice revolves around the restoration of 
rights, justice and the rule of law. Teitel has noted that one of the key features of 
transitional societies is a fundamental inquiry into the legitimacy of existing and 
inherited societal institutions including the judiciary.97 Such an inquiry is not the 
least bit compelling where any of the institutions is viewed as victims of the  
authoritarian period. 
4.3   The Judiciary as Victim 
   The judiciary as an institution, much like other arms of a democratic society, 
may be a victim of authoritarian rule in the same way political institutions 
(executive and legislative) were displaced by military rule in Africa and Latin 
America. It may even suffer in more individualised ways like the fate of judicial 
officers in Rwanda in the course of the genocide in that country. As a result, it is 
possible to take the position that the judicial institution ought to be excused from 
accountability in transition as a victim. But the victim-argument quickly loses 
force when it is considered that a truth-seeking process is basically designed in 
part (if not essentially), to ease the burden of victims- individuals and groups (it is 
not been suggested that institutional victims are precluded) - of rights violations 
by providing a forum for a narration and acknowledgement of their sufferings.        
   Further, where the choice of the truth-seeking process is made to establish a 
credible record of violations of human rights violations and subversion of the rule 
of law with a possible view to social acknowledgement, reconciliation, reparation, 
and fostering rule of law, no institution of state, least that avowed to upholding the 
rule of law, should be insulated from scrutiny. This is imperative, if only to 
ascertain that the judiciary, like other institutions that have functioned under 
abnormal conditions98 is retuned to the aspirations of society in the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy.          
    An inquiry into the propriety of the judicial role or the judiciary being required 
to tell its truths in a transition process is germane to obtaining a complete record 
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of a period of gross violations of human rights and impunity in a nation’s history. 
It could possibly achieve more. Such endeavour has the potential to ascertain the 
justification (some insist in the face of insurmountable constraints) for the course 
of judicial governance in the period. This perspective is relevant in view of the 
concession by a notable protagonist of the relevance of truth commissions in 
transition that ‘moral or meta-ethical debates feed directly into jurisprudential 
questions about whether and to what extent law- even in domestic systems- 
provides meaningful guidance for the judges who implement it.’99 
  What is the role of judges in authoritarianism or dictatorship? Are they 
‘unconstrained moral actors or bureaucratic functionaries effectively bereft of 
discretion, because the law tells them what to do and leaves them no choice to do 
otherwise?’100 Should the judicial function be insulated from the dictates of 
changes in society? Or should the judicial role be in a state of flux, subject to the 
vagaries of its environment?101 These are by no means easy questions to answer 
and there have been ongoing debates on them and related issues on the judicial 
function, all emphasising the crucial role of the judiciary in society.  A process of 
scrutiny is arguably well positioned to address these concerns.  
   Scrutiny of the role of the judiciary in the period of democratisation has the 
potential to promote the realisation of institutional transformation at the heart of 
the transition process. The South Africa transition process attempted such 
scrutiny. Happily, the precedent set by the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in this regard is the subject of an incisive evaluation by 
Dyzenhaus. In his aptly titled book, Judging the Judges,102 he has addressed the 
response of the judiciary to the truth-seeking process that was at the centre of the 
country’s efforts to recover justice for victims and achieve reconciliation in its 
transition to popular democracy. 
4.4    Judging the Judges? 
    The South Africa TRC blazed the trail in requesting the judiciary in a 
transitional society to give a public account of its institutional role in the period of 
its mandate. That attempt was all but roundly rebuffed by the South African 
judiciary. Unlike the various professional bodies representing lawyers (barristers, 
advocates and solicitors) no serving judge, despite repeated requests, turned up at 
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the scheduled three-day public ‘Legal Hearing’. The judiciary contended in the 
written memorandum submitted- ostensibly on its behalf- by Justice Michael 
Corbett (then Chief Justice of the apartheid era), that the proposition was plainly 
unworkable and in outright violation of the much-coveted principle of judicial 
independence. The argument was further advanced by the judiciary that a past-
focused enquiry threatened progress and could disrupt the march into the future. 
Thus, the judges stayed away and their failure to attend was strongly deprecated 
by Dyzenhaus who described it as the ‘most conspicuous feature’ of the special 
three-day public hearings.103  
   It was also argued for the judiciary that it was impracticable for the TRC to 
embark on the exercise that would require a case-by-case assessment of records in 
the absence of counsel. In all events, the record had been impressive particularly 
in view of parliamentary supremacy. ‘There was little to be gained from 
lamenting the past.’104 This position, canvassed by Chief Justice Corbett, 
Dyzenhaus notes, is clearly in ‘tension’ with the reliance on the same records by 
Corbett as the basis  for his contention that public accountability of the judiciary 
in South Africa was not necessary since they reveal that the judiciary had in fact 
performed creditably. 
   The TRC Legal Hearings were regarded by the Commission itself as the most 
crucial of a series of special hearings in view of the place of law under apartheid. 
Lawyers and the judges were brought under scrutiny for their role in applying 
apartheid law. Lawyers and more so judges, it was alleged, failed to exercise their 
discretion when they could have in their interpretation and daily application of 
discriminatory laws. For Dyzenhaus, the judges had no excuse for upholding 
unconscionable apartheid laws. He challenged the view, canvassed in the written 
submission of the judiciary, that judges were ‘disempowered’ in the face of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
   Support for the position of the judges is located in the plain-fact approach to 
judicial interpretation. The plain fact approach as an interpretive approach to law 
states that ‘the judicial duty when interpreting a statute is always to look to those 
parts of the public record that make it clear what the legislators, as a matter of fact 
intended.’ In other words, judges are to determine the law on the letters ‘without 
permitting their substantive convictions about justice to interfere.’105  
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   Judges who subscribed to this view under the principle of the plain fact rule of 
interpretation were guilty of ‘judicial dereliction of duty.’ He insists that the duty 
of judges is to maintain the rule of law that requires justice to be done at all times. 
Faced with the option of participation as against rejecting or relinquishing judicial 
office, he takes the position that opting out of the judicial function by reformist 
(liberal minded) judges was not to be preferred. 
   According to Dyzenhaus, it is the duty of judges to uphold ‘moral ideals’106 
even in the event that they may have their decisions overturned by appeals or 
trumped by countermanding legislation. That was in reality, the practice of the 
legislature during the apartheid era. Nonetheless, judicial resistance to apartheid 
laws through a purposive approach that gave primacy to common law principles 
of equality, equity and fairness could at least place the government in a very 
uncomfortable position though it was most unlikely to alter government policy. 
Such conscientious objections had the potential to place the government in a 
position where it would, through legislation have had to admit it was operating 
outside rather than within the confines of the rule of law. 
   Countermanding judicial decisions by legislation, a potent challenge to judicial 
conscientiousness in this way, he insists,  would have better exposed the system of 
apartheid for what it really was; the antithesis to the rule of law. It amounted to a 
lack of ‘fidelity to law’ to enforce discriminatory legislation which were against 
morality or good conscience because that would be antithetical to law. This is the 
proper course for judges to follow even in the face of obvious defiance by the 
other arms of government, if judges were to be loyal to their oaths of office and 
the course of justice.  
   Dyzenhaus argues further that where the historical record strongly suggests 
judges have failed in upholding their oaths of office to maintain fidelity to law 
(and his conception of law is one indivisible from morals), they ought to be called 
to account for their failure. He posits that in such situations, recourse can not be 
had to judicial independence as a shield. Independence of judges he maintains will 
not be compromised by an ‘account… of conduct which compromised their 
independence.’107      
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   Interestingly, the truth commission in Ghana108 (one of the immediate 
successors of the Oputa Panel in truth-seeking in Africa) did hold special hearings 
for the Legal Profession. The country’s experience provides support for the 
proposition that whether or not the judiciary is considered a victim of gross 
violations of human rights in conflicted societies should not preclude an 
examination of its role in governance in the period of conflict or authoritarian 
rule.  
   While it is largely true that the specifics of the experiences of no two societies 
are exactly the same, it is significant to note that Ghana shares more than a 
passing similarity with Nigeria in many ways. These include the fact of 
heterogeneity characteristic of many of post- British colonial states. There is also 
the fact of the experience of authoritarian rule for the better part of its post-
independence period. Close scrutiny further disclose similar political and social 
conditions as well as justification advanced by the military class for political 
intervention in the two countries.  
   Providing additional empirical bases  for analytical comparison, Ghana’s 
judicial and constitutional arrangements during the period were not only similar to 
Nigeria’s, the judiciary in both countries faced similar challenges of adjudicating 
in the context of military authoritarian rule for extended periods.109 Like the 
Nigerian truth-seeking process, the nine-member commission was chaired by a 
retired Supreme Court Justice, K. E. Amua-Sekyi. That Commission made the 
significant finding that the judiciary at some points in the country’s post-
independence history was intimidated into giving up its role in restoring the 
violated rights of citizens.110  
   In sum them, it is useful to clarify that what is being advocated on public 
accountability of the judiciary is a full account of their judicial role in the past. 
Even as a close reading of Dyzenhaus on the Legal Hearings of the TRC shows, 
the inquiry is not sought on an accusatory or judgemental premise. It is not so 
much to ‘judge the judges’ as been wrong in their actions or judgements (even 
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though there may be many or some instances of these). Rather, the objective is to 
achieve two important aims in the context of transition. The two objectives 
marginally appear correlative but are indeed distinct. 
   The first is to obtain a record of judicial activity during a period of 
misgovernance and gross violations of human rights as an institution of state. In 
this regard, obtaining an account of the judicial role serves to provide ‘as 
complete a picture as possible’ of past governance. This may of course disclose in 
part that the judiciary itself was a victim of violations of human rights and the rule 
of law and such disclosure is itself relevant. But it is only an accounting in the 
first place that can lead to such a finding and not an a priori position that the state 
of victim-hood should be assumed or justifies unaccountability of any institution 
of the state, in this case, the judiciary. The second aspect is the potential for the 
scrutiny of the judicial role in the past to facilitate transformation of the institution 
in the context of a new resolve to move society in the direction of change and new 
beginnings. While this second aspect of the matter may be incidental (at least, 
indirectly) to the first point, it is a separate one. The one looks at the past, the 
other projects reflexively, into the future. Thus, that there is ‘nothing to learn’ 
from the past does not detract from the societal right to know in the present. But 
an important dynamic is that when the two issues are taken together, judicial 
accountability for past conduct can be considered at being directed at 
strengthening, rather than undermining judicial independence, as argued by 
objectors to a public accountability of the judicial role as advocated in South 
Africa.      
 
CONCLUSION 
   The purview of accountability in transitions ought to be extended to the 
judiciary in recognition of its role in governance as the third arm in the tripod of 
state institutions. Public accountability ensures comprehensive accounts of 
governance in post-authoritarian societies that is essential to charting a 
transformative agenda for all the institutions of state. Institutional transformation 
is at the heart of the aspiration to reinstitute the rule of law in post-authoritarian 
contexts. Further, it is recognised as a component of the right to restitution for 
victims of gross violations of human rights in post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
societies.   
    Traditional notions of judicial independence gird objections to public 
accountability of the judiciary, setting it apart in the accountability paradigms 
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applied to the other arms of government. Objections to judicial accountability are 
rooted in conceptions of the judicial function in liberal democracies (distinguished 
by the absence of social upheavals) to the neglect of the dynamics of law and 
justice in transitional contexts.  
   In view of the concession that the interpretive role of the judiciary is not 
immune to the vagaries of time and place but rather contingent on it,111 fixation on 
a univocal judicial paradigm for all climes and periods is misplaced at best. The 
case for public accountability of the judiciary is further accentuated in transitional 
societies where there is (as is usually the case) direct, or implicit complicity on the 
part of the judiciary for gross violations of human rights violations. A study of the 
judicial function in such societies serves to advance our position on the salience of 
accountability of the judiciary for the past in such societies. The Nigerian 
transition to civil rule after decades of military authoritarianism provides just the 
context for such a study. 
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Chapter Three 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: THE NIGERIAN 
CONTEXT 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   It is utopian to expect that the judiciary is capable of curing all the ills of 
society.1 Conceding the reality does not detract in anyway from its potential role 
as an important agent for social change. It is highly unlikely that any of the other 
branches of government can independently cure every ill of society. It is also 
doubtful that the collaboration of the three branches can (even with the best 
intentions) lead to the realisation of that aspiration considering the complexities of 
social arrangements in contemporary society. However it should be safe to posit 
that effective cooperation of all three branches would likely enhance the quality of 
individual and collective social well-being.  
    A critical assessment of judicial impact on the course of governance and the 
exercise of state powers ensures that the judiciary is confronted with its role in 
governance and facilitate its institutional transformation where required. In 
Chapter Two, I argued a case for the relevance and merits of accountability for the 
judicial role in previous governance in transitions generally. The basic premise for 
that argument is the proposition that the judiciary as one of the institutions of the 
state participates in governance at all times and in transitions where accountability 
of governance is pursued, it should extend as a matter of principle to the judiciary. 
   In this chapter, I evaluate the impact of the judicial function on governance 
utilising some of the theoretical principles set out in Chapter Two. The utilitarian 
value of such assessment lies in ensuring that ‘the judiciary takes its fair share of 
the credit’ for the state of affairs in society. The judicial ‘fair share’ on close 
scrutiny could be on the debit side.2 More than that, it provides the basis for 
articulating a programmatic transformation of the judicial institution, where such 
is established, in line with the recognised need for societal reconstruction of 
                                                 
1A Barak “The Supreme Court, 2001 Term- Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
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 T I Ogowewo “Self-Inflicted Constraints on Judicial Government in Nigeria” (2005) 49 (1) 
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complicit pre-transition state institutions.3 To contextualize the argument, I focus 
on judicial governance and accountability within the paradigms of Nigeria’s 
transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. I analyse specific 
issues that necessitate accountability of the judiciary in the context of Nigeria’s 
political transition. It has been stated earlier that there were unresolved allegations 
of complicity for violations of human rights against the judiciary in Nigeria 
because the Oputa Panel omitted to engage with that aspect of accountability for 
the past in its work. 
  The judiciary like any other institution ought not to loathe taking the credit for its 
positive contributions to the course of governance and the exercise of state 
powers. In the same way, basic principles of equity and commonsense dictate that 
it should submit itself to criticisms for its failures. Accountability of the judiciary 
is relevant at all times. However, it assumes the nature of a compelling obligation 
in transitional contexts, particularly where there is substantial basis to adduce 
complicity to the judiciary for a situation of subversion of democratic governance, 
sustained, gross violations of human rights and impunity on the part of the state.  
   In proceeding, I set out a legal premise for accountability of the judiciary for the 
past in the Nigerian context. I then discuss the accountability gap in judicial 
governance in Nigeria’s transition. This is followed by an examination of the 
judicial function in authoritarian contexts. I then move on to analyse the bi-
dimensional issues that necessitate accountability of the judiciary in the context of 
Nigeria’s political transition. These are of a legal-jurisprudential and sociological 
nature. I conclude that the accountability gap with respect to the role of the 
judiciary saddles the transitioning society with an untransformed judiciary. The 
absence of transformation in the wake of the political transition in the country 
threatens not only the rule of law, but also the transition project as a whole. 
 
2. THE TRANSITION JUDICIARY: A LEGAL PREMISE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
   Scott has noted that in discussing accountability issues, it is germane to address 
three distinct questions. These are identification of who is to be held accountable, 
to who is it due, and for what?4 Call these the ‘premise or basis for 
accountability.’ The case for accountability of the judiciary in transitional 
contexts benefits from the adoption of Scott’s model. Failure to delimit the scope 
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4
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and process of desired accounts potentially impedes the clarity of the discussion. 
Thus, perhaps by far the most challenging aspect of accountability of the judiciary 
in the context of transitions is delineation of what is to be accounted, by whom 
and for what? There is yet little by way of state practice to assist the formulation 
of conceptual responses to the foregoing critical issues.  
  That said, however attractive it may seem, in the age of globalisation, to 
articulate a universal model for accountability of the judiciary, prescription of a 
model for such accountability in societies in transitions is potentially a difficulty 
endeavour. Societies in transition from one form of troubled past or the other 
predictably have varied experiences. Local dynamics and national specificities do 
not encourage prescriptive models for accountability of the judiciary for the past 
in transitional contexts. Experiential accounts of the implementation of 
prescriptive economic ‘restructuring’ programmes like the Bretton Woods 
institutions imposed Structural Adjustments Programmes in Africa as against Asia 
aptly demonstrates this point.5 Clearly, the development of international norms 
and standards are commendable. They establish benchmarks of best practices and 
set out evaluative standards for national development. However, in addressing 
transitional justice issues, it has been recognised and conceded at the highest level 
of the international system, that the imposition of ‘model’ approaches to the 
neglect of contextual peculiarities may be counter-productive.6  
   Further, the complexities that attach to the judicial institution suggest 
prescriptive or imposed models may unravel, rather than advance the quest for 
accountability of the judiciary for its past role in governance. It is arguable that 
the role of the judiciary and the constraints it may have had to operate with in 
large-scale and high-intensity armed conflict like a civil war (as was the case in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone) may significantly differ in a low-intensity armed 
conflict in apartheid South Africa. The dynamics of both cases may yet be 
different from the judicial circumstances under authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America, Ghana and Nigeria for instance. The fact of genocide in Rwanda (which 
also targeted the judiciary and the legal profession as a whole) would likely 
impact in a marked way on judicial accounts in that country. Notwithstanding 
                                                 
5
 A A Ali “Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty in SubSahara Africa 1985-1995” in T 
Mkandawire and C Soludo (eds.) African Voices on Structural Adjustment 
(IDRC/CODESRIA/Africa World Press Ottawa 2002). 
6
 UN Security Council Document No.S/2004/616, Report of the Secretary –General, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies 1at17 available at:  
http://www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement(
10th October 2005). See ‘Summary’ and pages 6-7. 
 86 
these problems, general principles may be outlined for the contentious process. 
One such key principle should be that the approach to be adopted for 
accountability of the judiciary be context-driven rather than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model.    
   Related to the above is that judicial accountability of a public nature ought to 
take in to consideration the level of development of the legal institution in relation 
to other arms of government. Here, the training of judicial officials, the reliance or 
otherwise of the citizenry on judicial processes, available judicial resources, the 
operative judicial environment, the tenure of judges, etc, could have some 
resonance for judicial output and the role the judiciary played (or was 
incapacitated from playing), in authoritarian and conflicted societies. Was there 
judicial independence (or an appreciable level of judicial independence)? Were 
judges adequately trained? Was the judiciary adequately funded and judges secure 
in their tenure? All of these are issues relevant to the disposition of the judicial 
function. Setting evaluative criteria a priori for otherwise largely context-driven 
dynamics can be as problematic as to be unproductive.  
   It may not be impossible to determine or ascertain the state of relevant factors in 
a pre-accountability environment. However, the point remains that a relativist 
approach may better serve the process of accountability in general and judicial 
accounting in particular. It is plausible to suggest that relevant factors to be 
considered in an inquiry in to the judicial role ought to include the incidence of 
wide spread corruption, lack of independence, legitimation of authoritarian, 
despotic or discriminatory rule (as was the case in South Africa), all of which 
were the norm for the most part of Nigeria’s post-independence history.  
   In view of the centrality of constitutions in articulating socio-political and 
economic reconstruction in democratisation and transition arrangements, 
constitutional supremacy commends itself as a viable basis for accountability of 
the judiciary for the past. In the Nigerian context, constitutional supremacy 
provides a functional approach to the issue of judicial accounting for its role in 
governance during the pre-transition period. The basic premise for this is the 
centrality of the constitution to the existence of the country as a nation state. In 
reality, the Nigerian polity is a nation of ‘nations.’ Like many other post-colonial 
African countries, it is an amalgam of largely historically independent, sometimes 
hostile ethnicities within a geographical territory involuntarily ‘united’ by British 
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colonial power.7 Thus a viable basis for normative accountability of all state 
institutions must be neutral in both origin and content to ground and sustain its 
legitimacy. 
   In terms of its constitutional history, the Independence Constitution of 1960 in 
particular (and its successors in varying degrees) aspired to provide a rallying 
point for establishing a functional state comprising heterogeneous ethnic identities 
and diverse interests. Specifically, fears of domination by ethnic minority interests 
led to the setting up of the Sir Henry Willinck Commission in 1956, its 
recommendation and ultimate inclusion of fundamental human rights in the 
Independence Constitution of 1960.8 It similarly led to the adoption of a federal 
political arrangement.9  
   Nigerian society has always expressed a foundational preference for express 
constitutional guarantee of rights, justice and accountability. This is reflected in a 
preference for constitutional supremacy as soon as the country attained republican 
status in 1963. It could be hardly otherwise, given the absence of a historical sense 
or culture of shared nationhood which could have generated or institutionalised 
political and legal conventions for a modern state.  
   In this regard, it is significant to note that in the political transition away from 
authoritarian military rule, the judiciary, particularly at the highest levels, has had 
constant resort to the concept of constitutional supremacy. In several cases (some 
of which are discussed subsequently in this study), the Supreme Court has 
asserted the supremacy of the constitution as a fundamental principle for resolving 
inter-institutional conflicts in the Nigerian state. 10   
   Thus, in addition to the principle of comprehensive accountability enunciated in 
Chapter Two, the arguments here adopt constitutional supremacy as the legal 
basis for judicial accounts for past judicial conduct in the country in the country as 
part of transitional justice measures. As stated earlier, this is in recognition of the 
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primacy of constitutional supremacy as a fundamental foundational and 
organisational principle of governance in pre-and post-authoritarian military 
period in Nigeria. It must be acknowledged though, that the very concept of 
constitutional supremacy, central to Nigerian post-independent statehood and 
subsequent republicanism, was violently displaced and distorted by military 
adventurism and authoritarian rule. The operations of state institutions, including 
the judiciary, came to be defined in terms of the prevailing socio-political 
displacement. This, it will be argued below, was done with the acquiescence of 
the judicial institution. Significantly however, the rehabilitation of the principle 
(alluded to above) as an integral part of the political transition invests it with 
considerable promise as a basis for accountability of all state institutions.    
    
3.   THE JUDICIARY IN AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS  
    The judiciary can to some extent be insulated from the vagaries of institutional 
displacement that result from authoritarian rule. The regular if not immediate 
casualties of military rule in democratic states are the executive, the legislature 
and popular sovereignty.11The continued existence of the political branches is 
incompatible with military intrusion into governance. To a large extent, the 
military leaves the judiciary nominally intact, but usually severely compromised.    
   Why do military usurpers of the democratic-will sack the executive and 
legislature but leave the judicial institution intact? Two factors can be advanced 
for this. The first is the legitimating function that the judiciary accords military 
usurpation of power.12 The self-serving motive has been aptly described by 
Mahmud 
               Usurpers appear to recognize that judicial pronouncements about the  
               nature and merits of the change and quantum of their legislative capacity  
               have an impact on the legitimacy of the new regime, because words like  
               “law” and “legality” function as titles of honor…Securing judicial  
               recognition appears to be the key to gaining political legitimacy.13  
 
   Conscious of the constitutional breach its claim to and hold on political power 
constitute, ruling military elites are usually anxious to secure some measure of 
popular acceptability in order to gain a semblance of legitimacy and mitigate their 
wanton illegality. Legitimacy is central to governance. From dual perspectives, 
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normative and descriptive, legitimacy is crucial to the ability of the ruling elite to 
make valid political decisions and orders as well as to the societal acceptance of 
such orders and decisions.14 Thus even the military class in its foray into 
governance is obliged to secure a veneer of legitimacy for the effective exercise of 
political power. 
   Besides the aspiration to legitimacy is the rather unavoidable necessity for the 
judicial institution. It is arguable that in contrast to executive and legislative 
governance, the more nuanced requirements of adjudication or judicial 
governance are well beyond the disposition or capacity of military adventurers in 
power. The incapacity on the part of the military to administer the judicial 
function dictates the need to retain the judiciary in governance. This specialised 
nature of the judicial function constitutes a positive force which the judiciary 
ought to have utilised in the quest to maintain its institutional integrity, uphold 
human rights and the rule of law irrespective of the duress constituted by 
authoritarian military rule.15  
   According to Mahmud, there are four possible options for the judiciary faced 
with the challenge of a coup d’etat. The options are (i) validating the usurpation, 
(ii) declaring the usurpation unconstitutional and hence invalid, (iii) resignation, 
thereby refusing to adjudicate the legality of the demise of the very constitution 
under which the court was established or (iv)declaring the issue a non-justiciable 
political question.16 The Courts in Nigeria chose the option of validating and 
legitimating the rebellious act, a choice Mahmud has asserted is only pragmatic in 
the circumstance of military authoritarianism.17 Ogowewo shares this view, 
insisting though on a post hoc judicial invalidation of legislative and 
constitutional acts of military usurpers.18   
   Military regimes, perhaps more than any other form of government, invariably 
desire a judiciary that is ‘pliant and which remains attentive to their interest.’ 
Despite that, military autocrats ‘in order to be able to project an image of 
legitimate political order’ aspire that the judiciary as well as judges ‘be seen to be 
independent and to be operating at one remove from politics.’19 Thus it may be 
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rather simplistic to justify judicial acquiescence to military authoritarianism (as 
some constitutional law scholars have sought to do) on the basis of the latter’s 
complete control of the powers of coercion and perceived self-sufficiency.20 The 
recurring preference of usurpers for preserving the judiciary in virtually all 
instances of military incursion into power in post-colonial commonwealth states21 
suggests the self-sufficiency claim is at best overrated. Following this situational 
analysis of the judiciary in authoritarian contexts, we should now turn attention to 
the judiciary in Nigeria’s transition.  
 
4.   THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
   In spite of the precedent set by the South Africa TRC and its aspiration to be 
seen as modelled after it, the Nigeria truth-seeking process, the Oputa Panel, 
neglected to focus attention on the judiciary. Through that failure (with the 
seeming acquiescence of civil society), human rights groups, the legal profession 
and the Nigerian public missed the opportunity to develop the theme of 
establishing the truth about judicial governance in the country. The failure of the 
Oputa Panel in this regard is rather intriguing, considering the Panel held special 
hearings for the Police and the Prisons Service; institutions that constitute an 
integral part of the criminal justice system. 
   As noted in Chapter One, the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Prisons 
Service had the legal profession, lawyers, magistrates and judges, to contend with 
in the execution of their duties. With regard to the notorious phenomenon of 
prison congestion as stated in Chapter One, the Nigeria Prisons Service was quick 
to point out that it was a hapless victim of the remand orders of magistrates and 
judges. Notwithstanding, the Oputa Panel (presumably to investigate petitions 
alleging gross violations of human rights of detained individuals in the various 
prisons), summoned the Prisons Service to give an account of its role in the 
violations of human rights in the country. Yet the judiciary and the broader family 
of the legal profession were not.   
   Was it the consensus that the judiciary was also a victim of military 
authoritarianism? Could it be a deliberate attempt to shield the constituency of the 
majority of the Panel’s members including the chairman, from possible unsavoury 
public scrutiny? This last, suggesting the possibility of institutional loyalty or bias 
on the part of the panel members appears unlikely, in view of the unquestioned 
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integrity of the members as a whole and the chairman in particular. There is the 
additional fact that at inception, the Oputa Panel held consultative forums with 
diverse interests in the Nigerian society including human rights and non-
governmental organisations to articulate an agenda for its work.  
   From a comparative perspective, it is relevant to recall that the chain of events 
leading to the South Africa TRC Legal Hearing was set in motion by the 
submission made to the TRC by a human rights lawyer alleging injustice on the 
part of the judiciary in the apartheid era.22 No petition or submission of similar 
purport directly challenging the judiciary is on record to have been made to the 
Oputa Panel. But should the omission on the part of the Oputa Panel be excused? 
This is an important question considering that the Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission (instituted after the Nigerian process), as alluded to earlier, held a 
Legal Hearing similar to the South Africa TRC. The Ghana NRC Legal Hearing 
was conducted without a petition of the nature that spurred the latter’s inquiry.   
   It would appear the Oputa Panel maintained a deafening silence on judicial 
governance as a deliberate policy. It may have felt satisfied that the report of an 
earlier inquiry on the state of the Nigerian judiciary constituted sufficient scrutiny 
of the institution.23 The inquiry, instituted by the late dictator, General Sanni 
Abacha was headed by another respected retired Supreme Court Justice, Kayode 
Eso, with the report named after him. It did expose some unsavoury details about 
the judicial institution in the country. Suffice to say however that the inquiry was 
about the state rather than the role of the judiciary during years of military 
authoritarian rule in the country. It was by no means an attempt at public scrutiny 
of the judiciary for its past conduct.  In any case, the latter remit was temporally 
beyond the purview of the Eso Panel that was constituted by and conducted under 
military rule. Thus, satisfaction on the part of the Oputa Panel in this regard could 
be regarded as misplaced and out of tune with transitional justice considerations.  
   It could also be argued for the Oputa Panel that there was not in fact a public 
demand for the inclusion of the judiciary in the truth-seeking process. This is 
however due, not so much to the fact that the judiciary enjoys a reputation of 
probity. Nor is the exclusion a definitive indicator of public satisfaction with the 
existence of judicial independence, its accountability or lack of complicity for the 
suffering inflicted on the Nigerian society by decades of authoritarian rule. 
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Rather, the absence of such a public challenge or demand for the truth-seeking 
process to involve the judiciary would appear to be connected (at least in part) 
with the origins of the predominant segment of the institution (the common law 
courts) and perceptions of it in Nigerian society.  
   To the average citizen, the judiciary, to a large extent, constitutes one of the 
most prominent symbols of a colonial heritage. It is usually considered as being at 
some remove from the regular day-to-day activities of the common folk. Even in 
the post-authoritarian period in Nigeria (as elsewhere in Africa), the courts 
continue to suffer from a serious ‘social legitimacy’ deficit enjoying recognition 
within a much circumscribed segment of society24 and certainly much less than 
the two political branches of government. The judicialisation of politics 
(discussed later)25 would appear to have generated a newfound bonding between 
the ‘ordinary’ citizen and the judiciary. But as will become evident, the turn to the 
judicial moderation of the turbulent political process has been largely a matter of 
expedience. From a pragmatic point of view, there is no other institution to turn to 
in order to salvage the polity from descent in to chaos. The fear is rife in the 
country that socio-political chaos will provide an excuse for the military to return 
to power. In any event, the current recourse to the judicial intervention in the 
political process does not account for the judicial years of the locust in which the 
judiciary was largely a distant institution from the man on the streets, enforcing 
laws that were considered at best alien to the majority.  
   Beyond localised and society-specific perceptions of the judiciary as an alien-
imposed elitist institution, the failure of the Oputa Panel to focus on the judiciary 
may be situated within the trend of political transition agenda in general. There is 
a general tendency to elide the critical issue of accountability of the judiciary in 
political transitions. State practice and to some extent, theoretical conceptions of 
democratic transitions in post-authoritarian societies in particular (where the 
judiciary survives military or one party rule), project a ‘let-the courts-be’ attitude. 
As far as the proper functioning of the judiciary in the post-authoritarian period is 
concerned, proponents of the democratic agenda usually content themselves with 
making textual constitutional provisions stipulating (or in cases where such had 
existed in suspension like Nigeria, reaffirming) judicial power and independence. 
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They do so in the belief that such steps are adequate for the judiciary to take on 
the enormous challenge of upholding the constitution.26   
   The practice of incomprehensive accountability as described above is similarly 
discernible in the approach of international bodies whose remit commends 
efficient and independent judicial practices. Their institutional focus compels, or 
at least, encourages them to get involved in judicial reformation as part of 
institutional restoration processes required in transitional societies. An apposite 
case in point is the ongoing collaboration of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) with the Nigerian judiciary and law enforcement agencies. 
The UNODC programme being implemented for ensuring judicial integrity and 
capacity in the country has conspicuously neglected accountability of the judiciary 
for past misgovernance.27 The approach is rather ironic because careful reflection 
on the judicial record, both operational and jurisprudential, discloses several 
issues that justify a public accounting for the judicial role in governance during 
the period of authoritarian rule in the country to achieve the laudable aims of the 
programme. Thus, the accountability gap remains. The issues around the 
accountability gap can be broadly categorised into two. One is the legal-
jurisprudential dimension. The other is socio-political in nature. 
 
5. LEGAL-JURISPRUDENTIAL DIMENSION 
 5.1 Legitimising Military Rule 
   In constitutionalism, judicial review of legislation is usually conceived of in 
terms of its restraint on legislative and executive action. But there is also the 
crucial aspect of its legitimation of laws and decisions of the political branches of 
government. Absent judicial declarations of unconstitutionality of such acts in 
legal challenges to them, they are contra-wise invested with constitutional validity 
by the courts.28 In that respect, judicial review is potentially a double-edged 
sword.     
   In Nigeria, the highest court, the Supreme Court (the Court) maintained an 
ambivalent attitude to the legitimacy of military rule, right from the onset of 
military intervention in the country’s politics. The judiciary had legitimised 
military adventurism at the earliest opportunity to pronounce on the rebellion that 
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brought the military to power in 1966. This it did in Isaac Boro v Republic29 the 
first case that tested the waters of judicial attitude towards military rule. It came 
before the Court in December 1966, barely six months after the second military 
coup30 in the country. 
   In the subsequent case of Council of the University of Ibadan v Adamolekun, 31 
the court decided inter alia that the mutiny that resulted in the military usurpation 
of executive and legislative powers was a ‘military take over of the Government 
of Nigeria.’ Significantly, it went further to hold that the take over was of a nature 
that kept ‘the Constitution of the Federation alive subject to the suspensions and 
modifications made by the Decree.’32  It thus legitimised the unconstitutional, 
purported ‘transfer’ of power by the Council of Ministers to the mutinous soldiers 
who had murdered some key political figures including the Prime Minister, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. 
   The foundations of judicial obeisance to authoritarian military rule in the 
country, which became an imprimatur of most judicial decisions bearing on the 
constitutionality and legitimacy of military rule in the country, was however 
irretrievably laid by the Court’s decision in E O Lakanmi and Kikelomo Ola v The 
Attorney –General (Western State), The Secretary to the Tribunal (Investigation 
of Assets Tribunal) and the Counsel to the Tribunal (Lakanmi Case). 33 The 
substantive issue in the Lakanmi case was the constitutionality of Decree No. 45 
of 1968- Forfeiture of Assets Validation Decree- promulgated by the Federal 
Military Government (FMG). It had among others, directed the forfeiture of the 
assets of the Plaintiffs/Appellants for alleged corruption in public office. The 
Plaintiffs contended that the decree was null and void for been in violation of their 
property rights guaranteed by the 1963 Republican Constitution operative in the 
country at the time.    
   The Attorney-General argued on behalf of the Defendants that the events of 16 
January 1966 that brought the FMG into power amounted to a revolution of the 
Kelsenian type that destroyed the legal system. The FMG had then become the 
supreme legislative authority in the country and its legislative powers could not be 
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assailed in any way. The Attorney-General placed much store on the provisions of 
Decree No.1 of 1966- Constitution Suspension and Modification Decree, that 
provided inter alia that ‘the  Federal Military Government shall have powers to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.’ He further relied on section 1(1) 
of the Decree which modified the 1963 Republican Constitution in these terms 
               This constitution shall have force throughout Nigeria and if any other  
               law…is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this  
               Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the  
               inconsistency, be void. Provided that this Constitution shall not prevail  
               over a decree, and nothing in this Constitution shall render any  
               provision of a decree void to any extent whatsoever.34 
 
The Court agreed with the submission of counsel for the Plaintiffs that it was 
vested with powers of judicial review of executive action. It rejected the purported 
ouster of its jurisdiction by the decree, declaring it a piece of legislative 
judgement. But the Court, per Chief Justice Adetokunbo Ademola, nonetheless 
accorded recognition to the Federal Military Government not only as one deriving 
from ‘necessity’ and thus a ‘constitutional government’ within the contemplation 
of the 1963 Republican Constitution, but also affirmed the FMG was ‘the 
Supreme Legislative body’ in the country. This recognition was in spite of the fact 
that it rejected the argument of the Federal Military Government that it had come 
into power through a revolution.  
   Although the Court mustered some courage to insist on judicial review of the 
executive and legislative actions of the federal military government in the 
Lakanmi case, it capitulated in Adejumo v Johnson.35 In Adejumo the Court 
implicitly overruled even the limited recognition it had accorded the military 
usurpation of power in the Lakanmi Case. In its place, the Court substituted an 
unqualified acknowledgement of the events of January 16 1966 as a revolution. 
The decision in the Adejumo case was sequel to the promulgation by the FMG of 
the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No.28 of 1970,36 barely two weeks after the decision in the Lakanmi case. 
Thus, the Court adopted and went on to retain, the plain-fact jurisprudence in the 
interpretation of military decrees in much the same way as the courts in apartheid 
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South Africa did apartheid laws.37 The decision in the Adejumo case gave effect to 
the provisions of not only Decree No.28 but that of Section 1(1) of Decree No.1 
of 1966 that it had hitherto partly rebuffed in the Lakanmi case.  
   The plain-fact jurisprudential approach adopted by the judiciary was applied to 
its interpretation to all manner of legislation promulgated by successive 
authoritarian regimes in Nigeria. The duplicitous effect of the plain-fact 
jurisprudence came to the fore in the interpretation of military decrees that sought 
to suspend parts of the constitution, curtail fundamental human rights and oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts by subsequent military administrations in the country. 
The legitimation of military usurpation of power underlies the jurisprudence of 
the Nigerian judiciary in the judicial review of the fused executive and legislative 
action of the military throughout their authoritarian hold on power.  
   Mahmud rightly rejects this conflation of a revolution with a coup d’état. 
According to him, a revolution leads to a complete disintegration of existing 
societal structures and the establishment of a new legal order that is ‘autonomous’ 
of the previous order. A coup d’etat on the other hand has the limited aim of 
capturing political power within the framework of the existing legal structures but 
in an illegal manner. It proceeds to seek legitimacy and recognition within or from 
the (pre) existing order. 38  
   Mahmud’s position on the nature of revolutions as against coup d’etat ought to 
be preferred on cursory assessment of political experience of authoritarianism. It 
has been demonstrated by the attitude of military usurpers in Africa, Asia and 
parts of the Middle East over time, notably in the common practice of leaving the 
judicial institution intact and seeking judicial approbation of its legitimacy. It is 
further reflected in lip-service claims to upholding the rule of law and 
constitutional arrangements (with certain caveats) by even some of the most 
notorious dictators. 
   No doubt the question of the appropriate judicial approach to military 
authoritarianism is a much contested one. The merits or propriety of one or the 
other approach constitute contentious issues that have attracted scholarly 
attention. The fine points of the complex debates involved are outside the scope of 
this work. It is relevant to note in this regard that even Dyzenhaus cautioned in 
further reflections on the role of judges in the apartheid legal order that ‘one must 
be careful not to err on the side of over- or underestimation’ of what judges can do 
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within an unjust or authoritarian legal order.39 In the case of authoritarian military 
regimes, there is little doubt the response of the military as indeed demonstrated 
by the enactment of the ‘Supremacy Decree’ following the half-hearted decision 
of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the Lakanmi Case, is to override such decisions. 
However, that state of affairs does not detract from the case for accountability of 
the judiciary. 
   Providing an account of judicial governance accords popular supremacy to the 
people and promotes the rule of law by demonstrating that the judiciary itself is 
subject to law. It also reflects the responsiveness of the judiciary to societal 
sensitivities both of which are critical to its institutional viability. Events in 
Pakistan in 2007 where the public rallied behind the Chief Justice, Iftikhar 
Muhammad Chaudry as a symbol of democracy against the usurper, General 
Pervez Musharraf demonstrates the point quite well.40 
   The question of judicial accountability in transitions seeks the production of a 
record of judicial governance to highlight the nature, course and impact of the 
judicial function in the period of social displacement occasioned by 
authoritarianism or violent conflict. It may include considering such questions as: 
Is it not the case that the judiciary served to perpetuate subversion of the 
constitution that established it and to which it was sworn to protect? What 
considerations conditioned the jurisprudence of the courts? In the Nigerian 
context, the question can be raised as to why for instance did the Supreme Court 
not give consideration to the question of the origin or nature of its judicial powers 
in the foregoing cases? Why did it jettison the supremacy clause in the 
constitution? 
   According to Mahmud, any court that evinces a serious inclination towards 
‘strict constitutionalism’ in the aftermath of a coup d’etat is ab initio obliged to 
consider the source of its own powers to determine whether they are derived from 
the ‘old’ or ‘new’ constitutional arrangement.41 Following on Mahmud’s position, 
it can be argued that consideration of the basis of judicial powers after the military 
putsch may have proven decisive to the course of jurisprudence in the period of 
authoritarian military rule in Nigeria. This is particularly important when it is 
considered that the Republican Constitution of 1963 in operation before military 
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incursion into governance in the country (unlike the South African apartheid 
constitutions) had an unequivocal constitutional supremacy clause as the first 
substantive provision. 
    The supremacy clause has been replicated in all subsequent constitutions in the 
country. Significantly, unlike the case in Ghana and Pakistan that similarly 
witnessed military incursions into governance, justices of the Nigerian Supreme 
Court (and for that matter, all other judges in the country then) were not required 
to take new judicial oaths by successive regimes of military usurpers to retain 
their offices. In that way, their personal offices were hardly threatened and they 
were thus saved the moral dilemma of the propriety of publicly examining the 
basis of their power.  
   No doubt writing from the vantage position of the pinnacle of a judiciary that 
was established and continues to operate within the most controversial and longest 
ongoing conflict in the post-second world-war era, Barak asserts that  
               The democratic nature of a regime shapes the role of all branches of the  
               state. It also directly affects the judiciary…the character of the regime  
               affects the interpretive system that the judge should adopt…With a  
               regime change, the view of the judge’s role and the way it is exercised  
               also change.42 
 
On this view, the absence of democracy impacts on the role of the judiciary and 
its institutional claims to independence. The truth-seeking process in the context 
of the political transition in Nigeria provided an opportunity for exploring the 
workings of the legal order and the judiciary. It provided a viable forum for the 
clarification of the legal or other considerations that conditioned the jurisprudence 
of the courts in jettisoning the supremacy clause in the constitution at the relevant 
period. But the opportunity for public accountability of the course of judicial 
governance was frittered away. This missed opportunity raises the important issue 
of the place of popular sovereignty in the adoption of accountability measures in 
transitional contexts. 
 5.2   Imperatives of Popular Sovereignty 
    Section 14 (2) (a) of the Nigerian constitutions of 1979 and 1999 (the latter 
constitutes the transition some critics insist interim, constitution of Nigeria) lend 
constitutional support to the case for accountability of the judiciary in Nigeria to 
the people. Both constitutions, fairly representative of the dynamics of 
constitutionalism in the Nigerian polity in the post-independence period, 
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specifically entrench popular sovereignty, providing that ‘sovereignty belongs to 
the people of Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives 
all its powers and authority.’ The illegality constituted by the subversion and 
impairment of the popular will of the people as embodied in the constitution, 
through the use of ‘superior force’, by the military according to Ogowewo, alters 
their expressed wishes on how they prefer to be governed.43  
   Further, the unequivocal provisions of the constitution provide support for the 
proposition that all institutions of the Nigerian state owe a duty of public 
accountability to the people, the source of all governmental powers. This is 
implicit in the specific vesting of sovereignty in the people of Nigeria by the 1979 
constitution which Ogowewo argues is the legitimate and validly subsisting 
constitution of the country44 and the transition constitution of 1999 now operative 
in the country.  
   It may be the case that there is a need to protect the judiciary from been made 
pliant to unbridled subjection to common public opinion and that it maintains 
some respectable distance from the flux of (sometimes indeterminate) popular 
opinion. It is however in the interest of the judiciary that such autonomy be 
conditioned by the realities of the society from which it derives authority if it 
hopes to establish and maintain relevance or even more fundamentally, 
legitimacy. The demands of the period of transition when the need for social 
restructuring is more imperative than at any other are the most momentous for the 
exercise of such recognition. As stated above, a legal basis for accountability of 
the judiciary in the Nigerian context can be located in constitutional supremacy 
and with reference to Scott’s paradigm set out earlier, it is owed to the people. 
Such accountability which requires all institutions to be equally made to answer to 
the people is what Smulovitz and Peruzzoti refers to as ‘societal accountability.’45 
    In the Nigerian situation, the case for accountability of the judiciary is made 
stronger by the fact that judicial officers are unelected. They are thus immune 
from the democratic check on public office-holders characteristic of the executive 
and legislature. The public is precluded from directly participating in and 
imposing sanctions on perceived improper or perverse use of power by the 
judiciary in the way it generally does with politicians in the executive and 
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legislative branches of government through elections, recall, judicial review, etc. 
Even military adventurers in power have been known not to be completely 
immune from one or the other form of public sanction or accountability, as the 
trials of Haile Mengistu and Hissen Habre of Ethiopia and Chad respectively have 
shown. Such trials reinforce the imperative of popular sovereignty in 
accountability for the exercise, or more appropriately, abuse of power.  
 
6. SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 6.1   Corrupt and Compromised 
   There is consensus within and outside legal circles in Nigeria that the judiciary 
had been palpably corrupt. It had become a notorious fact that in the period of 
authoritarian military rule in the country, justice was available for sale to the 
highest bidder. The situation in the courts had become so bad that ‘Trials often 
turn into charades where powerful litigants, aided by unethical lawyers and 
faithless judges, manipulate the judicial process to achieve pre-ordained 
outcomes.’46 Reflecting on the disturbing level of corruption in the Nigerian 
judiciary, Justice Oputa who was later to head Oputa Panel, had lamented 
rhetorically, almost two decades earlier 
               What is it that in present day Nigerian society tarnishes, desecrates and  
               disfigures the solemn, sacred and beautiful image of justice and the  
               judiciary? The answer is not far to seek. It is the cancer of bribery and  
               corruption…one is faced with the stark and naked reality that some  
               judicial officers are corrupt.47 
   
The judiciary itself is aware of this continuing unwholesome state of affairs. Two 
leading judicial officers recently warned of dire consequences awaiting judges 
who engage in corruption in the discharge of their duties.48 The perception that 
corruption exists in the judiciary has not changed though a recent assessment 
suggests it has been reduced.49  
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   Apart from corruption, by several accounts, the judiciary had become severely 
compromised in the important task of upholding human rights.50 The nature of 
military rule in the country led to severe haemorrhaging of human rights of 
citizens. It is relevant to recall Justice Olajide Olatawura’s comments referred to 
earlier, on how the law became weak as result of military ouster clauses.51 The 
observation justifies the case for some form of accountability by the judiciary, at 
the very least, to highlight whether there was dereliction on the part of the 
institution entrusted with the duty of enforcing those rights.  
   The need for public judicial accounting for the past in the context of Nigeria’s 
transition is also heightened by the fact that the military scarcely showed interest 
in the enterprise of law reform, notwithstanding the plethora of decrees it passed 
in the course of its hold on power. Although a law reform commission was 
established for the country, this was in form rather than substance. Not only was it 
poorly funded, proposals for reforms in existing legislation were largely ignored. 
As a result, the country was saddled with considerable obsolete and anachronistic 
laws even in vital areas like criminal law, evidence and commercial law. Thus for 
example, a 1987 survey discovered that pre-1900 ‘received’ English statutes 
numbering 195 were still applicable in Nigeria.52 Laws governing matrimonial 
causes, probate, litigation practice and procedure hardly fared better. In not a few 
instances, the laws remained (with cosmetic amendments in few cases) in the 
form they were inherited from the colonial period. These were laws designed for 
the imposition of colonial authority53 and well suited to the command-structure 
governance of military rulers. The judiciary in the period of authoritarian rule and 
beyond has been party to the enforcement of laws many of which are in clear 
violation of human rights and the spirit of successive constitutions of the country 
in the post-independence period. The situation, yet to be satisfactorily remedied, 
was lamented in recent times by no less a legal personage than a recently retired 
Chief Justice of Nigeria.54  
   One reason for the persisting judicial attitude to authoritarian legislation is the 
adoption of the English common law jurisprudence of legislative supremacy in the 
interpretive function of the courts, even in legal systems (like Nigeria) with 
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express constitutional-supremacy provisions. This is itself rooted in the training of 
Nigerian lawyers and judges in the Anglo-common law tradition which conceives 
a limited role for the interpretive role. It is a heritage that sometimes constitutes a 
burden for an activist and transformative judicial agenda desirable for 
transitioning societies.55 The clear preference of the jurisprudence of that legal 
tradition for the plain-fact interpretation of statutes has assisted, if not the 
imposition, but certainly the sustenance of a ‘rule by law state’ as against the ideal 
of a ‘rule of law state.’56   
   Successive military administrations foisted untold hardship and suffering on the 
mass of the people.57 What role did or could have the judiciary played in that 
suffering? This ought to have constituted an important thematic focus of the truth-
seeking process in Nigeria in view of its broad terms of reference. Part of its remit 
was to ‘identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organizations 
which may be held accountable’ for gross violations of human rights and 
determine the motives for the violations or abuses.  
   The empirical record of the Nigerian judiciary in the period of authoritarian rule 
commends the imperative of accountability for the performance of the judicial 
function. The finding of the Oputa Panel that the courts, faced with decrees 
ousting their jurisdiction in many cases, had become ‘toothless bull dogs’ in the 
years of military rule,58 strengthens the case for accountability of the judiciary. It 
ought to have led to an enquiry on why the judiciary took to the path of 
compromise when their judicial oaths of office require fidelity to law as stated by 
the Constitution rather than military legislation. It is significant for instance that 
the judicial oaths of office were contained in the Constitution at all times. All the 
constitutions, as stated above, contained supremacy clauses. No judge was sworn 
on military legislation. The compromised status of the Nigerian judiciary is 
further exacerbated by a legacy of questionable appointments characterised by 
nepotism and prebendalism.59 The compromised and corrupt judicial function 
generated a lacklustre attitude within the public for recourse to due process of law 
in the resolution of disputes.  
    
 6.2 Public Apathy for Due Process of Law 
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   Public mistrust of the judiciary constitutes a danger to societal cohesion and 
respect for the rule of law. Citizens may resort to self help rather than have 
recourse to the law and the judicial institution to resolve disputes. The effect of 
resultant distortions for the choice is fraught with serious negative consequences 
for hitherto authoritarian societies. Oftentimes, a considerable number of citizens 
are already confronted with the challenges of coming to terms with the harm they 
have suffered in the past that still remain with them.   
   Calls for transformation of the judiciary as a measure to check public apathy for 
due process of law is important for the transitioning society. Thus, calls for reform 
of the judiciary have been particularly strident from stakeholders even in the 
transition period. Voicing the concern of civil society groups, Joseph Otteh, 
Executive Director of Access to Justice, a leading non-governmental organisation 
focused on the justice sector, stated that the judiciary required a ‘full turn around 
maintenance’60 in view of the perversion of the rule of law occasioned by 
structural deficiencies of that branch of government. His observations explain the 
considerable public mistrust of the judiciary and the whole institution of law in 
the country.   
   Cynicism about the role of judicial governance had developed in Nigeria. This 
was due in part to the dysfunctional judiciary that was steeped in corruption.61 In 
turn, the public attacked the judicial institution. Judicial decisions became highly 
suspect sometimes without justification but owing to the persistent institutional 
reputation for corruption. The perception has been carried over into the transition 
period.62 How did the judiciary come to such infamy as a largely failed institution 
in the Nigerian polity? This is a critical issue that should have been given a 
hearing by the truth-seeking process in the country.  
   It has been recognised that public accountability ‘... helps to insure that judges 
perform their duties disinterestedly and conscientiously.’63 This is in itself 
necessary for building, restoring or ensuring public confidence in the judiciary. It 
is also needed to promote individual recourse to law rather than self-help. 
Ensuring such trust is reposed in the judiciary can only be negotiated away with 
dire consequences for a fragile polity as obtains in a transitioning society.  
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    An account of the circumstances under which the judicial role was performed is 
required not only for its historical value though this may be value enough. Rather, 
it ought to be produced for its potential of providing a viable prognosis for the 
way forward in the quest for justice and reinstitution of the rule of law in the 
emerging democratic society. Transitional justice theory recognises the right of 
individuals and society to the reform of compromised and deficient institutions. 
The right to transformation of afflicted institutions can only be properly realised 
where opportunity is provided for developing and scrutinising accounts of the 
conduct of the institutions in the troubled period.  This remains the case even 
where the concerned institution can be considered a victim of the period. 
 6.3 Unacknowledged Victims? 
   It is something of a paradox that the Oputa Panel neglected to hold a hearing on 
the legal profession and the judiciary for an account of its governance during the 
period of military authoritarian rule in Nigeria. This is the case because the 
judiciary itself could be considered a victim of military rule. The paradox is 
heightened by the poignant description of the institution during the military era as 
a ‘beleaguered fortress.’64 That description notwithstanding, could it be that the 
judiciary felt itself under such a heavy burden of complicity for misgovernance 
which surpassed (and thus precluded) any sense of victim-hood during the 
decades of military authoritarian rule? A host of questions regarding the course of 
judicial governance in the authoritarian period in the country remain unaccounted 
for. 
   The experience of the judiciary during the years of authoritarian rule in Nigeria 
was quite different from that of South Africa in a number of ways. Unlike the 
South African judiciary, the judges in Nigeria could themselves be considered, 
though in a limited sense, victims of human rights violations. As Dyzenhaus 
pointed out, post–appointment, South African judges were secure in their tenure 
during the apartheid era and they enjoyed relatively comfortable conditions of 
service. In Nigeria, the security of tenure was breached and judges were 
unceremoniously dismissed or retired in a good number of cases during the years 
of military rule sometimes without any reason given.65 A good case in point was 
in 1975 when the Chief Justice of the country, Justices of the Supreme Court, the 
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Western State Court of Appeal and High Court Judges were removed by the 
military government.66 
   Judicial pay was poor67 particularly when compared with the salaries paid to 
military officers in executive positions. The tenure of judges was on many 
occasions violated in contravention of the Basic Principles of the Independence of 
the Judiciary68 and the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Judges.69 
They lacked proper housing, worked under strained conditions, took notes in long 
hand, administered justice in ill-equipped court rooms and chambers, worked with 
ill-trained and unmotivated support staff, etc.70 Cases of violations of judicial 
tenure must however be qualified in one respect. The military regimes were not 
noted for interfering with the tenure of judges on the basis of (adverse) judicial 
review of executive (and or legislative) actions. Rather, judicial purges were 
invariably premised on allegations of corruption, even if, as in many other aspects 
of military conduct of power, such purges were carried out in breach of due 
process.  
   It is nonetheless plausible in the Nigerian context to contend (like Dyzenhaus 
did in the case of South Africa) that the people were entitled to know why ‘men in 
so privileged position, with such an important role, and with so much space to do 
other than they did, made the wrong moral choice’ in the performance of their 
duties. This is the case because like in South Africa, Nigerian judges could have 
maintained fidelity to law (and it is again crucial to note that a few did), ‘without 
fear of serious personal repercussions’ since they were not required to follow the 
orders of the power-usurpers.71 
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   In manifestation of what has been referred to as ‘the strange irony that 
sometimes characterizes the conduct of public affairs in Nigeria,’72 the post-
transition period has witnessed alleged threats to the safety and well being of 
some judges in the conduct of their legitimate judicial functions. 73 In contrast, for 
all of the reported cases of state-sponsored murder during various military 
regimes, not even in the case of the most notorious Generals Babangida and 
Abacha74 were judicial officers targeted. Nigerian judges are thus obliged to 
account for why they sought ‘a warm place by the fire’75 rather than uphold the 
law for which they were specially prepared by their training and entrusted by their 
oath of office. 
   Curiously, no judge is on record to have petitioned or attended the public 
hearings of the Oputa Panel. The reason for the non-participation remains  unclear 
given that even military officers who had either participated in governance (and 
took active or passive roles in the gross violations of human rights) not only 
petitioned the Panel on violations of their rights but were at the centre of some of 
the most dramatic sessions of the public hearings. The public hearings on petitions 
by General Oladipo Diya, (formerly No.2 man to General Sanni Abacha), General 
Abdul-Kareem Adisa (one of his key ministers), General Abacha’s Chief Security 
Officer, Major Hamza Al-Mustapha and a good number of mandarins in that 
regime readily come to mind. 
   So why didn’t the judges come forward as victims? Did they feel it was below 
their office to do so? Could it be a result of some resentment and contempt for the 
truth-seeking process, similar to the response of the judiciary in South Africa to 
the TRC? One thing is for sure, judges in Nigeria have now dropped their lethargy 
to combat perceived unjust treatment in the hands of the executive that was at play 
under military authoritarian rule. Unlike in the past when dismissal and retirement 
of judges went virtually unchallenged, in the wake of the transition to democratic 
governance, a number of judges have challenged their perceived wrongful 
dismissal or retirement from the bench in the courts of law. At least in one 
instance, a dismissed judge has been ordered reinstated following successful legal 
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challenge of his sack for corruption almost three years on.76 In all events, that 
dismissed judicial officers seemed to have resigned to ‘fate’ under military rule in 
the past speaks volumes of their self-perception and the institution of the judiciary 
at that period of Nigerian socio-political and legal history. 
   In view of the of foregoing discussion, the failure of the Oputa Panel to call the 
Nigerian judiciary to account for its role in governance in the period of 
authoritarian military rule in the country can by no means be regarded as a faux 
pas. Even if arguably there is a good case to be made for the judiciary as victim of 
authoritarian rule, the truth-seeking process in Ghana clearly demonstrates that 
such a finding does not preclude the conclusion that the judiciary was complicit 
for executive (and sometimes legislative) actions that deprived citizens of their 
fundamental rights.77 Thus, there is the need to publicly scrutinise the course of 
judicial governance in post-conflict societies as a principal measure for 
institutional transformation. It has been recognised that the judiciary in post-
conflict contexts will be faced with enormous challenges of dispute resolution.78 
Institutional transformation of the judiciary following a period of siege is critical 
to the survival of democracy and the rule of law.  This applies with equal force to 
post-authoritarian societies. 
  
CONCLUSION 
   The iconography of Justitia, the familiar symbol of law and justice, is one of the 
few that has continued to survive Renaissance art. Both the citizen and the state 
remain in obeisance to the image of the female, regally-robed and impersonal 
goddess. The reason for this, as succinctly stated by Loughlin is          
               …a rather functional one. The fact of the matter is that the State remains  
               in need of a corps of officials able to enforce and authorize the  
               imposition of violence over its citizens. Although politics, broadly  
               conceived involves a process of world-building, the State ultimately  
               exists to maintain a particular form of order, and the special task of the  
               judge lies at the sharp end of that process. As the consequence of the  
               decision of a judge, citizens lose their liberties, their property and their  
               children. This is indeed an awesome  power…79 
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   While Loughlin’s position is arguably more apposite in a democratic society, it 
nonetheless has resonance in authoritarian societies as the Nigerian experience has 
shown. The military at no point in the course of its hold on political power in the 
country lay claim to judicial capability in the way it was quick at emphasising its 
leadership abilities derived from military training in justification of its hold on 
power where the political class had failed. This state of affairs constituted a potent 
weapon for the defence of the rule of law and human rights by the judiciary and 
for our purposes, stronger justification for insisting that the judicial institution 
maintain an unwavering fidelity to law in all circumstances.  
   Some scholars insist there are grave limitations to or even no latitude at all 
available for affecting the state of affairs against a military regime bent on having 
its way.80 While this may be tenable in certain circumstances, I have argued (like 
Dyzenhaus) that the ‘tales of disempowerment’ such a position portends may not 
be adequately represented in the totality of judicial experience in illiberal regimes. 
In any case there is much to be said for the need for accountability of the judiciary 
in the post-conflict period for the tacit admission of complicity in governance 
inherent in the position.  
  The crux of Dyzenhaus’ position on the Legal Hearings of the TRC appears to be 
that the institutionalisation of apartheid and the violation of human rights of a 
large segment of South African society which violations were aided by the 
judiciary, made accountability of the judiciary in South Africa a moral, if not a 
legal imperative, in the country’s transition to popular democracy. It can similarly 
be argued that the existence of a nascent democracy in post-colonial Nigeria cut 
short barely six years after independence by mutinous soldiers whose adventurism 
led to the subsequent take-over of power by the military leadership (that was in 
turn) legitimized by the judiciary, also justifies a requirement for public 
accountability of the judiciary in the country’s transition to democracy.  
   The case for such a process is arguably stronger if it is considered that the 
Nigerian judiciary was a creation of a democratic constitution.81 The antecedents 
of the Nigerian judiciary impose a heavier moral burden of public accountability 
on it. This is because of its key role in legitimising what in retrospect, was to be a 
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string of authoritarian regimes that committed a range of atrocities on the people. 
The military thus legitimated by judicial sanction, deprived Nigerian society of 
the right to determine how they were governed for about three decades. In this 
way, the judiciary played an indirect but critical role in legitimising the military’s 
plunder of the country’s resources in the process of which the later left not a few 
in misery. 
   The Nigerian experience of military authoritarianism has not been one of 
physical decimation of the judiciary. Rather, the judiciary acquiesced (with few 
notable exceptions)82 to the rule of force in many cases and to the suspension, 
abridgement or outright abrogation of human rights and constitutionalism by 
successive military regimes. Years of military dictatorship thus bequeathed the 
country with a conservative and compromised judiciary. The versatility of the 
judiciary in making an expeditious transformation could have notable impact on 
the course of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in transitional societies.  
In this regard Ogowewo has noted that  
               ….the true test of the judiciary does not lie in its approach to the rule of  
               law when democracy is not under attack; instead, the test will be its  
               approach when democracy is severely assaulted by usurpers- when the  
               challenge to the rule of law is greatest. 83    
 
   It is widely accepted that ‘an independent judiciary is a central pillar of the rule 
of law and in many ways a guarantor of fundamental rights of individuals and 
groups.’84 But the very proposition presupposes an independent judiciary, not one 
that acquiesces to the subversion of the rule of law, a charge at the door of 
judiciaries that give effect to military authoritarian rule like the Nigerian 
experience.  
   The judiciary demonstrated a lack of independence in the pre-transition period. 
This has arguably continued to feature in its recognition of questionable decrees 
(now styled Acts) including those introduced on the very eve of the hand-over that 
were unconnected to the hand-over, but instead dealt with the regulation of the 
capital market. In other words, the military were purporting to legislate for the 
civilian government, a few hours before the civilian government took over. The 
courts in true fashion never questioned this.85 Such judicial posturing constitutes 
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eloquent testimony to the need for public accountability as a tool for effecting 
institutional transformation of the judiciary in the ensuing political transition.86  
   The retention of repressive authoritarian legislations in the post-transition 
period, as Prempeh notes, is not peculiar to Nigeria. The neglect to effect required 
changes as part of the transition process has now, rather ironically, placed a 
disproportionate burden on the judiciary to sustain constitutionalism and human 
rights.87 Ogowewo on his part advocates a radical judicial delegitimation of such 
statutes. This is no doubt an uphill task in the Nigerian situation where they 
constitute a sizeable component of the statues in the books.88 Barak supports the 
more nuanced approach of judicial substitution of the legislative intent of the 
‘undemocratic legislature’ in such statutes with that of the ‘democratic 
legislator.’89 Whatever approach is to be adopted, it can be asserted with some 
measure of confidence that only an accountable, credible and progressive 
judiciary would be strategically positioned to discharge the onerous responsibility 
of judicial governance. The peculiar circumstance of transitioning states with its 
common incidence of ‘democratic deficit’90 and tenuous political representation 
strongly suggests the need for a transformed judicial institution to secure the 
transition in the public interest.  
   The failure of the truth-seeking process to challenge the judiciary to tell its 
truths in governance during the period of authoritarian rule in Nigeria constitutes 
a major flaw in the otherwise laudable conduct of the truth-seeking process 
represented by the Oputa Panel. In the aftermath of that failure, there is much to 
be said for the apprehension that the Nigerian judiciary, still considerably staffed 
and controlled by judicial officers appointed by successive military regimes, 
remains untransformed in the transition from authoritarian rule. As noted above, 
an ambivalent disposition suffused judicial attitudes to repressive legislations in 
Nigeria during the era of military authoritarian rule.  
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   Critics have asserted that in the aftermath of the transition to civil rule in the 
country, ‘The Nigerian judiciary is still in disarray.’91 This is due at least in part, 
to the yawning accountability gap on judicial governance in the period of the 
country’s experience of authoritarian rule. That gap is still a threat to democracy 
and the rule of law in the country. It is a critical failure that currently constitutes a 
veritable challenge to the transition in the country. The process of transition 
requires an independent and formidable judiciary to deepen democracy and rule of 
law, after decades of authoritarian rule. The neglect may continue to haunt the 
Nigerian society in the foreseeable future. Worse still, it could engender a reversal 
of the landmarks achieved in the country’s transition. The accountability gap 
identified in the foregoing analysis has had a marked effect on the judiciary in the 
post-authoritarian period. The impact of the gap in accountability of the judiciary 
for its role during the period of authoritarianism on judicial governance in Nigeria 
in the political transition will be evaluated in subsequent parts of this study. 
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Chapter Four 
  THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN NIGERIA’S TRANSITION 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
   In previous chapters, this study focused on accountability of the judiciary for its 
role in governance and gross violations of human rights during the period of 
authoritarianism in Nigeria. It has been argued that this ought to form part of the 
transitional justice measures in the process of political change in the country. I 
sought to show that unaccountability for the judicial role in the past has created a 
gap on its institutional exercise of power during the period. However, from this 
point, attention shifts to the impact of the judicial accountability gap on the 
judicial role in the present and (presumably), the future. The remaining chapters 
will discuss the resonance of the gap on the judicial function which, in the context 
of the political transition, it will be argued, has become quite strategic.    
   In this chapter, I critically analyse the role of the Nigerian courts in mediating 
tensions that have emerged in the post-authoritarian transition period. In doing 
this, I examine jurisprudence emanating from the courts on some serious inter-
governmental disputes as well as decisions that touch upon individual and 
collective rights particularly connected to the transition process. The dynamics of 
democratic transition in Nigeria after decades of military rule, dictate the 
inevitability of these disputes. The military left a legacy of institutional distortion 
and dysfunctions the result of which is a series of ongoing and formidable 
challenges to the transitioning society. The societal distortions and dysfunctions 
extend beyond the economic, social and political sectors to the constitutional and 
legal order. This is due in part to the nature of military rule with its legendary 
disregard of the rule of law, constitutionalism and due process.  
   The Nigerian experience is complicated by the predilection of military rulers for 
a unified command-structure approach to governance in a heterogeneous society. 
Rhetorically, successive military governments paid lip-service to the preservation 
of the federal character of the country1 but in practice, the command-structured 
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governance that characterised military rule saddled it with a caricature federation. 
Analysts have noted that such unification or ‘high degree of uniformity in the 
nature of political arrangements’ is second nature to authoritarianism.2  
   The military legacy has predictably generated considerable tension between the 
federal (central) government and the states. The tension has brought about critical 
consequences for constitutionalism and the rule of law in Nigeria. In particular, 
the legislature and largely, the judiciary have been tasked with resolving the 
executive impasse that has been the fall-out of the tension in the transition period. 
Despite the growing importance of the judicial function in transitioning polities,3 
scant attention has been paid to judicial activity in contemporary African 
democratisation processes.4 There is thus reason to critically evaluate the nature of 
judicial government in Nigeria in view of recent socio-political developments in 
the period of transition to civil rule in the country.  
   The discussion in this chapter is set against the backdrop of several 
complexities. These include unresolved issues of transitional justice and 
reparations for victims of gross abuses of human rights from decades of military 
authoritarian rule discussed in Chapter One,5 and concerns regarding the alarming 
levels of insecurity in the Niger Delta (source of oil, the main-stay of the 
country’s economy). Other prevailing concerns are the control of the political and 
economic sectors of the country by erstwhile military rulers (or their acolytes). 
Many political office holders in the political transition have strong links to, are 
sponsored by or are actually former military officers who held political power 
during the authoritarian period. Many erstwhile ex-military rulers have 
accumulated immense wealth and either directly or through fronts, acquired 
substantial control of the national economy partly through the acquisition of 
former state-controlled enterprises through privatisation and trade-liberalisation 
programmes. There is also the issue of continued violations of human rights in the 
post-authoritarian period by a democratic government; growing poverty 
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(associated with IMF/ World Bank economic structural adjustment programmes);6 
electoral manipulation and political violence, etc.  
   Framing issues around constitutionalism, human rights and the critical nature of 
the role of the judiciary in contemporary Nigerian society indicates there is indeed 
an onerous responsibility on the judicial function. How the judiciary has played its 
role in the post-authoritarian period, particularly in the exercise of its 
constitutional powers of judiciary review can be gleaned from the jurisprudence 
emanating from decisions relating to these and sundry issues. 
  The analysis will be conducted within two politically significant period-frames; 
the transition to civil from authoritarian rule (1999-2003) and the post 2003 period 
leading to the ‘civil-civil’ transition achieved in 2007 as well as the immediate 
period after. This periodisation is adopted with the aim of presenting a 
constructive template for critical evaluation of the consequences of the judicial 
accountability gap discussed in Chapters One and Three7 on judicial governance 
in the country. The focus in this chapter is on the first period. However, as is the 
wont of on-going activities, it may sometimes inevitably overlap with the second 
period just as the evaluation of that period in Chapter Six also sometimes looks 
backwards.     
   The adopted framework is consistent with transitional justice theory. 
Transitional justice theory recognises that while a single ‘transitional moment’8 
can be identified in ‘paradigmatic transitions,’9 a number of transitions (or 
transition milestones) may in fact be discernible within the process of political 
change.10  In the context of the Nigerian transition, I argue in what follows that 
there are discernibly distinct strands in judicial governance that can be evaluated 
through the prisms of the ‘transitions-within-a transition’ experience of the 
country.   
   The Nigerian judiciary has recently been the focus of both national and 
international attention as a forum that offers hope for the resolution of ongoing 
disputes and contestations in the country’s troubled political transition. Has the 
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judiciary been instrumental to furthering or impeding the transition to democratic 
rule, and the respect for human rights and upholding the rule of law? What has 
been the nature of judicial intervention in ongoing tensions that emerge from the 
interplay of a centrifugal federalism11 and dynamics of political transition in a 
heterogeneous, resource-rich but impoverished polity? These questions constitute 
the foci of this chapter. We return to some detailed consideration of these issues 
after a brief consideration of the nature of judicial review in Nigeria’s legal 
system. 
 
2.   JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NIGERIAN COURTS SYSTEM 
   On a prefatory note, it is relevant to identify the nature of judicial review in the 
Nigerian court system. The significance of such identification derives from the 
realisation that the concept lies at the heart of evaluations of constitutionalisation 
discussed here and the judicialisation of politics later in this research. Adopting 
Epstein et al’s characterisation of constitutional courts, judicial review in the 
country’s court system, though very close to the American system, is best 
described as a hybrid.12  
   Like the American system, the Nigerian court system features a diffusion of the 
power of judicial review. It is marked by the absence of a constitutional court and 
a general power of judicial review vested on all courts of superior record. These 
are the high courts (usually, but not always), the court of first instance, the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The courts possess only concrete, as against 
abstract judicial review powers and the locus required to initiate the process are 
basically closeted, vested in individuals or groups that can establish a real stake in 
the outcome of the process. However, from judicial practice and a close reading of 
the provisions of Sections 6 and 46 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, it is 
apparent that the Nigerian system of judicial review accommodates both ex ante 
and ex post facto judicial review. This is a feature it shares with some European 
constitutional courts.13 In addition, Section 315 (3) of the Constitution provides 
for extensive judicial powers for review of legislation. It states that nothing in the 
Constitution shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of law or any 
tribunal established by law to declare invalid any existing law in the country, and 
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perhaps more importantly, any provisions of the Constitution. It is now apt to 
direct attention to the issues of constitutionalism and Nigeria’s transition.   
 
3. BACKWARDS WITH PLAIN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE OPUTA PANEL CASE 
   Barak contends that the primary role of the Supreme Court in democratic 
governance is ‘corrective’ in nature. In the discharge of this corrective function, 
the judge is expected to bridge ‘the gap between law and society as well protect 
democracy in cooperation with the other branches of government.’14 If we agree 
with Barak on the primary duty of a supreme court, it can be argued that the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria fell short of this role in its decision in Justice 
Chukwudifu Oputa (Rtd.) and Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 
and Gani Fawehinmi v General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and 
Brigadier Kunle Togun (the Oputa Panel Case).15 In view of the resounding 
impact of the case on Nigeria’s choice of transitional justice mechanism and the 
evaluation proposed on the judicial role in transitional contexts below, it is 
germane to set out the facts of the case in some detail. 
 3.1   The Facts, the Decision  
   As stated in Chapter One, the desire of former military heads of state and their 
security functionaries to resist the summons of the Oputa Panel on the Dele Giwa 
murder led to their institution of the case at the Federal High Court. The case of 
the generals is that the Tribunal of Inquiries Act (TIA) under which the Oputa 
Panel was established was not an existing law within the meaning of section 315 
of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  Section 315 makes 
provisions for savings and modification provisions for existing laws in the 
country.  
   They further sought a declaration that the compulsive powers granted the Oputa 
Panel under the TIA are in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed by sections 35 
and 36 of the 1999 Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the 
right to liberty while section 36 concerns the right to fair hearing. With the 
concurrence of the parties, the Federal High Court, a superior court of record of 
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first instance, referred constitutional issues arising from the case for determination 
by the Court of Appeal.  
   On 31st October 2001, precisely ten days before the close of public hearings by 
the Oputa Panel, the Court of Appeal ruled on the issues. The Court of Appeal 
declared the ‘compulsive’ powers of the 2nd Appellant unconstitutional and in 
violation of the Respondents’ fundamental rights contained in sections 35 and 36 
of the constitution. Dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court 
and this enabled the Panel to proceed with the public hearings. The Respondents, 
also dissatisfied with the decision, cross-appealed. 
   The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal of Inquiry Act was existing law under 
section 315 of the 1999 Constitution. It also however held that the Constitution 
does not confer powers on the National Assembly to enact a general law on 
tribunals of inquiry for the whole country. The Court also held that tribunals of 
inquiry fall within the residual powers of both the National Assembly (for the 
Federal Capital Territory) and State Houses of Assembly for the respective States. 
The Tribunal of Inquiry Act of 1966 under which the Oputa Panel was established 
therefore took effect under the 1999 Constitution as an Act of the National 
Assembly for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, only. In essence, the president 
had exceeded his jurisdiction in establishing the Oputa Panel with a remit to carry 
out a national inquiry into the violations of human rights in all parts of the 
country. 
 3.2   Between Executive Failure and Judicial Complacency 
   The Oputa Panel Case eloquently presents two of a number of unsettling 
features in the legal and statutory framework of governance in Nigeria’s political 
transition. First, is the extensive reliance by all branches of government on 
autocratic legislation deriving from the colonial past and authoritarian military 
regimes. Second, is a customary, uncritical judicial adherence to precedent based 
on principles of the common law. Deriving from the first feature, an elected 
democratic transition government placed reliance on the TIA, a pre-republican 
legislation, to set up a truth commission by executive fiat at a time when it had 
become standard practice to do so elsewhere under purpose-specific legislation.16  
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 Thus, the South-Africa and Ghana truth commissions which in temporality closely preceded and 
succeeded the Nigerian truth process respectively were set up pursuant to tailor-made legislation. 
For a fairly comprehensive and representative discussion of the establishment and conduct of 
truth-seeking processes in different parts of the world, see P B Hayner Unspeakable Truths: 
Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (Routledge New York 2002) 94.  
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   Proceeding on the second feature, the judiciary relied extensively on the case of 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa & Others v Doherty &Others17 in the Oputa Panel 
Case. In the former case, the then Federal Supreme Court and the Privy Council 
both upheld objections to the compulsive powers and the jurisdictional reach of 
the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1961, which had similar provisions to the TIA. 
Without delving into the contentious value of judicial precedent, particularly in 
the common law legal tradition, it is important to make the point that the post-
republican Nigerian Supreme Court is bound neither in fact, nor law, by the 
decisions of both authorities. This is because the Federal Supreme Court was not 
the highest court for Nigeria at the time since, (as in this case) final appeals still 
lay to the Privy Council in London. The subsequent republican status of the 
country saw to the end of precisely that. Thus there was no compelling legal basis 
to rely on the case in the circumstances of political change and especially in light 
of the imperatives of transitional justice.      
   The Obasanjo administration relied on shaky legal foundations for addressing 
crucial transitional justice issues. Such reliance in the aftermath of three decades 
of authoritarian rule that earned the country international censor18 clearly places a 
question mark over the administration’s sincerity and the degree of its 
commitment to justice, human rights and the rule of law in the country.  In this 
regard, the action of the elected executive seriously impaired the fulcrum and 
raison d’être of the transition. However, the faltering premises of executive 
initiative notwithstanding, the transition judiciary can not be excused for its 
fixation on a rational legal formalism that is impoverished by its lack of 
engagement with the socio-political circumstances of the country and the 
developments in the international arena.   
   In coming to a decision that struck at the root of the truth-seeking process 
epitomised by the Oputa Panel, the Nigerian judiciary in the Oputa Panel Case 
arguably undermined the rule of law (even if not deliberately), in the course of the 
country’s transition from authoritarian rule. The attitude of the Court derives from 
an entrenched judicial tradition of plain-fact jurisprudence. The Court obviously 
accorded primacy to protecting the federal character of the Nigerian polity over 
the rights of victims of gross violations of human rights.  
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   It is noteworthy that the violations in issue were largely committed by military 
regimes that paid no more than rhetorical heed to the country’s federal character 
(like most other established aspects of the country’s law and politics) and (mis) 
ruled it in a virtually unitary fashion. In deference to the supremacy of military 
laws (decrees), the judiciary hardly intervened to check the various violations of 
the constitution in this regard. It is thus ironic that the transitional judiciary at the 
highest levels will advert to the territoriality argument as justification to shield 
alleged perpetrators from accountability and transitional justice claims.  
    Further, the Supreme Court  upheld the Court of Appeal’s position that Sections 
5(d), 11(1) (b), 11 (4) and 12(2) of the Tribunals of Inquiry Act were 
unconstitutional and invalid because they  empower a tribunal of inquiry to 
compel attendance or impose a sentence of fine or imprisonment for non-
attendance to its summons.  According to the Court, the sections contravene 
sections 35 and 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 that provide for the right to 
liberty and fair hearing respectively. It viewed mandatory attendance at a truth 
commission as contrary to the right to personal liberty. The Court insisted that 
under the Constitution, only a court of law can make an order to deprive a citizen 
of his fundamental right to personal liberty. While this position of the Court is 
attractive, it is arguably not sustainable considering the provisions of section 35 
(1) (b) that  
               Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall    
               be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance  
               with a procedure permitted by law… by reason of his failure to comply  
               with the order of court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any  
               obligation imposed upon him by law19 
 
The Court placed reliance on section 35 (1) that provides for deprivation of liberty 
in execution of the judgement of a court, as if it were the only derogative clause to 
individual liberty in the constitution. Such an interpretive approach is, it is humbly 
submitted, in view of section 35 (1) (b), erroneous.  
   Surely, the Court could have upheld, on the basis of the proviso in section 35 (1) 
(b), the ‘coercive’ powers of the Oputa Panel under the 1999 Constitution. The 
Court is well situated to do so from its vantage position as the judicial forum of 
last resort even without recourse to comparative legislation and jurisprudence in 
South Africa, another common law jurisdiction with relevant (and at least 
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persuasive) precedent on the issue. After all, the Oputa Panel was constituted 
under a law and the duty to attend the summons of the Oputa Panel challenged by 
the Plaintiffs was imposed by the TIA.  
   Curious and more objectionable still, is the finding that the powers of the Oputa 
Panel contravened fair-hearing provisions of section 36 of the Nigerian 
constitution. It is a basic procedural practice that has been upheld by the courts (in 
Nigeria and elsewhere) that evidentiary rules weigh against a party who fails to 
utilise reasonable opportunity provided to air the party’s side of a case, as a result 
of which such party can not be heard to complain about lack of fair hearing. In 
vindication of this position, the Court was to hold in a later case that               
               ...the duty of the court, trial and appellate, is to create the atmosphere or  
               environment for a fair hearing of a case but it is not the duty of the court   
               to make sure that a party takes advantage of the atmosphere or  
               environment by involving himself in the fair hearing of the case. A party  
               who refuses or fails to take advantage of the fair hearing process  
               created by the court can not turn around to accuse the court of denying  
               him fair hearing. 20 
 
   On the facts in the Oputa Panel case, the provisions of section 36, it is 
respectfully submitted should not have inured to the benefit of the generals. They 
were summoned as witnesses before the Oputa Panel and the case was initiated by 
them to obtain judicial sanction for depriving the petitioners and the Nigerian 
society the benefit of the facts peculiarly within their knowledge relating to 
serious allegations of wrong doing.    
   Contestations around the legality of the Oputa Panel in various suits and appeals 
on them instigated by the generals in an attempt at self preservation brought to the 
fore the tension that may arise between the truth-seeking process and the judiciary 
in transition. More importantly, the Oputa Panel case in the context of a 
transitioning polity arguably demonstrates the dangers inherent in the existence of 
an accountability gap with respect to the judiciary which has been earlier 
identified in Chapters One, Two and Three. Such an accountability gap bequeaths 
a polity with a judiciary that may be immune to the changes taking place in the 
transition environment all around it.21  
 3.3   Again, the Rule of Law Dilemma 
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 See in this regard, the position of the Court in Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham 
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   Former authoritarian military rulers are reputedly difficult to bring to accounts. 
Roehrig has noted that any attempt to ensure accountability for violations of 
human rights by past military regimes in post-authoritarian societies is fraught 
with complexities.22 There is some convergence of opinion on this view. This 
does not, however, provide justification for avoiding the challenge of re-
establishing the supremacy of law over the authoritarian exercise of power that 
had deprived individuals, groups and society in general, of their rights. Supreme 
Courts in particular have a unique role in a constitutional democracy23 in the 
pursuit of this objective.  
   The decision of the Court in the Oputa Panel Case calls into question its 
commitment to the duty to bring alive the law as an agent of positive 
transformation (largely viewed as essentially revolving around the executive and 
the legislature). The phenomenon at play in cases like the Oputa Panel in the 
context of Nigeria’s transition has been aptly described by Teitel as ‘the rule of 
law dilemma.’24 Teitel has criticised accounts of the role of law and legal 
institutions in transitional contexts that do not take cognisance of the 
circumstances of political change. Adopting existing conceptions of the role of 
law, she argues, restricts the potential transformative capacity of law in hitherto 
conflicted societies.25 In assessments of what now constitutes pioneering 
experiences in the ‘contemporary wave of political change’ in diverse regions of 
the world (Eastern Europe through Latin America to Africa), she identifies the 
judiciary as a powerful institutional agent for transformation. But as she further 
notes, the judiciary is itself faced with enormous challenges in the mediation of 
ensuing transitional tensions. Teitel locates the major reason for this in the 
distinctive nature of law and justice in transitional contexts. Law and justice as 
handmaidens of change make a paradigm shift in transitions. Law is moulded by 
and also remoulds the society in the flux of transition. The exigencies of the 
transition context demand new conceptions of law and justice that are at once 
‘transformative…extraordinary and constructivist.’26  
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   The foregoing formulation constitutes what can be considered a historication of 
law and justice within the context of transitions. Adjudication by a ‘transitional 
judiciary’27 in neglect of the sui generis role of law and thus, the adjudicatory 
function, positively threatens the aspirations for change constitutive of the whole 
process of political transition. Further, it raises the question of the continued 
relevance of that arm of government in the post-conflict era and its ability to 
foster the rule of law.   
 3.4   The Judiciary, Transition and the Transformative Agenda 
   The gap in governance created by a transition’s peculiar political power-
dynamics accentuates the need for a judiciary committed to constructively 
‘engage with the transformative agenda,’28 ideally the hallmark of and 
legitimising justification for the transition in the first place. This is particularly 
relevant in the context of a transition that has resulted not in a real (as is the 
aspiration of the people and mantra of the elites now in power) but a virtual 
democracy: in other words, a situational dynamic in which the ruling elite have 
perfected the art of manipulating the transition process in a way that does not 
dislocate their hold on power and yet creates the impression that liberal 
democracy has been instituted. 29 The transition to democratic rule in Nigeria 
presents a good example of this socio-political dynamic.  
   The elections in the political transition from over three decades of authoritarian 
rule were strongly contested or influenced by civilians who had held offices under 
the past military governments or were actually retired military officers in past 
military regimes.30 Ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo epitomised this dynamic. 
The former army general and military head of state is generally believed to have 
been tipped and largely sponsored for president in 1999 by the country’s former 
self-styled ‘military president’, General Ibrahim Babangida. General Muhammadu 
Buhari, himself a former military head of state remains one of the frontline 
contenders to the presidency while General Babangida only dropped his 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. at 2030. 
28
 H Corder “Judicial Policy in a Transforming Constitution” in J Morison, K McEvoy and G 
Anthony (eds.) Judges, Transition and Human Rights (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 91, 
93. 
29
 R Joseph “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives” in 
L Anderson (ed.) Transitions to Democracy (Columbia University Press 1999) 237, 242-3. See 
also H K Prempeh “Africa’s ‘Constitutional Revival’: False Start or New Dawn” (2007) 5 (3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 469, 505: ‘Indeed, Africa’s recent democratic 
transitions have become an occasion for recycling old elites, not for the emergence of a new 
generation of leadership.” 
30
  T Oyekola “Ex-Military Officers are Doing Well in Politics- Gowon” Nigerian Tribune Online 
Edition (Lagos Tuesday 4 September 2007) 
 123 
presidential ambitions shortly before the April 2007 elections. During the 2003 
elections, three generals had been front runners.31 They had all ruled the country 
as military heads of state at one time or the other. It remains an irony of the 
democratic transition in Nigeria that military officers who ran the country aground 
still occupy the most prominent positions in elite power contestations.  
   The current president of the Nigerian Senate (the upper house in the two-tier 
legislature, the National Assembly), is also a retired general and ex-military 
governor of a state, just as the longest-serving chairman of the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Ahmadu Ali, is a retired army general and one time 
Minister for Education.32 A number of state governors, law makers in the federal 
and state legislatures, ministers and other key public office holders are ex-military 
men, who held strategic public positions under various military regimes in the 
country.33 The phenomenon aptly referred to as ‘feigned’ ruler conversion34 
situates the judiciary as the unlikely institution of state for holding out the 
prospect of a genuine realisation of democracy and rule of law commitment as 
underpinning the political transition.  
   The situation in Nigeria is not unique as the experience in Ghana (embodied in 
what has been referred to as the ‘Rawlings factor’) has shown. Jerry Rawlings’ 
hold on power in Ghana in the post-authoritarian transition period was so potent 
that it staved off accountability for human rights violations for eight years after 
the transition to democracy. This was no surprise considering he got elected as 
civilian president under the transition programme he instituted and supervised.  
Beyond that, the ‘Rawlings factor’ also reputedly conditioned largely, the choice 
of transitional justice mechanism eventually adopted by the successor 
administration to achieve accountability for human rights violations.35 The politics 
of transitions in post-communist Eastern Europe and Latin America have often 
followed a similar course.36 The reason for this may not be far-fetched; 
democratic politics, for all of its merits, is after all a game played with resources 
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(financial and material) often in abundance in the arsenals of erstwhile 
authoritarian rulers, often privileged by plundered state resources amassed during 
their tenures. Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the political dividend 
the transition process has delivered is a quasi-democracy.37  
    Again, the formidable challenges posed by powerful ex-military rulers against 
efforts to obtain justice in the transition period are largely consistent with the 
mixed results and varied experience of attempts elsewhere. While in some Latin 
American countries like Argentina, prosecutions were later ‘rolled back’ in 
deference to military take-over threats,38 the judiciary in Greece contributed 
positively and directly to the restoration of the rule of law by way of fearless 
adjudication in prosecutions involving erstwhile military rulers in the country.  
   According to Teitel, twice over confronted with the dilemma of the rule of law, 
the courts in Unified Germany adopted a jurisprudence in which ‘moral right’ 
trumped a formalist (plain-fact) approach to law, lending credence to the view that 
transitional justice necessitates a sui generis conception of law. In the context of 
post-communist Eastern Europe’s experience in transition to liberal democracy, 
the Hungarian judiciary similarly opted for a transition-sensitive response to the 
rule of law dilemma by protecting the individual’s right to security. Teitel posits 
that conditioned by different ‘historical and political legacies’, both judiciaries 
arrived at similar results of ‘transformative understandings’ of the rule of law 
despite charting different courses.39 
   The judiciary at all times, but especially in the flux of the transition context, 
must be wary of the designs of any individual or group to have recourse to judicial 
process as a shield against justice. This is particularly important for the restoration 
and fortification of the rule of law in a transitional setting. Such awareness 
appears to have been lost on the Nigerian Courts in the Oputa Panel Case. It is a 
paradox that the military would have recourse to the rights-regime and the courts 
to stave off accountability. While in power, when it was not busy corrupting or 
trying to subvert the judiciary through bribery and exclusion clauses, it treated its 
efforts at independence with contempt at best. Military governance is unarguably 
a violation of the rule of law. It violates the constitution of virtually every modern 
state.    
                                                 
37
 Okafor note 6 supra at 86. 
38
 For an elucidatory account of the challenges in Argentina’s transition from military authoritarian 
rule in the early ‘80s, see C S Nino Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996). 
39
 Teitel note 24 supra at 2019-2027. 
 125 
   The judiciary had become largely impotent in upholding the rights of 
individuals in the era of military rule in the country. In the appeal case of Nwosu v 
Environmental Sanitation Authority,40 to take but one example, a Justice of the 
Supreme Court boldly advised victims of rights violations to seek redress 
elsewhere. He concluded that the Military left no one in doubt as to the 
inviolability of their decrees. This apologia was borne as much out of a sense of 
frustration of the courts with the importunate and contemptuous treatment of 
judicial decisions (and the institution as a whole) by successive military 
administrations as from an attempt at self-preservation. In a way though, it 
reinforces the need for accountability for the nature of judicial governance during 
the years of authoritarian rule. How or why was this situation possible? Clearly, 
considered against the background of the intransigence of the Nigerian military 
class towards the judicial institution and rule of law while in power, it is 
paradoxical that the military would turn to the courts ostensibly to protect their 
rights.  
   However, the recourse of the Nigerian generals to the courts reinforces the 
proposition that a virile, dynamic, independent judiciary is central to the nurture 
of democracy and human rights. If the courts maintain their independence, 
ultimately, both the rulers and the ruled are always protected. The virility of the 
judiciary goes a long way to ensure good governance at all times. The guarantee 
of judicial independence and justice through due process of the law constitutes a 
check on the inordinate exercise of political power. 
   The decisions of the Nigerian courts in the legal challenges to the Oputa Panel, 
the key mechanism in the process of restoring human rights and achieving justice 
for victims of impunity in the transition to democratic rule, raises concerns 
regarding how the courts intend to respond to the demands for justice and 
acknowledge violations of human rights. This also extends to what the role of the 
courts will be in mediating critical conflicts in the transition era and beyond. One 
of the concerns is that it appears the courts are pliant to the wishes of the ex-
military rulers (who appointed most of them) and who continue to participate 
directly, by proxies or hover visibly in the background of socio-political life in the 
country. This leaves a question mark over their required decisional independence.  
   Another is the fact that despite the recourse of the plaintiffs to human rights 
provisions as one of the twin bases of their case, none of the Courts, not even the 
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Supreme Court, seized on the opportunity to invoke the obligations of the country 
under international human rights law. Significantly, counsel to one of the 
Appellants/Defendants had canvassed that ‘…the Tribunal of Inquiry (the 
HRVIC) was set up in connection with violation of human rights… for the 
purpose of implementing a treaty.’41This provided the Court with the opportunity 
for advertence to the treaty obligations of the country under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),42 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and customary international law.  
  But while the Court conceded that the Oputa Panel was set up in connection with 
human rights violations, it rejected out of hand any link with the country’s treaty 
obligations. In the view of the Court, there was nothing in the enabling law (the 
TIA) to validate that proposition. It thus rejected one of the mediating forces in 
transition as theorised by Teitel. That line of reasoning also deprived the Court of 
a core value of international law in providing stable understandings of the rule of 
law in transitional contexts.43  
  Taken together, the two issues raise a third and one perhaps more profound: 
judges continue to apply and interpret the unreformed set of laws inherited from 
the authoritarian period with ‘uncritical vigour’44 that was the hallmark of their 
decisions at the time the laws were handed down by dictatorial regimes. While it 
is not argued that all the laws passed during the authoritarian period are bad with 
reference to their content, as discussed earlier, there are substantive and 
procedural reasons for viewing a good deal of military made legislation in the 
country with suspicion. Further, it is interesting to note that it was not an issue of 
debate nor was it suggested as to whether judges invariably appointed by the 
authoritarian military regimes45 should resign given the questionable role the 
judiciary played in the pre-transition period. None did. Again, this followed the 
pattern elsewhere.46 The oversight that has left the judiciary intact, no doubt 
strengthened in the Nigerian experience by a tradition of military-imposed 
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constitutionalism, may be partly responsible for judicial apathy to the policy 
issues surrounding the Oputa Panel Case. 
   It is arguable that the judiciary is obliged to resolve the issues at stake in the 
Oputa Panel Case from the perspective of its national as well as international 
significance. From the national perspective, the country is in search of a lasting 
transition to a democratic society where the rule of law will substitute whimsical, 
authoritarian and usually brutish deprivation of political, economic, social and 
cultural rights. Not a few Nigerians had been denied their rights in the period of 
military rule aptly described in the words of Justice Oputa in (biblical allusion, no 
doubt) as ‘the years of the locust’. An overly narrow interpretation of precedent 
by an unreformed, unaccounted for judicial body would put rectification of this in 
jeopardy.   
   On the international level, the country was in dire need of assuming its pride of 
place in the comity of nations as the foremost black nation in the world 
considering its enormous potential in light of its human and material resources.47  
More importantly, the country’s legal obligations under international human rights 
covenants required the deployment of an effective mechanism to secure 
reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights that ought to be 
promoted by a robust engagement of the judiciary with transitional justice 
process. 
 3.5. Safety in a Cocoon: Ignoring International Human Rights Law 
   The Court ought to have taken cognisance of the transitional status of the 
country, seized the opportunity to enunciate and identify with the developing 
jurisprudence of the imperative for accountability and justice for victims of gross 
human rights violations through an affirmation of the right to truth.48 Some 
scholars49 are of the view that this right is guaranteed by Article 19 of the UDHR 
and Article 9(1) the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Afrocan 
Charter). While the former has come to assume the status of customary 
international law, Nigeria is party to the latter. 
    The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) has been 
the most progressive of existing human rights mechanisms in its explication and 
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development of a jurisprudence affirming a right to truth for victims of human 
rights violations. The Inter-American Court, along with its sister mechanism, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, faced with a large number of 
‘enforced disappearance cases’50 has stated in a number of its decisions that there 
is a right to truth for relations of victims of such disappearances.51 The locus 
classicus on the matter is the case of Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras52 where the 
Inter-American Court held that relations of an individual, who was arrested, 
reportedly tortured and then ‘disappeared,’ were entitled to have the report of an 
independent and transparent investigation carried out by the State into the 
disappearance. 
    Counsel to the Oputa Panel advanced the argument (without success) that it was 
properly set up under the African Charter. The Court held that for this to prevail 
there was the need for specific legislation setting up the Oputa Panel and investing 
it with powers to carry out an inquiry of the nature the Oputa Panel was meant to 
accomplish.53 The constitutional panel54 of the Supreme Court of Nigeria made 
only a dismal reference to international human rights law despite the country’s 
obligation in respect of the African Charter.                     
   The socio-political circumstances of the country at the time required the courts 
to adopt a reflexive jurisprudence in the determination of the Oputa Panel Case. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria in particular, ought to have proceeded on the 
premise that the issues arising from the case transcended the question of the 
personal rights of the plaintiffs. Regrettably, like the Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court preferred placing premium on how the ‘coercive’ powers of the 
Oputa Panel interfered with individual rights. A broader perspective commends 
the view that the issues involved may no doubt ‘offend’55individual rights. Yet, 
they also border, even if implicitly, on the obligation of the country to ensure that 
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victims of human rights violations are provided with an opportunity to be heard 
and provided an effective remedy.    
   The decisions of the Nigerian Courts on the Oputa Panel arguably demonstrate a 
glaring disconnection of the judiciary with the transitional realities of the society. 
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria ratified the African Charter in 1982. The country 
had gone further to incorporate it into domestic legislation as far back as August 
1983. The Supreme Court of Nigeria is bound to respect international customary 
law as embodied by the UDHR. It also has a ‘double’ obligation in respect of the 
African Charter that is at once an international treaty and a municipal legislation. 
The latter reinforces and expands the limited bills of rights encompassed in 
successive Nigerian constitutions including the current one of 1999.   
   The decisions of the Nigerian courts in the Oputa Panel Case reflect an 
impervious disposition against the current position of international human rights 
law regarding state obligations on victims’ right to truth and accountability in 
transitional societies. The attempt by counsel for the Oputa Panel to open the 
window was resisted by the only justice who did not go beyond a cursory 
reference to it. The significance and historic nature of the case does appear to 
have been lost on the courts.  
   Ratification of international covenants by a state constitutes an undertaking to 
fulfil the commitments stated in them. A state voluntarily surrenders part of its 
sovereignty in ratifying international covenants. On questions of international law, 
treaty obligations and human rights, the decisions of the United Nations 
specialised committees and regional human rights institutions deserve more than a 
‘persuasive’ status. This is in line with state-party obligations under international 
law. The obligations include according recognition to decisions made by 
mechanisms established for ensuring compliance with the instruments. It can be 
argued that decisions on covenants’ provisions by appropriate bodies ought to be 
regarded as canons to be observed by contracting parties. Otherwise, the whole 
field of international law will be rendered irrelevant.    
 3.6    Privileging Domestic Law over International Law 
   The foregoing further raise the propriety of the precedence sometimes accorded 
to domestic law (ordinary or constitutional) over international covenants. The 
issue is particularly topical in jurisdictions like Nigeria and South Africa where 
the constitution requires that a treaty must be enacted by the national legislature in 
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order for it to take effect as binding law in the country.56 Nigerian courts have 
developed an ambivalent jurisprudence on the issue. In Gani Fawehinmi v 
General Sanni Abacha,57 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the provisions of 
the African Charter can not prevail over the Nigerian constitution. In the lead 
judgment, Ogundare JSC conceded that the Charter as enacted under Nigerian 
Law (Cap. No.10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990) possessed an 
‘international flavour’ and ‘a greater vigour and strength than any other domestic 
statute’. However he proceeded to hold that  
               But that is not to say that the Charter is superior to the constitution…Nor  
               can  its international flavour prevent the National Assembly…removing  
               it from our  body of municipal laws by simply repealing Cap No.10.58 
 
With that, the constitutional (and highest) panel of the Supreme Court overruled 
the decision of the Court of Appeal. The latter had accorded special and decidedly 
higher status to the African Charter.59 The Court of Appeal had decided the 
international statute had superior status to other municipal laws. It is submitted 
that the position of the Court of Appeal which accords special recognition to the 
statute as an international covenant ought to be the correct statement of the law. 
The judicial position that state constitutions are superior to international law the 
same state contracted to adhere to, can not be valid. Such jurisprudence hits at the 
roots of international law. It is standard to find that treaties provide for the binding 
nature of their provisions on state parties and require that they take adequate 
measures for the implementation of their provisions. A good example is Article 2 
of the ICCPR 
               Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,    
               each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the  
               necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with  
               the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other  
               measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in  
               the present Covenant.60 
 
   In view of Article 2 of the ICCPR, it should not be open to municipal courts to 
override treaty provisions by domestic law. Cases of apparent or implicit conflict 
between the two ought to be resolved in favour of international law. This is 
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consistent with Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention.61 Article 26 affirms 
the binding obligation created by treaties on contracting states. Article 27 provides 
that provisions of domestic law may not be invoked to justify failure to perform 
treaty obligations.  
   The Nigerian courts ignored the obligation of the country under the ICCPR. 
Article 2(3) provides that individuals whose rights or freedoms recognized by the 
covenant are violated are entitled to an effective remedy. The ICCPR similarly 
guarantees to an individual claiming such a remedy a right to have his claim 
determined ‘…by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or 
by any other competent authority provided by the legal system of the State’. The 
latter clause any other competent authority covers a Truth Commission 
established by law (like the Oputa Panel) with a mandate inter alia, to 
‘investigate’ cases of rights violations and ‘make recommendations’ for 
‘appropriate compensation.’        
   The Oputa Panel clearly constituted the strongest if not the only mechanism 
chosen by the government to comply with its obligations in this context as 
discussed earlier. The mandate of the Oputa Panel addressed virtually all 
foregoing obligations. Only a handful of individuals (less than ten) were facing 
criminal charges at the time for some of the atrocities committed during the 
Abacha regime. To date, none of the trials has been concluded. Over 8 years of 
protracted trial of the former Chief of Army Staff, General Ishaiya Bamaiyi and 
four other minions of the late dictator, General Sanni Abacha, in The State v 
General Isahiya Bamaiyi & 4Ors62 typifies how the current state of Nigeria’s 
criminal law and procedure can be exploited by powerful individuals to frustrate 
the administration of criminal justice in the country.  
   It is pertinent that in the context of the transition in Nigeria, the rights of victims 
to obtain a remedy thereby relied to a great extent on the truth-seeking process. It 
was quite open to the Supreme Court in particular, as the court of last resort, to 
have taken the expansive view of the facts and law and come to a radically 
different decision. Disappointingly, it took a rather restricted view of the issues in 
the case. The decision did not take cognisance of the fact that the nation was at the 
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threshold of history, in transition and desirous of making a decisive break with a 
past of human rights violations.  
     Truth Commissions have now acquired the status of a recognised mechanism 
for addressing past human rights abuses in transitional societies.63 They have 
taken a position of increasing significance alongside other transitional justice 
mechanisms. They play an important role in efforts to restore the rule of law in 
post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies. The Supreme Court ought to have 
seized upon the reliance of the applicants on the fundamental rights provisions 
guaranteed by the constitution to consider the right of victims to a remedy as 
provided by the foregoing provisions. This would have provided it with a 
balanced progressive jurisprudence on the matter.    
 3.7   Policy Considerations and Transitional Justice Claims 
   Apart from normative imperatives of international law, policy considerations 
should have been positively taken into account by the Court to the benefit of the 
defendants in the Oputa Panel Case. Nwabueze has made the important point that 
consideration of public policy may contribute positively to judicial 
determinations. The guiding principle, he advocates, is that public policy 
considerations, particularly of the subjective type, be subordinated to legal 
principles and ‘objective standards.’ He further suggests that ‘considerations of 
expediency’ in deserving instances ‘may justifiably inform the application of law 
by the courts in the solution to problems.’64 Nwabueze’s postulation on the value 
of public policy in judicial decision-making, it can be argued, supports the 
position that the Nigerian courts should have had advertence to the principle to 
decide the Oputa Panel Case in a manner cognisant of the societal expectations at 
the time in Nigeria’s socio-political history.  
   A crucial issue on which the Nigerian courts found for the applicants was the 
unconstitutionality of the so called ‘coercive’ or ‘compulsive’ powers of the 
Oputa Panel. These were the powers of the Oputa Panel to subpoena witnesses65 
and punish for contempt.66 The courts held that those powers impugned the 
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fundamental right to liberty guaranteed by section 36 of the 1979 constitution of 
Nigeria (now section 46 of the 1999 constitution). This aspect of the decision in 
the Oputa Panel case, even from the purely formal legal point of view, is curious. 
The right to liberty under the Nigerian constitution of 1999 as well as earlier 
constitutions, and indeed in line with international human rights law and practice, 
can be and is in practice derogated from in defined circumstances. One context in 
which such derogation might take place concerns reasonable suspicion of the 
commission of an offence, which was precisely in issue before the Oputa Panel.            
   A Truth Commission has an extended form of inquiry as its core function. This 
core function can be easily frustrated or defeated if the truth-seeking body lacks 
the power to summon witnesses and issue subpoena for the production of 
evidence. Such power is in state practice not at all novel for quasi-judicial bodies 
in the country in question. Similar powers are statutorily conferred and exercised 
with judicial sanction by professional disciplinary bodies in Nigeria.67  
   By way of comparison, the South African TRC had very wide powers to 
summon witnesses, subpoena evidence, and order the search of premises and 
seizure of materials 68 as part of its notably ‘significant procedural powers.’69 
Powers of similar purport were contained in the Ghana National Reconciliation 
Commission Act that established a subsequent truth commission.70  It is doubtful 
that a truth commission without such powers can effectively carry out its 
functions.71 At the very least, the relevance of such a truth-seeking process will be 
diminished. In all events, the Court ought to have positively construed the 
provisions of section 8 of the TIA that emphasised the fact-finding remit of the 
Oputa Panel. It provided that evidence taken under the Act shall be inadmissible 
against any person in any civil or criminal proceedings except in the case of a 
person charged with giving false evidence before the members. Section 10 further 
reinforced the protection granted to witnesses testifying before the Oputa Panel by 
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restating the rule against self-incrimination as the standard set for witnessing 
before a court of law.  
    In contrast, a reflexive jurisprudence suggesting a constructive engagement 
with the process of transition was enunciated by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in litigation challenging the truth-seeking process in the country’s 
transition to popular democracy. The decision of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa (the Constitutional Court) in Azanian Peoples’ Organisation (AZAPO) & 3 
Ors v President of the Republic of South Africa 4 Ors (the AZAPO Case)72 stands 
out in this regard. The applicants sought an order declaring the amnesty 
provisions in section 20 of the TRC Act void. They were particularly aggrieved 
that section 20(7) of the TRC Act extinguished criminal or civil liability of the 
perpetrator for the amnestied criminal act. The absolution from liability also 
extended to the state as well as any other body, individual or corporate, that would 
have been vicariously liable for the violation in question.  
   In approaching the issue, the Constitutional Court conceded that the provisions 
could be considered a limitation of the constitutional provisions on the right to 
seek settlement of disputes in a court of law guaranteed by section 22 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. In resolving the issue, the Court 
resorted to the constitution to determine whether there was any other provision 
that permitted a limitation to the right in section 22.  In the event there was none, 
it sought to determine whether the limitation could be justified in terms of section 
33(1) of that constitution which allowed for some limitations by ‘law of general 
application’ to rights provided in the constitution. However, the Court placed 
premium on the fact that the society was in transition.  
    Thus, while the Constitutional Court recognised that  
               every human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a  
               consequence which  might allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the  
               streets of this land with impunity, protected in their freedom by an  
               amnesty immune from constitutional attack 
 
 it preferred to be guided by the dynamics of the transitional context when it stated 
that ‘the circumstances in support of this course require carefully to be 
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appreciated.’73 In recognition of the social context, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the need to provide an environment conducive to the emergence of 
the truth. The Constitutional Court held that surfacing the truth could only be 
achieved where perpetrators were assured that they would not be liable to trials, 
criminal or civil for coming forward to give their testimonies. The question of 
amnesty as a part of the truth-seeking process, the Constitutional Court noted, was 
part of a ‘historical situation’ the country was confronted with in the process of 
transition to a democratic order.74 
   Arguably, the Constitutional Court was aided in its decision by the fact that the 
operative constitution was negotiated for a society in transition. Thus it held that 
                The real answer …seems to lie in the more fundamental objectives of  
               the transition sought to be attained by the constitution and articulated in  
               the epilogue itself. What the constitution seeks to do is to facilitate the  
               transition to a new democratic order, committed to ‘reconciliation  
               between the people of  South Africa and the reconstruction of society.’75  
 
But the purposive interpretation placed on the constitutional provisions by the 
unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court was central to achieving the 
historic purpose.76 This is particularly so when it is considered that Mahomed DP, 
delivering the lead judgement, concluded inter alia that his decision to uphold the 
amnesty provisions of the TRC Act was based on the ‘most comprehensive and 
generous’ view of the relevant constitutional provisions.77  
   In this way the decision in the AZAPO Case upholding the constitutionality of 
the amnesty procedure served to progress the truth-seeking process in South 
Africa and this stands it in contrast with the Oputa Panel Case. However, it is 
noteworthy that though the Oputa Panel Case constitutes an example of negative 
interaction between the transitional judiciary and transitional justice mechanisms, 
it is by no means unique. The ensuing tension is similarly reflected in a few other 
legal challenges to the TRC. A notable reference is the decision of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (now the Supreme Court of 
Appeal) in Brigadier Jan du Preez and Major Gen. Nick van Rensburg v Truth 
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and Reconciliation Commission.78 The TRC, pursuant to its powers to determine 
its rules of procedure under section 30 of the TRC Act, sought to create an 
informal and culturally-sensitive atmosphere for victims to narrate their 
experiences before the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC). One of the 
ways it hoped to achieve this was by excluding cross-examination.  
   Brigadier Jan du Preez and Major Gen. Nick van Rensburg challenged the 
validity of section 30 of the TRC Act. They claimed it was in violation of section 
24 of the 1993 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The 
TRC had caused to be served on them notices to the effect that ‘an unnamed 
witness would testify that they were involved in, or had knowledge about, the 
poisoning and disappearance of a person, also unnamed’ at stated location and 
date. They demanded prior service of the statements of the witnesses before the 
scheduled hearings, a request the TRC turned down. The case for the TRC was 
that the remit of the Committee was investigatory and not judicial and thus it 
ought not to be bound by the legal formalism of courts.  
   The Supreme Court upheld the objection of the Applicants on the premise that 
the TRC was obliged to observe the principles of natural justice notwithstanding 
the nature of the proceedings. Once the TRC received information that may be 
prejudicial to a person, it was under obligation to furnish the concerned individual 
with such information prior to its been heard publicly as information of that nature 
could lead to criminal proceedings. The decision significantly hampered the work 
of the TRC. It led not only to logistics problems but also the rather awkward 
circumstance of prior exposure of the Commission’s report to alleged 
perpetrators.79   
    Unlike the constitutional situation in South Africa, the 1999 constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria under which the truth-seeking process in Nigeria, 
reflected in the Oputa Panel Case was challenged by the generals, remains much 
contested. Initiated and imposed by the military as part of a transition to civil rule 
programme, it lacked public ownership. 80 Again, as earlier noted, the truth-
seeking process was initiated by executive action under an existing legislation as 
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against the purpose-designed legislation of the TRC. This may have piled the 
stakes somewhat against the Oputa Panel.            
    The needs of the times, restoration of the rule of law, reparations for victims of 
gross human rights violations and transformation of societal institutions, required 
an activist consideration of the issues arising from the truth-seeking process. The 
Nigerian courts ought to have broken away from the conservative stance 
characteristic of traditional commonwealth judiciaries and opted for a 
jurisprudence reflecting not a ‘legalistic’ consideration of the issues in contention 
but an activist posture that is sensitive to the ‘ideals of the nation’.81  
  The decision of the Supreme Court could have been different if it took a 
purposive approach to the legislation in question. Such an approach would have 
allowed it to uphold the establishment of the Oputa Panel for investigating past 
human rights violations as a measure for ensuring ‘order and good government of 
the Federation or any part thereof’. Section 4 (1) of the Constitution of 1999 
confers this power on the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
 
4.   TWO DECISIONS AND THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH: HOPES FOR TRANSFORMATION? 
 4.1.   The PDP Case: When Death is not to Die  
   Achieving institutional transformation presents ‘profound challenges’ to states 
in transition. How to deal with existing state institutions with a record of 
inadequacies in governance or even outright complicity for human rights 
violations have also tasked transitional justice analysts.82 The engagement of state 
institutions with the context of transition in their work would be required for 
desired transformation. Such a commendable recognition of and engagement with 
the transitional context of the country was displayed by the majority decision of 
the Supreme Court (constitutional panel) in the earlier case of Peoples 
Democratic Party & 1Or. v. Independent National Electoral and 4Ors (PDP 
Case).83  
 4.1.1   A Lacuna, a Formidable Minority and a Slim Majority 
   The case emanated from the transition to civil rule elections which 
foreshadowed the current democratic dispensation in the country. The crux of the 
matter was that following his victory in the gubernatorial elections Adamawa 
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State,84 Atiku Abubakar (and before he was to take the oath of office), was 
subsequently nominated by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to run as his vice-
presidential candidate on the platform of the same party, the PDP. They won the 
presidential election on that joint ticket.  
   The situation was thus that Atiku was no longer available to be sworn in as 
Governor of Adamawa State. The electoral body, the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), indicated its intention to conduct a by-election for 
the office of Governor and Deputy Governor in the State on the premise that 
Abubakar’s acceptance to run as vice-presidential candidate rendered the position 
of Governor–elect vacant. In a letter sent to him by INEC, the electoral body 
averred that since he had not been sworn-in, his deputy could not ‘automatically 
take over the position.’ Bonnie Haruna, Atiku’s running-mate, challenged that 
move in court, contending that he ought to be sworn in as governor in the 
circumstances. 
   Faced with the situation where there was an obvious lacuna in respect of a key 
issue in electoral legislation in an all important transitional process, the learned 
justices reasoned that for the court to perform its constitutional functions 
               effectively and satisfactorily, it must be purposive in its construction of  
               the provisions of the constitution. Where the constitution bestows a right  
               on the citizen… we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure   
               that the inured right is not lost or denied the citizen by construction that  
               is narrow and not purposive.85 
 
The Court held that the intention of the framers of the law was to provide for 
situations where for one reason or the other (the ultimate being death), the deputy 
governor should step into the office of the governor where the latter is no longer 
available to take up his position.86 The Court, with a split decision of 4 to 3 
(Uwais, Chief Justice of Nigeria with the majority, Justices Ogundare, 
Mohammed and Uwaifo, strongly dissenting) thus abandoned the unambiguous 
provisions of the law and sought to discover legislative intent in a radical and 
implicit recognition of the unique situation of transition from decades of military 
authoritarian rule to civil democratic governance.  
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   Specifically, Uwais CJN, in the lead judgement decided that the provisions of 
section 37(1) of the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 3 of 1998, to the effect that 
                If a person duly elected as governor dies before taking and subscribing  
                the oath of allegiance and oath of office, the person elected with him as  
               deputy shall be sworn in as governor and he shall nominate a new deputy  
               governor from the same senatorial district as that of the deceased  
               governor who shall, with the approval of the House of Assembly of the  
               state be appointed as deputy governor. 
 
 must be liberally construed. Leading the majority, he maintained there was 
nothing sacrosanct about the word ‘die’ in the provision, thereby reversing the 
premise for the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had preferred the formalist 
(plain fact) approach. Rather, it should be liberally construed to accommodate a 
case where the elected candidate was ‘unavailable’ to be sworn in. It dismissed 
the plain-fact (formalist) interpretation approach adopted by the Court of Appeal 
as ‘narrow and restrictive’ and sometimes inappropriate to fulfilling or advancing 
‘the intention, spirit, objects, and purposes of the Constitution.’87 
   The Supreme Court went on to hold that since in relinquishing his Governor-
elect status, Atiku Abubakar was irrevocably barred from reclaiming it, his action 
could, in the words of the Court, be ‘likened to permanent incapacity or even 
death.’ In the circumstances, his action came within the contemplation of the 
relevant provisions of the law.88 For this proposition the Court relied heavily on 
the provisions of section 45(1) of the same law, which provides for the Deputy 
Governor to hold the office of Governor where the latter becomes vacant by 
reason of death, permanent incapacity or removal for any reason.  
   The majority judgment was strongly89 criticised in the dissenting judgements as 
deliberate usurpation of the legislative function under the guise of interpretation. 
Ogundare JSC objected to what he rightly sensed was a ‘policy’ decision. The 
duty of the Court, he insisted was not to ‘determine what the legislature meant to 
say but what it actually said.’90 The plain - fact interpretation according to the 
learned justice was the proper approach. It was not within the competence of the 
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Court to attempt modification of unambiguous provisions to ‘bring it into 
accordance with its own views as to what is reasonable.’91 He averred that any 
gap in legislation must be left to the legislature to fill for the contrary would 
amount to ‘judicial legislation,’ which was not the function of a court. Note how 
this approach completely ignores the important issue of the rights of the Deputy 
Governor-elect. As noted above, this was a decisive point in the majority decision.  
    In the lead dissenting judgement, Ogundare JSC posited that there was in any 
event, no lacuna in the provisions of section 37(1) of the State Government (Basic 
Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree 3 of 1998, which was in 
contention.92 Subscribing to these views, Mohammed JSC similarly contended 
that ‘policy, expediency, political exigency and convenience’ ought to be 
excluded from constitutional interpretation,93 thus implicitly (at the least) rejecting 
a reflexive jurisprudential approach to the transitional processes ongoing in the 
country at the time. In towing the line of dissent, Uwaifo JSC, expressly dismissed 
the majority’s preference for a ‘purposive approach.’ His position was based on 
what he (rightly) surmised was a radical change in the traditional jurisprudence of 
the Court 
                ...the line of decisions of this court on the preference for the literal  
               interpretation of statutes whose words are clear, precise and  
               unambiguous is intimidating and can not be ignored by sheer resort to   
               another principle of interpretation which may in a sense tend to overrule  
               or undermine those other decisions indirectly and without justification.94  
 
This was despite his concession that the liberal or broad interpretational approach 
was suited among others to ‘circumstances to cover such eventualities due to 
changing times, different social environments...not fully contemplated or 
overlooked at the time the constitution was drawn up.’95 He thus discounted the 
circumstances of political transition (arguably an inextricable part of the case), as 
not momentous (enough) to warrant a departure from the plain fact jurisprudential 
tradition of the Nigerian Supreme Court. 
                                                 
91
 Ibid. at 93. 
92
 PDP Case note 83 supra at 85 to 99. Uwaifo JSC expressed similar sentiments. See page 126-
28. 
93
 Ibid. at 111. 
94
 Ibid. at 123. Emphasis mine. 
95
 PDP Case note 83 supra at 123. 
 141 
    In fairness to the dissenting judgement, it is noteworthy that the provisions of 
section 45 unlike section 37(1) in fact and by the concession of the Court applies 
after the Governor and the Deputy Governor had been sworn in. Thus on the 
specific facts of the case, section 45 would be inapplicable. Yet, the Court in its 
majority decision took the view that since the legislation in issue was of a 
constitutional nature, the document must be ‘read together as a whole.’ It thus had 
no problem in arriving at the decision that the rationale of the provisions taken 
together was to avoid a vacuum in the important office of Governor and ensure a 
‘smooth’ succession.’ 96 To hold otherwise in the context of a fragile transition 
with a highly sceptical public,97 wary of ‘transitions without end’98 and dashed 
hopes on an end to authoritarian rule, would have constituted a disservice to the 
role of law and the transition judiciary in a post-authoritarian dynamic.    
 4.1.2    Breaking Away from Tradition 
   A fundamental issue in the PDP Case is the nature of the rights of the 2nd 
plaintiff, Bonnie Haruna; Atiku’s elected running-mate for deputy governor. The 
law in question, the State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree, even as the title suggests, was constitutive of the transitional 
arrangements going on in the country at the time, particularly with respect to 
elections. While conceding the constitutional nature of the legislation, the 
Respondents argued that the law was intended to provide a framework for 
governance of the country in the transition period and not to create individual 
rights. 
   In rejecting the contention, the Court held that constitutional legislation 
establishes rights that the courts must be ‘creative’ to protect and uphold. This 
approach led the majority to hold that where the Governor-elect abdicates, 
abandons or relinquishes his mandate, the Deputy Governor-elect (though elected 
on a joint ticket) does not thereby forfeit his right to the latter position.  This was 
so because they had each acquired individualised rights by their election, the one 
to be governor and the other, deputy governor.99 The right so conferred was of a 
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public nature and did not inure to the benefit of an individual who was not elected. 
Quite importantly, the Court noted that to hold to the contrary was not only 
‘fallacious but dangerous to the democratic process.’100 I share this concern.   
   Regrettably, as earlier noted, the court failed to carry forward such a purposive 
approach in the subsequent Oputa Panel Case particularly with regard to the 
rights of the victims of authoritarian rule. The judicial misdirection set the stage 
for non-implementation of the Panel’s recommendations. As noted earlier, the 
government insisted that the outcome of the Oputa Panel Case incapacitated it 
from taking the submitted report forward. But it did not state the specific aspects 
of the decision that supported or mandated this position. In turn, the fact of non-
implementation of the Oputa Panel’s recommendations has been attended by dire 
consequences for transitional justice, social stability and economic development 
in Nigeria. The current bedlam in the Niger Delta, where whole communities had 
come forward with serious allegations of violations of human rights by the state 
and multinational corporations at the Oputa Panel but failed to obtain redress, is 
but one cardinal indicator of this.  
 4.2.   The ICPC Case: Federalism v Commonweal 
    The foregoing purposive approach to judicial interpretation was also adopted by 
the Supreme Court in another epoch-making case in the transition period. This 
was in Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 
Ors (the ICPC Case). 101   
 4.2.1   From the Doldrums of Infamy 
      At the dawn of the transition to civil rule, Nigeria had become a notoriously 
corrupt country occupying the non-enviable position of second most corrupt 
nation in the world, according to Transparency International’s corruption index.102 
The country has been cited as ‘the crowning example of governmental corruption 
and betrayal of the hopes of the citizenry in Africa.’103 Combating corruption in 
the polity was clearly a policy imperative for an incoming administration intent on 
halting the downward spiral in the nation’s economic and social development, or 
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even one determined to move the society towards the realisation of its full 
potential. Then incoming-President, Olusegun Obasanjo recognised the enormity 
of the problem of corruption in the country. In his inaugural address to the nation 
at his swearing-in, he expressed the determination of his administration to tackle 
corruption which he described as ‘a full-blown cancer’ and ‘the greatest single 
bane of our society.’104  
   To underscore the administration’s commitment to combating the scourge of 
corruption as a major policy initiative, the anti-corruption law was the first 
executive bill submitted by it to the National Assembly (the federal legislature) 
for enactment. After stiff opposition from a considerable number of legislators, 
excision or tempering of some perceived ‘draconian’ provisions and public 
outrage at the obvious reluctance of the legislature to pass the bill into law, the 
National Assembly enacted the Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act No.5 of 
2000 several months later.105    
   The explanatory memorandum at the end of the law states its purpose as the 
prohibition and prescription of punishment for corrupt practices and other related 
offences. In addition, it established the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC, the Commission) to investigate and prosecute offenders. The 
powers of the ICPC extended to all individuals; public and private, including 
corporate bodies in the country. The all-encompassing reach of the ICPC Act was 
bound to attract jurisdictional challenge given the federal character of the 
Nigerian polity and the general discontent with previous practice of military 
regimes to disregard the dynamics of federalism in governance and law-making.  
   The attempt by the Commission to prosecute an official of the Ondo State 
government set the stage for the inevitable challenge of the jurisdictional powers 
of the ICPC. 106 By virtue of section 232 of the 1999 constitution and in line with 
Nigerian constitutional practice, the Attorney–General of Ondo State on behalf of 
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the state government headed for the Supreme Court. The section confers on the 
Supreme Court, original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, on any 
dispute between the federation and a state or between states inter se once the 
dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or 
extent of a legal right depends. This was one such case.   
   He challenged the constitutionality of the ICPC Act by taking not just the 
Federal Government (protagonist of the legislation) to Court but also all the other 
35 states in the country for the obvious reason that the decision in the case would 
automatically affect their interests. The relief sought by the Plaintiff was double-
pronged. First, the Plaintiff sought an injunction of the Court to declare the law 
invalid on the ground that the law lacked jurisdictional validity for purporting to 
create a commission with powers to prosecute public and private individuals for 
offences within the states and in state high courts.107 Secondly, and of even more 
significance, it sought a perpetual injunction to restrain the ICPC and the Federal 
Attorney-General from exercising or applying any of the provisions of the law in 
Ondo State. In effect, the law would thereby be invalidated as a whole. Counsel to 
the Plaintiff canvassed precisely that in concluding his address to the Court.108  
   The case for the Plaintiff (and some of the Defendants other than the 1st 
Defendant) was basically that no express or even implied provisions in the 
Constitution confer powers on the National Assembly to create a monolithic body 
with such an all-encompassing reach as the ICPC or the offences (of corruption) 
for which it was empowered to prosecute for the whole country. It was urged on 
the Court that the omission of a ‘general power to create and punish offences’ in 
the ‘scheme of enumeration’ (Legislative Lists) in the Constitution precluded the 
National Assembly from enacting the ICPC Act.109 Thus the anti-corruption law 
and a fortiori the ICPC were ultra vires the National Assembly as ‘corruption’ is a 
residual matter within the exclusive legislative competence of the state 
governments. It is pertinent to note the similarity of this argument with that 
proffered by the Plaintiffs in the (earlier) Oputa Panel case on the powers of the 
president to establish a truth commission for the whole country.110 I will return to 
a juxtaposition of the two cases later.  
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   Less than half of the states, sixteen, filed briefs of argument in the matter. Not 
surprisingly, they were evenly split (8 each) in their support for or opposition to 
the case for the Plaintiff.  While thirteen completely abstained, 6 were represented 
at the hearing but were precluded from arguing a position due to procedural 
requirements that only parties who had filed a brief could canvass oral arguments 
before the Court.  
   At the core of the case for the 1st Defendant (the Federal Government) was the 
argument that the National Assembly was vested with the power to enact the 
ICPC Act pursuant to its constitutional powers to make laws for the ‘peace, order 
and good government of the Federation.’ The 1st Defendant conceded that the 
Exclusive Legislative List does not refer expressly to ‘corruption.’ It however 
argued that the National Assembly is conferred with the power to legislate as it 
did on corruption by a joint reading of several provisions of the Constitution. 
These include in particular the provisions of item 68 of the Exclusive List which 
provides that the National Assembly is empowered to legislate on ‘Any matter 
incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list.’   
   The 1st Defendant further anchored its argument on a joint construction of 
sections 15 (5), 88 (2) (a) and (b) as well as paragraph 2 of Part III and item 60 (a) 
of the Constitution. Item 60 (a), relied upon by the Federal Government provides 
that the National Assembly has the power to establish and regulate authorities ‘for 
the Federation or any part thereof’  in order ‘To promote and enforce the 
observance of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles’ contained in 
the Constitution. Section 15 (5) of the constitution tersely provides that ‘The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.’ Finally, section 88 (2) (a) 
(b) of the constitution provides that the National Assembly shall have the power 
to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the administration of laws within 
its legislative competence.’     
   The Court sanctioned the legality of the ICPC Act. It noted that in view of 
section 4 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the National Assembly has 
the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List, it 
was intra vires the National Assembly to enact the ICPC Act under Item 60 (a) of 
the Constitution as canvassed by the 1st Defendant. Uwais C.J.N stated that the 
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“Fundamental Objectives and Directives of State Policy” can only be enforced by 
legislation. He dismissed the argument that the anti-corruption law ought to be 
limited to public officers and the three arms of government alone since it forms 
part of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. In 
identifying with the social realities of the country in relation to the challenge 
posed by corrupt and related practices, he declared that since 
               Corruption is not a disease which afflicts public officers alone…If it is to  
               be eradicated effectively, the solution to it must be pervasive to cover  
              every segment of the society...’111  
 
4.2.2   ‘Policy United’ All the Way 
   Clearly, as noted by Professor Ben Nwabueze, one of the amici curiae, the task 
of the Court in the case was ‘challenging because the issue impinges on the 
cardinal principles of Nigeria’s federal system.’112 The ICPC Act in the view of 
the respected jurist was ‘subversive’ of the principles of federalism as enshrined 
in the Nigerian constitution and in violation of its constitutive doctrines of 
autonomy and non-interference.113 The confluence of constitutionalism and a key-
policy issue in a transitional context was bound to test the jurisprudence of the 
Court with resonance for the polity. 
      The special significance of the case and its policy implications were not lost 
on the Court. In a clearly uncharacteristic move (at least in recent memory), it 
invited three distinguished legal practitioners as amici curiae to address the Court 
on the case. All three filed separate (advisory) briefs of argument with two 
arguing against the legality and the third in support of the ICPC Act.114 In an 
unbridled positivistic approach to the role of law in society, a highly regarded 
constitutional law jurist and retired Professor of Law, Benjamin Nwabueze, 
argued that the country could ‘cope better’ with corruption which had a long 
history in the polity, than for the Court to uphold a legislation that tampers with 
the federal structure of the country and could lead to ‘grave political danger.’115 
The Court tilted the balance in favour of actively working against corruption, 
viewing it as a more dangerous phenomenon in the polity. 
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   It is germane to an understanding of the case to note that there is an allocation of 
legislative powers between the two tiers of government in the second schedule to 
the Constitution. The ‘Exclusive Legislative List’ itemises the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal (central) government while the ‘Concurrent Legislative 
List’ specifies the shared sphere of legislative powers between the two tiers. There 
is an unwritten Residual Legislative List that is constitutionally deemed the 
exclusive province of respective state governments on unlisted matters.    
   The learned Chief Justice displayed a utilitarian conception of the function of 
law to buttress his jurisprudential preference to sacrifice formalism (that could 
have accorded better recognition to the federal status of the country) at the altar of 
the (transitional) exigencies of the times when he further observed that ‘the aim of 
making law is to achieve the common good.’116 He took the view that ‘state’ in 
section 15 (5) applied to both the Federal and State levels of government in the 
country and thus the power to legislate on corruption could be regarded as 
concurrent. 
   The point ought to be made however, that on a formalist construction of the 
foregoing provisions and others in the Nigerian constitution, it may well be 
argued that the Plaintiff and most of the Defendants who adopted the position, 
brief and argument of the former, were on quite firm grounds. To buttress this 
position, the Court did find some merit in the case for the Plaintiff and the case for 
the latter succeeded in part even if minimally, in respect of certain provisions that 
it sought to be declared ultra vires the ICPC. Incidentally, these were only aspects 
of the law the Court adjudged impugned on the judicial powers and independence 
of the courts. The Court applied the blue pencil rule to strike down those 
sections.117   
   For good measure, it is noteworthy there are no specific provisions in the 
itemised list of legislative competencies in the Nigerian constitution conferring 
power on the National Assembly to enact law and establish a monolith anti-
corruption agency for the whole country, desirable as this may be. The Court only 
came to such a decision by applying a liberal interpretation and imputing an 
implied existence of such powers 
               Reading these provisions of the 1999 constitution together and construed  
               liberally and broadly, it can be easily seen that the National Assembly  
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               possesses the power both “incidental” and “implied” to promulgate the  
               Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 to enable the State which  
               for this purpose means the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to implement the  
               provision of Section 15(5) of the Constitution. 118 
   It is important to note here that the Court addressed the tension between the 
policy choice to combat corruption through a monolith institution like the ICPC 
and the fundamental principle of federalism clearly enshrined in the Constitution. 
Uwais C.J.N conceded the possible infringement of the ‘requirement of autonomy 
of the State government and non-interference with the functions of State 
government (sic).’ But he was quick to observe that such interference has 
constitutional support.  
   The learned Chief Justice waived ‘cardinal principles’ aside as ‘best ideals to 
follow or guidance for an ideal situation,’119 again demonstrating the recognition 
of the transitional circumstances of the country and the policy considerations 
involved in the Court’s position on the matter. Ogwuegbu JSC was even more 
candid in his admission of the possibility of interference and a compromise 
concerning the doctrine of autonomy at the core of federalism as the unanimous 
decision constituted. He readily sacrificed the latter for what he and other 
members of the Constitutional Panel of the Court considered to be the overriding 
priority to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Federation.’ He was of the view that corruption constituted a threat to all of these 
and the ICPC Act was designed to combat the threat. In what can be regarded as 
poignant reflection of the letter and spirit of the judgement, he affirmed that 
               The Court is conscious of the history of corruption in Nigeria and should  
               not be at liberty to construe the ICPC Act or any Act …by the motives  
               which influenced the Legislature, yet when the history of the law and  
              legislation tells the court what the policy and object of the Legislature  
              were, the court is to see whether the terms of the Act are such as fairly  
               carry out the policy and  objective…Any legislation on corruption must  
              be of concern to every  Nigerian.120   
The Court was thus acutely aware of the political nature of its decision. The 
remarkable identification of the Court with the aspirations of the society and its 
preference for a purposive jurisprudential approach constituted unparalleled 
exceptionalism in the history of judicial constitutionalism in Nigeria.  
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5. VALIDITY OF PURPOSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN NIGERIA’S TRANSITION 
      Barak posits that the purposive judicial interpretational approach is the ‘proper 
system of interpretation’ of the constitution and statutes alike in democratic 
societies.121  If we agree with this postulation, then the purposive interpretive 
approach is even more apposite for adjudication in transitional contexts where 
immense national and international resources, are usually deployed to effect 
institutional transformation and restoration of the rule of law.  
5.1 Displacing Formalism in Transitional Contexts 
   A comprehensive reading of the judgements delivered by each of the six justices 
in their concurrence with the lead judgement in the ICPC Case reveals a 
purposive jurisprudence that identified with the peculiar historicity of corruption 
in the country. Thus, the Court waxed strong on casting its lot with policy 
measures regarding one of the salient programmes stated in the inaugural address 
of (then incoming) President Olusegun Obasanjo. In this regard, Uwaifo JSC 
declared in his judgement  
               The issue of corruption and abuse of power has become international. It  
               is a declared state policy in Nigeria to combat it and so it has assumed a  
              national issue of high priority which is considered best suited for the  
              National Assembly to be addressed through a federal agency like the  
               ICPC.122 
   Similar advertence to the foregoing principles and the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ provisions adopted by the Court in the ICPC Case would have 
served equally well to save the Oputa Panel Case from been determined along so 
narrow lines as did the Court on that occasion. The Court in coming to the 
decision to uphold the ICPC Act clearly made a policy decision to reject the black 
letter of the law. Formalists (especially) may strongly deprecate such an approach 
in normal situations as fostering uncertainty in the law. But that is precisely the 
point that the Court missed in the Oputa Panel Case. Transition contexts are not 
normal contexts. While certainty in the law requires the judiciary to be consistent, 
consistency in transitional societies ought to be in full awareness of, and attuned 
to, the social context.  
    Teitel’s contention that in transitional contexts, what makes law ‘positive’ is the 
‘popular perception in the public sphere’123 is apt to the Nigerian situation. Thus 
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the adoption of a liberal purposive approach as demonstrated by the Supreme 
Court to the social realities of the country in its attempt to break with the past it is 
argued, is to be preferred to the plain-fact or formalist approach that may be the 
appropriate course in the absence of social contingencies challenging the very 
foundations of societies in political transition. This is what Teitel considers as the 
‘social construction of the law’; one of the paradigmatic shifts from conventional 
understandings of the rule of law relevant to conceptions of law in transitions.124  
   In the pre-transition period, Nigerian society had been victim of economic and 
financial rape leading to monumental social deprivations perpetrated by the 
largely predatory ruling elite.125 This deplorable situation was occasioned partly 
by weak legislation and law enforcement arrangements as well as a corrupt and 
compromised judiciary. Bell, Campbell and Ni Aolain, much like Teitel, have 
noted that the law as well as legal institutions suffer degradation in conflict (and 
repressive) situations that impair their legitimacy. Thus, both law and legal 
institutions must facilitate change as well as be changed themselves.126 Perhaps in 
realisation of this, the Court opted here for a ‘constructivist’127 transformative 
model of adjudication, and actively led the way in support of the expressed 
popular desire for checkmating past injustices and continuing similar 
tendencies.128 The attitude of the Court is well captured in the concluding remarks 
of Ogwuegbu JSC in the case. At the risk of descending into the adversarial arena, 
he candidly voiced what is no doubt popular opinion on the matter in the Nigerian 
society 
               I must also point out that all Nigerians except perhaps those who benefit  
               from it are unhappy with the level of corruption in the country. The main  
               opposition to the ICPC Act is I believe, borne out of fear and  
               suspicion.129  
 
5.2   Deepening the Rule of Law in Transitional Contexts    
   There is also the sense in which the decision in the ICPC Case significantly 
deepens the rule of law in the country. This is in the way it has strengthened the 
hands of prosecutors who are reassured that no one will be above the law in the 
fight against corruption. The decision signals clearly that it would not be ‘business 
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as usual’ for corrupt public and private actors who had held the country hostage 
and taken it to ‘the nadir of the miasma of corrupt practices.’130 Recently, the 
chief prosecutor and highest ranking law officer in the country, the Attorney-
General of the Federation, after coming under strident public criticism for his 
perceived toleration of corruption by public officers, declared an all out war on 
corruption. He vowed to ensure the prosecution of all established cases of 
corruption by public officers in the post-transition period till date. Prosecutors, he 
assured, would leave no sacred cows as ‘governors, ministers and any other 
government official mentioned in those reports would be prosecuted.’ 131 In this 
regard it is noteworthy that recent research on public perceptions of institutional 
performance and legitimacy in the democratic transition in Nigeria indicates a 
‘growing approval for anti-corruption efforts.’132  
   The role of the judiciary in adopting a purposive approach to salient 
foundational issues in the anti-corruption project, with its notable impact on the 
rule of law, can not be divorced from such perceptions. This is particularly so 
granted that clamours for transparency in the management of public funds, on the 
one hand, and prosecution of erring corrupt public office-holders on the other, 
have assumed centre-stage in the criminal justice administration system in the 
country in recent times than ever before.133 A clear manifestation of the situation 
is the tremendous support (including again, judicial) for the establishment and 
activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), despite the 
clear overlap in the functions and powers of the two and the elaborate structural 
arrangements that have been made for their effective operations.  
   Teitel has stated that the judiciary, more than any other arm of government, is 
better positioned to facilitate change in transitional societies.134 In the event there 
appears to be substantial political will in the other arms of government to design a 
policy to effect radical change, it would be counterintuitive for the judiciary to 
frustrate such policy initiatives.  
   Mass public support for an anti-corruption policy in the Nigerian context is 
better appreciated against the background that the statute books have for decades 
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provided some of the severest punishments (including death sentence in some 
cases), for property crimes like robbery, stealing, arson and related offences 
generally considered crimes within the province of underprivileged felons. The 
anti-corruption drive with its seeming emphasis on ‘grand’ (as against ‘petty’) 
corruption135 was viewed as more inclusive if not specifically targeted at the 
criminally-minded members of the upper strata of the society.  
   The decision of the Court in the ICPC Case constitutes a defining moment, a 
watershed in the country’s nascent anti-corruption policy. The enormity of the 
corruption scourge in the country is highlighted by the fact that - and again in 
contrast with the facts of the Oputa Panel Case is instructive - the ICPC was 
finalising prosecutorial arrangements on more than 20 former state governors 
barely 4 months after they left office and lost executive immunity from 
prosecution for official corruption and abuse of office.136 At least one has been 
convicted following his impeachment and three others are currently on trial on 
similar charges.          
   The Court made a remarkable (albeit momentary) break with the past in the 
ICPC Case moving tangentially along some of the very lines it was to later reject 
in part or whole in the Oputa Panel Case. This approach comes through not only 
in the lead judgement but ran through all the separate concurring decisions in the 
ICPC Case. It is significant that the issue of ‘policy’ consideration was cited in 
the latter decision with unanimous approbation and expressed in the lead 
judgement rather than in reprobation and dissent that characterised it in the PDP 
Case. Recall that Ogundare JSC raised this point in condemnation of the majority 
decision in the PDP Case. He had stated that 
                It is not for the Court to determine what the legislature meant to say but  
               what it actually said. Nor is the court to read something into such  
               provisions on the grounds of policy.137 
 
This is no doubt in obvious disregard of the dynamic role of law and the judiciary 
in transition. In implicit disavowal of its long-standing plain-fact jurisprudential 
approach, the majority of the Court did not refer to any of its earlier decisions that 
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relied so heavily on ‘policy considerations.’ The Court indeed closed its eyes to 
formalist adjurations to keep the flow of the waters of law and politics pure and 
separate. 
5.3   Beyond Provincialism 
   Equally significant was the willingness of the Court to engage in a comparative 
juridical approach in its judgement in the ICPC Case. It analysed with much 
approval, many foreign cases from other federal jurisdictions bearing on 
transition, emergency, and more generally, cases with significant implications on 
national life. It had hitherto demonstrated a judicial proclivity for ignoring even 
relevant international law obligations of the country in the context of the transition 
as with the Oputa Panel Case.  
   Thus, a good deal of the rationes decidendi in the ICPC Case were rooted in 
foreign precedents specifically from federal jurisdictions like the United States, 
Canada and Australia. This marked a departure from a fairly established tradition 
of insularity in which otherwise relevant foreign decisions were considered with 
suspicion and declared inapplicable in the country. It is significant to the extent 
that failure to benefit from and accord recognition to such decisions delivered in 
similar contemporary socio-political contexts (like the South Africa transitional 
experience), hampered the development of a robust human rights jurisprudence 
and culture in the country.  
   Advertence to comparative law constitutes one of the tools to achieve an 
effective discharge of the duties of judges in a democracy, particularly in the 
context of an increasingly globalised world.138 In the converse then, neglect of 
comparative perspectives may deny national courts of potentially perspicacious 
jurisprudential insights.   
5.3.4   Peace, Order and Good Governance to the Rescue    
   Another striking feature of the decision in the ICPC Case is the heavy store 
(rightly) placed by the Supreme Court on the constitutional provision that the 
National Assembly had the power to legislate for the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ of every part of the federation. As I argued earlier, rejection of this 
provision by the Court in the Oputa Panel Case constitutes a fundamental 
misdirection regarding the role of law in the context of transition. There is again 
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in this regard, the circumstance that the series of human rights violations, the 
investigation of which formed the core of the remit of the Oputa Panel, were 
committed under various military regimes that ruled in a unitary fashion. Thus, a 
centralised process of scrutiny and accountability is arguably best suited to 
addressing transitional justice claims arising from them. No doubt, the shaky legal 
arrangements of the Oputa Panel made the intentions of the executive less 
credible at best. However it would have better served the purpose of the rule of 
law and justice to victims of impunity to uphold the process than to chip away the 
basis of its legal validity through unrepentant and rigid plain-fact jurisprudence.  
   The foregoing position is reinforced by the fact that the TIA, which was in issue 
in the Oputa Panel case, started its life and was so upheld by the Court, as a valid 
Act passed by the National Assembly. It thus shared a critical element with the 
ICPC Act; it is meant to ensure the ‘peace, order and good government’ of every 
part of the federation without precluding state governments from enacting similar 
legislation.  
  In any event, the purpose it was made to serve in the establishment of the Oputa 
Panel was clearly for that. That the Court ought to have followed this purposive 
approach is underlined further by the fact that it appeared to have laid fairly firm 
foundation for transition jurisprudence in the majority decision in the earlier PDP 
Case. This is in spite of the unsuccessful attempt to retain it on the well-worn 
tracks of plain-fact jurisprudence. But the Supreme Court failed to establish a 
required and important line of consistency when it upheld the jurisdictional 
argument against the Oputa Panel.  
 
6.  DISCORDANT TUNES 
   One of the important functions of judges in their interpretive role is the creation 
and sustenance of ‘normative harmony.’ This ensures individual statutes are 
creatively interpreted as part of an integrated legal system.139 Failure of the 
judiciary, especially at the highest levels, to foster an integrated and consistent 
approach to the interpretive role particularly in the context of transition tend to 
jeopardise the critical role, outlined for the transition judiciary by Teitel. The 
judiciary would then be failing in its role of ‘bridging the gap… between law and 
society.’140 
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   I have contended above that there exists a public accountability gap with respect 
to the judiciary in the process of Nigeria’s political transition. It is pertinent to 
determine further whether the judiciary, faced with the challenging dynamics of 
law and justice in the context of transition, has itself become transformed, the 
accountability gap notwithstanding. It is possible to come to a positive conclusion 
at first blush. Closer scrutiny however suggests differently. The jurisprudence 
emanating from the Nigerian judiciary in the post-military authoritarian period 
appear to be discordant at best.  
6.1   Ambivalence or New Directions? 
     An ambivalent disposition continues to characterise the decisions of the courts. 
This view of the matter could of course be challenged particularly in view of 
recent acclaim that has trailed a number of transition-related decisions delivered 
by the judiciary, the Supreme Court in particular. They centre on constitutional 
issues generated from a rash of election related cases in the heated political scene 
in the country. A good number of them have been described as ‘landmark’ 
decisions141 for which it has received plaudits even from usually critical 
quarters.142  
   In particular, public opinion surveys focusing on election petition tribunals 
which adjudicate the highly controversial ‘civilian-civilian’ election transition 
cases in the country, even suggest the judiciary has been the most ‘consistent’ 
branch of government in the transition period.143 Others have described the 
judiciary as ‘the hero of Nigeria’s democracy.’144 In view of these examples, 
therefore, ought not the Nigerian transition judiciary to be commended for 
overcoming its previous questionable record of judicial governance? We will 
examine further the growing incidence of judicial intervention in mediating the 
political transition later in this research. Suffice to say at this point that 
commendable as the above appraisals may be, they constitute no more than 
flashes in the pan of the situational circumstance of judicial activity in the 
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country. In this regard, it is important to consider the temporality of the foregoing 
decisions and other contemporary transition cases and the trends they reflect. In 
other words, what does the analysis of the foregoing cases tell us about the 
judicial function in Nigeria’s political transition?   
  Consider that the Court in its decision in the Oputa Panel Case that was decided 
more than three years after the PDP Case,145 seemed to have still been caught up 
in its old plain-fact jurisprudential approach despite the purposive approach 
signposted by the majority decision in the latter. Further, it bears repetition that a 
seven-man Constitutional Panel unanimously decided the Oputa Panel Case in 
defiance, I have argued, of international law obligations of the country to victims 
of gross violations of human rights. The relapse displaced the purposive approach 
advocated by the constitutional panel of the Court in the PDP Case.  
   Even the commendable purposive approach of the ICPC Case decided on 7th 
June 2002 was clouded by the Oputa Panel Case and despite their 
contemporaneousness there was no reference in one to the other at all levels of the 
courts involved. The absence of cross-citation reflects a lack of coherence in the 
jurisprudential outlook of the Supreme Court. In a common law based legal 
system, where precedent is at the nerve-centre of judicial-decision making, such 
lack of clear judicial direction necessarily impacts on the lower courts negatively. 
   Again, it is germane to recall that the purposive decision in the PDP Case was 
itself seriously threatened at the time and was only achieved at the closest 
possible split of 4/3. This was despite the obvious threat to the rule of law a 
counter decision posed in the prevalent fragile political environment of a non-
negotiated transition.146 It is important to note too that none of the cases made any 
explicit reference to the transitional status of the Nigerian society, momentous as 
this was in all three cases in particular, and the socio-political circumstances of 
the time. All of these suggest the absence of a coherent purposive jurisprudential 
approach that behoves a transition judiciary.  
   In summary, the initial post-transition period was characterised largely by 
jurisprudential ambivalence and lack of engagement with the dynamics of 
                                                 
145
 The Supreme Court decided the PDP Case expeditiously on 11th May 1999 on time for the 
inauguration of the Plaintiff on 29th May 1999 and gave its full reasons on 16th July 1999. The 
Oputa Panel Case was decided on 31st January 2003. The Supreme Court did not at all advert to 
the purposive approach in the PDP and ICPC Cases when it decided the Oputa Panel case in 
2003. 
146
 P M Lewis Growing Apart- Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria 
(University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor-Michigan 2007), 243-245 and S Akinrinade 
“Constitutionalism and the Resolution of Conflicts” (2003) 368 41, 47-50. 
 157 
transitional justice. It will be suggested that the courts later adopted a judicial 
attitude marked by relatively progressive and transition-conscious adjudication. 147  
However, some inconsistencies challenge the proposition that there is a clear and 
coherent direction in terms of the jurisprudential approach of even the Supreme 
Court. Thus there are cases of both judicial approaches in the two strands. 
However, there are dominating elements of each approach in the initial and later 
periods to justify the case for a fairly distinct categorisation as advanced in this 
chapter. What appears certain though is the fact that the Court has now become 
more conscious of its powers and the need for an active judicial role in the 
country’s troubled political transition. The transition-conscious adjudication is 
more closely considered in Chapter Six in the discussion on judicialisation of 
politics in Nigeria.  
 
CONCLUSION 
   The need for all institutions of governance to participate in obtaining redress for 
human rights violations in post conflict societies is underscored by the necessity 
of a process of accountability to serve as the foundation for establishing the rule 
of law in such societies.148 The judiciary, considering its usually privileged 
stability in the face of political upheaval, must be at the forefront of 
institutionalising the rule of law particularly in post transitional contexts.  
   The enunciation of a radical, transformative jurisprudence by the judiciary in a 
post-authoritarian transition holds considerable promise for the restoration of the 
rule of law and at the institutional level, signals a definitive break from the past.149 
Such judicial disposition is particularly important in transitional societies where 
the executive and legislature in the new democratic dispensation may owe 
avowed loyalty to or are actual protégés of the illiberal regime, thus potentially at 
the risk of derogating from the quantum of real representation of the common 
interest.  
   The judiciary in societies in transition can not remain aloof of the realities of the 
operating environment, even if only for the pragmatic necessity to maintain its 
relevance in society. It has a critical role to play in mediating conflict and 
upholding human rights through a robust interpretation of law in transitional 
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societies moving way from the experience of abuse of power and misuse of state 
institutions. The need for the mediating role of the judiciary role in governance is 
even more acute in societies, like Nigeria, where the judiciary has been previously 
implicated in validating authoritarian rule and thus, undermining the rule of law. 
Proper performance of the role will enable the judiciary to earn credibility, 
promote justice, foster peace and contribute to societal recovery and development. 
Such a proactive role is of particular relevance in developing and transitional 
societies where the judiciary has been noted for enunciating ‘usurper friendly’ 
jurisprudence.150 
    In the performance of its adjudicatory role in the Oputa Panel Case, the 
Nigerian judiciary opted for a conservative approach to the issues at stake in the 
emergent contestations. In its handling of the challenge to the powers of the Oputa 
Panel and its work, the Nigerian judiciary not only failed to engage with the 
established international human rights standards on the right to truth and remedy 
for victims of gross human rights violations, but also the dynamics of a society in 
transition. The judiciary may not be faulted for not offering, of its own volition, to 
tell its truth about its role in gross human rights violations and misgovernance. 
But there are good reasons to expect it would allow the truth-seeking process to be 
carried out by another agency, in this case, the Oputa Panel, unhindered. Rather, 
the formalistic judicial approach to the truth-seeking process left the truth in 
jeopardy and victims in despair.  
   The foregoing judicial attitude would appear due largely to a failure of self-
realisation on the part of the judiciary. The attitude has prevailed because of the 
judicial accountability gap identified in Chapters One, Two and Three above. The 
seeming faux pas of the Oputa Panel to integrate judicial accountability for past 
governance as part of the truth-seeking process, led to the absence of a conscious 
and concerted institutional introspection on the part of the judiciary. An 
accountability mechanism in the nature of the truth-seeking process represented 
by the Oputa Panel would have engendered institutional soul-searching and 
facilitate a coordinated and consistent initiative of self-redemption which is still 
missing in the performance of the judicial role in Nigeria. 
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    In post-authoritarian societies, the public expect much of the judiciary. As the 
Nigerian experience demonstrates, in the spirit of newly restored constitutional 
supremacy, civil liberties, democracy and openness in governance, the judiciary is 
constantly required to mediate between the rulers and the ruled and hold the 
exercise of power in check and (more) accountable.  Such demanding 
expectations derive partly from the fact that it has the longest history of functional 
institutional stability compared to the executive and legislative branches of 
government, since both are invariably trumped by military political-adventurism 
and authoritarian rule. Ironically, the judiciary typically steeped in well-worn 
traditions and customarily exempt from popular public accountability mechanisms 
deployed in transitional societies may be slow or even unwilling to take on 
headlong the challenges of social transformation. It may be ill-prepared or even 
oblivious to these great expectations and its important role in the transitioning 
polity. 
   The discussion in this chapter on judicial constitutionalism in Nigeria’s political 
transition suggests a combination of public-driven factors may significantly 
impact on the state of judicial inertia in transitions. Such factors may reconfigure 
judicial synergy, redirecting the judiciary to the realisation that it cannot but move 
with the socio-political realities of the times. It will thus be primed to join the 
front seat in taking on a proactive role in governance and moving the transitioning 
state forward as evinced in the ICPC and PDP decisions. How well it proceeds on 
the path that takes forward this purposive approach is dependent on its ability to 
make a distinct break with a past tainted by complicit jurisprudence.  
   However, the potential of this public-driven initiative for judicial transformation 
is intrinsically limited and must be regarded with caution. This is because it is 
largely spontaneous, uncoordinated and not institutionalised as a matter of official 
policy. It is doubtful, as evidenced by the ambivalence that characterised the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court discussed above (and further examination of 
the conduct of the judicial function in the post-authoritarian period that will be 
examined later), that it can evoke a consistent and permanent transformation of 
the judiciary in the country. This is because the demands of post-authoritarian 
adjudication can be daunting. The challenges of grappling with mediating 
disputed institutional and individual claims have in fact become a critical issue in 
transitioning polities all over the world and its to these that we turn our focus in 
the remaining part of this research. 
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Chapter Five 
THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS: DIALECTICS OF A PHENOMENON 
 
INTRODUCTION 
   The existence of a gap in accountability of the judiciary for the past in Nigeria’s 
transition to civil democratic rule has been identified and analysed in previous 
chapters.1 Thus far, the imperative of accountability of the judiciary in transitional 
contexts has been advanced on two cardinal premises. The first is distinctly 
normative in nature. Normatively, there is the imperative of comprehensive 
accountability as a measure of transitional justice claims. All institutions of state 
responsible for misgovernance are in the transitional justice paradigm required to 
account for their conduct. The other reason, of a hybrid character, can be located 
simultaneously in normative and political considerations. It is the need for 
transformation of complicit state institutions as a sine qua non for the reinstitution 
of the rule of law and sustenance of the democratic initiative in the transitioning 
society. A process of reform would require a holistic evaluation of previous 
performance in order to identify operational strengthens and deficiencies to map 
out action points.  
   In this chapter, the focus is on the dialectics of the judicialisation of politics with 
particular reference to transitional contexts. The judicial role in governance has 
taken centre stage not only in developed democracies,2 but also, democratising 
polities round the world.3 A central feature of judicial powers in contemporary 
governance is the growing influence of courts on the direction of politics and 
mechanisms for democratic accountability in the public (government) and private 
(individual) spheres. This growing incidence of active and (sometimes) direct 
judicial participation in policy-making in transitioning polities further validates 
the case for institutional accountability of the judiciary (along with other 
institutions of the state) for its past role in governance in those societies. 
   In other words, the increasingly decisive role the exercise of judicial power 
plays in policy-formulation and decision-making in contemporary governance 
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reinforces the importance of accountability of the judiciary for the past in societies 
in transition. The strategic position of the judiciary in governance raises the need 
for substantial scrutiny and accountability for its role in the authoritarian period of 
a society’s past which may be, as in the context of this study, one of authoritarian 
rule. This is important to legitimate its authority in the conduct of the moderating 
role almost invariably thrust on it in post-authoritarian societies. In view of its 
peculiar institutional design that mostly shields the judiciary from scrutiny, 
especially of a public (or democratic) nature on a regular basis (in contrast to 
other public centres of power), society has to be assured that the judiciary is 
properly constituted to exercise its expanding powers.    
   In this regard, it has been recognised that motivations other than holding power 
to account, or concern for the common good, may condition otherwise bold, even 
confrontational, decisions of the judiciary, trumping actions and policy initiatives 
of other branches of government. The operation of the judicial function based on 
such an institutional outlook, jeopardises the symmetry of ‘horizontal 
accountability’ which judicial activity ideally represents in such contexts.4 
Horizontal accountability is a form of accountability where a subordinate reports 
to, or is held accountable by, an external as against a hierarchical superior. This 
contrasts with the traditional, vertical form of accountability in which an agency 
reports ‘internally’ to a superior. Horizontal accountability is regarded as being 
more promising for achieving accountability and has now become an increasingly 
adopted form of accountability.5  
   In our context, horizontal accountability refers to the situation where the 
judiciary actively participates in activating or monitoring legal mechanisms for 
the democratic accountability of the political branches. In an ideal setting, the 
separation of powers anticipates that, democratic accountability mechanisms will 
operate vertically within the institutional confines of the respective branch of 
government. In other words, democratic accountability is conducted within an 
individual branch of government without reference to another.  
   The judicialisation of politics in transitions to democracy suggests the judiciary 
increasingly finds itself involved in governance in democratising societies in 
contexts where its role remains under-defined, and its motivations, opaque. 
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Despite this, there is an incremental resort (by the political branches of 
government as well as individuals), to the judiciary for the resolution of 
administrative and policy disputes in post-authoritarian societies. Newly 
established or rehabilitated constitutional courts in East Asia have been actively 
involved in emerging political controversies. They have played, and continue to 
play, notable roles in allocation of political offices, election oversight, corruption-
monitoring, transitional justice claims, human rights enforcement and legislative 
compliance with constitutional provisions and standards. 6  
    A comparative evaluation of the process and parameters of judicialisation in 
South East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa (with 
particular reference to Nigeria), suggests convergence on the centrality of the 
judicial function in the institutionalisation of human rights and democratic ideals. 
Thus, judicialisation of politics has come to be recognised as an important, if not 
indispensable feature of political activity in the modern state.7 However, this view 
of the judicial function in the democratic process appears, at least potentially, 
antithetical to the substantially well articulated and sustained counter-majoritarian 
view of the judiciary.   
   This chapter presents a brief juxtaposition of judicialisation of politics with 
democracy and the rule of law. It highlights the existential dynamics of the 
phenomenon in the contemporary society in general and transitioning polities in 
particular. The chapter then critiques counter-majoritarian objections to the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review. There is a challenge of assumed solidity 
of the representative nature of the political branches around which such objections 
are typically crafted. The discussion subsequently focuses on an analytic 
framework for the judicialisation of politics.  It further proceeds to an examination 
of comparative experiences of judicialisation of politics in transitioning polities. 
This is followed by an outline of the failed attempt at establishing a constitutional 
court in Nigeria before focusing on the Nigerian experience of court-packing and 
its impact on judicial independence. It emerges that there is a need for closer and 
more comprehensive attention the judicial function.  
 
2. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
                                                 
6
 T Ginsburg and G Ganzorig “When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia’s Constitutional 
Crisis” (2000-2001) 14 (2) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 309 (-326). 
7
 Domingo note 4 supra at 21. 
 163 
   In his pioneering work on judicialisation of politics, Shapiro placed the judiciary 
at the heart of governance much more than legal purists were ready to concede.8 
The notable resurgence of the judiciary as a political force in transitioning polities 
in particular, validates Shapiro’s views on the nature of the judicial function in 
democracies.   
   Mature democracies have not been immune from the continually extending 
reach of judicial power and its impact on governance in recent times. However, 
accounts of the judicial function, especially in transitioning polities disclose that 
judicial power has challenged and in some cases, strongly eroded parliamentary 
sovereignty.9 From the Americas to Europe, through Africa to Asia, the story is 
the same; the judiciary is playing a decidedly more prominent role in shaping 
policy and governance than ever before.10 For this reason, Hirschl draws attention 
to a ‘rapid transition to “juristocracy”.’11  
   Pildes12 and Isaacharoff13 both refer to the judicialisation of politics as the 
‘constitutionalization of democratic politics.’ Their terminological preference is 
easily the norm in scholarly considerations of judicialisation of politics by 
American legal and political theorists.14 It appears to be preferred perhaps for its 
more orthodox origin which in-effectively obscures the centrality of judicial 
governance in contemporary democratic experience. After all, it is practically 
inconceivable to discuss democratic arrangements without some form of 
constitution and thus, the incidence of institutional ‘constitutionalism’ or 
‘constitutionalisation.’  
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   Shapiro and Sweet have noted the ironic dialectic of the judicial function in 
democratic societies. Public office holders in the political branches seek 
legitimacy by subjecting themselves to elections and control by the people they 
are to serve. Judges on their part claim to be ‘neutral servants of “the law”.’15 In 
other words, unlike other government officials and other institutions of a 
democratic state, judges achieve legitimacy by claiming neutrality in the exercise 
of their powers and performance of their duties. Thus, their allegiance is to law 
and not the people law serves. But while it is indispensable that the judiciary 
upholds the law in an independent manner, Shapiro and Sweet make the important 
point that judges do have a lot to do with politics.  
   In transitioning societies, particularly authoritarian ones, the judiciary is usually 
the only one, of the three branches of government that has a record of institutional 
continuity through out the period of distortion in the exercise of state powers. The 
political branches suffer either suspension or abrogation at some points and only 
remerge as democratic institutions in the post-authoritarian period. They are 
usually, as in the Nigerian experience, fragile partly due to their chequered 
institutional existence. The judiciary thus emerge as a critical player in 
governance building on the privilege of institutional continuity and function as a 
mediator.  
   The recognition that the judiciary plays an important role in established 
democracies,16 usually through horizontal accountability (despite institutional 
continuity and relatively better developed accountability mechanisms), in a way 
explains the ascendance of judicial power in polities transitioning to democracy. 
This is because (as explained above), the displacement experienced by the other 
branches saddles the transitional society with fragile political institutions that are 
usually ill–equipped to effectively manage the resolution of inevitable state-
society and inter-institutional disputes that arise in the context of transition. The 
judiciary easily becomes the choice forum for resolution of myriad contestations.   
   However, the growing incidence of horizontal accountability in established 
democracies does not fully explain the remarkable growth of judicial power in 
transitional societies. Some normative questions regarding the validity of the 
judicial role in policy-making remain unresolved.17 Specifically, does the 
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experience of transitioning polities of the judicial function not challenge the rather 
well established objections to the tangential ascendance of judicial governance at 
the heart of the counter-majoritarian argument? Is the devolution of more powers 
to the judiciary not directly antithetical to the very principles of accountability and 
representation at the heart of the democratic transition project? These are 
important questions to which the discussion now turns. 
 
3. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS AND THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN ARGUMENT18 
   Contemporary political and legal thought has witnessed a growing opposition to 
the rise of judicial power. There is the concern that judicial governance in a 
democratic society is contrary to notions of popular sovereignty.19 In what is 
regarded as the classic articulation of the issue, Bickel asserted it was contrary to 
democratic precepts to allow an unelected, minority branch of government, to 
upturn the decisions of elected officials.20  
   On the counter-majoritarian view, through the instrumentality of judicial review, 
judges effectively impose the views of a faction on society as a whole. This is 
especially the case in the context of appointive judicial positions where political 
actors play an important role in their appointments.21 For critics of the appointive 
system, the growing influence of partisan interest groups over the appointment 
process constitutes a sore point. The growing influence of such lobby groups 
further strengthens opposition to the considerable powers exercised by the 
judiciary over policy issues.22 The influence of interest groups in judicial 
appointments (and implicit influence on the direction of judicial 
constitutionalism) is acutely felt in American judicial constitutionalism. 
According to Schor, this has led to the development of the view, in some quarters, 
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that the easiest route to amending the American constitution is not by legislative 
majority, but getting ‘one’s partisans on the Supreme Court.’23  
   The quest to check the growing power of the judiciary, the ‘counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,’ has reputedly remained at the centre-stage of American constitutional 
theory for over five decades. To combat the challenge, Schor suggests a 
‘democratisation of judicial review’ through the creation of appointive 
mechanisms that ensure ‘democratic majorities’ have a say in the composition of 
the courts or over their decisions.24 In effect, such democratisation meets the 
challenge of the ‘undemocratic’ nature of the power wielded by a few (judges) 
over representative (executive and legislative) branches of government. 
     It is arguable that the counter-majoritarian objection can sometimes be 
overstated. First, judges are themselves not any less representative or democratic 
in certain jurisdictions, as is the case in some American states where judicial 
offices are elective. Second, a certain amount of democratic representation is at 
play within appointive jurisdictions where judicial offices are filled through the 
instrumentality of (independent) committee recommendation, executive 
nomination and legislative assent as is the case in some national jurisdictions.25 
Nigeria is, at least in theory, one such jurisdiction. This is arguably the case, 
considering that the executive (represented by the president or governor) and the 
respective branch of the legislature (usually the upper chambers like the Senate in 
both America and Nigeria), are ordinarily deemed representatives of the people. 
They thus constitute a form of Electoral College for judicial appointment. 
   The foregoing position is objected to by critics of judicial review on the basis of 
‘comparative legitimacy.’26 Waldron argues in this regard that legislatures are 
much more accountable to their constituents and more democratically elected than 
judges. The comparative legitimacy argument is not without considerable force. 
This is the case, especially if it is considered that an electoral college sometimes 
tends to offer such narrow representation as to be undemocratic, notably in the 
context of first past the post electoral practices.  
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   However, a significant flaw in the comparative legitimacy argument is the 
neglect to take in to account the complexities that attend elections to political 
offices even in advanced democracies. Critical analysis of the electoral systems in 
a number of liberal democracies may not yield the rather presumed solidity of the 
counter-majoritarian dismissal of judicial review. It can be reasonably argued that 
there are differing levels of representation for both majorities and minorities in the 
various electoral systems ranging from first past the post, preferential voting, 
electoral colleges, to proportional representation. But the characterisation of the 
executive and legislative involvement in judicial appointment as an electoral 
college assumes the political branches of government are themselves elected in 
free and fair, popular elections. The validity of the characterisation dissolves (or is 
at the least diluted), where the political branches are not elected through a 
transparent process. The lack of transparency however impacts on the legitimacy 
of the democratic credentials of the political branches and their representative 
claims as a whole.   
   Conceding the democratic legitimacy of the political branches does not however 
resolve the representation quagmire ‘haters of judicial review’27 have set up in 
objection to judicial review. Kyritsis rightly argues that it is essential to identify 
what is the exact nature of ‘representative democracy’ which critics of judicial 
review insist it devalues. He argues that the legislature (and presumably by 
extension, the executive) ‘represent’ the people under a ‘trustee’ as opposed to a 
‘proxy’ model of representation. Under the proxy system, a political 
representative is ‘like a conduit of the convictions of his constituents,’ without 
recourse to his own notions of the merits of the decision at stake. On the proxy 
model of representation then, ‘the law of the country’ (and by extension, 
government policy) is a concrete reflection of the actual will of the people. 28 
   Conceivably, representation under the proxy model justifies democratic 
objections to the legitimacy of judicial review, in as much as it could be regarded 
as trumping the decisions of the people directly carried out by their 
representatives in the political branch. But Kyritsis argues that the reality of 
representation in contemporary democratic practice is of the trustee model. Under 
the trustee model of representation, representatives take the views of constituents 
into consideration. However, they still maintain considerable distance from even 
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an agglomeration of such views in the performance of their representative 
functions. They exercise a wide berth and independence of thought and action on 
matters of legislation, policy and governance generally. 29 This is the operative 
conception of representation in democracies today.30 Kyritsis contends that 
glossing over the elitist nature of representation in democratic practice, even (if 
not especially) in model democracies, is at the heart of over-emphasises on the 
undemocratic nature of judicial review.31 While this may not directly address the 
argument against judicial review, it at least substantially weakens the comparative 
legitimacy argument. 
   Kyritsis’ model of representation and participation in liberal democracies finds 
support in political philosophy. It broadly fits into Ci’s characterisation of 
‘political agency’ in modern democratic practice. Kyritsis’ proxy and trustee 
models of representation substantially aligns with Ci’s postulation that 
participation in liberal democracies is reflected in ‘utopian’ and ‘ideological’ 
discourses respectively. Like Kyritsis, Ci argues that a considerable dose of 
ideological rhetoric is employed in liberal democratic discourse to conceal the gap 
between representation and actual participation of constituents.32  
   In principle, democracy connotes a system which allows the people to rule 
themselves. But, as Ci emphasises, ‘political agency,’ the form representative 
governance is expressed, may be considered somewhat antithetical to the 
aspirations of majoritarian participation in governance. This is because in practice, 
the people get an opportunity to appoint to positions of power, those who will rule 
them, ostensibly ‘in their name.’33 But for the most part, they are unable to 
determine how this power is exercised. There thus remains a significant measure 
of domination, a condition democracy was conceived to obviate. On this view, 
representation as a salient feature of democracy in liberal democratic societies is a 
fiction sustained by a series dynamics.34 The distance between the ideal of 
represented and the representative in democratic practice highlights the debate 
about the weight of the presence required to determine consent in a liberal 
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democracy. This is what political theorists refer to as ‘the paradox of political 
representation.’35  
   Further, it can be contended that the dialectic of judicial legitimacy, sets the 
grounds for opposition to the growing powers of the judiciary in determining the 
course of policy and governance. In matured democracies, the exercise of power 
is usually available to scrutiny. Governmental power is to a large extent, 
accounted for in the public domain. However, experiential accounts and empirical 
evidence in contemporary transitional societies, suggest the need for care in 
applying such a standard as evaluative mechanism for the judicial function in 
transitional polities. Deriving from this, the counter-majoritarian view on the rise 
of judicial power may have an important place in the socio-political scheme of 
matured and stable democratic polities. It may conduce to the needs of such 
societies which over time, have developed and institutionalised sophisticated 
mechanisms, and processes for scrutiny and accountability, regarding the exercise 
of state power. Substantive accounts of judicial intervention in the governance of 
transitioning polities through adjudication of emerging disputes point in new 
directions.  
   Rather than the rise of judicial power constituting an erosion of the common 
(democratic) will, normative and context-specific examination of the judicial 
function, lean towards a positive role for the judiciary in the institutionalisation of 
democratic values. This is largely the case in the ever-shifting sites of such 
disputes which range from horizontal and vertical levels of political arrangements, 
electoral contestations among political actors to individual and group (rights) 
claims by citizens against the state.  
   Waldron, notwithstanding his articulate opposition to judicial review generally 
and the ‘strong’ variant decidedly,36 implicitly endorses the validity of the 
foregoing position. In a representative restatement of his views on judicial review 
in a recent article aptly titled ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,’37 he 
sets out four conditions which must be satisfied before a valid case can be made 
against judicial review. He stipulates that the society must have functional 
democratic institutions in ‘good working order,’ with a legislature elected through 
free and fair elections, conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage and a 
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non-elected judiciary. The other two conditions are the requirement of societal 
commitment to individual and minority rights, and ‘persisting, substantial, and 
good faith disagreement’ within those committed to those rights.38 He argues that 
objections to judicial review may not hold where any of these conditions is non-
existent. Thus, he sets up social prerequisites (‘assumptions’) that must be taken 
for granted in arguing a case against judicial review. In transitional polities, it is 
easily the case that one or other of these conditions does not exist. In fact, the 
absence of some or all of these conditions underwrites the democratic transition 
process.    
   For clarity, it serves to relate the foregoing discussion to the African experience 
of governance in the context of political transition. Governance in many African 
states has continued to be steeped in corruption and parochial considerations. In 
many instances, the political elite secure and maintain their hold on power 
through sham electoral processes in countries that are still recovering from 
extended periods of social displacement deriving from authoritarian military rule 
or civil-conflict. In such societies, there is palpable disconnect between political 
office-holders and the people they purport to serve arsing from the legitimacy 
deficit that underwrites the ascendance and hold on power by many actors on the 
political scene. The Nigerian socio-political situation is a classic example of this 
untoward situation. I will return to this later. 
   The frequent breakdown of elite political consociation arrangements, in many 
developing countries, is another factor in support of judicialisation of politics as a 
force for democratisation, and construction of the rule of law. The political 
struggle for power by the elite in fractious and multi-nation states, commonly the 
sites of democratisation and transition from conflict in Africa (and elsewhere), 
usually erodes, if not rolls back, the gains of democratic statehood. The recent 
experience of political crises in Kenya and lately, the dire situation in Zimbabwe, 
are sad commentaries on this dynamic. In essence, the fragility of the power-
sharing and democratic culture in many transitioning polities, commends resort, as 
Teitel has pointed out, to an apolitical institution for institutionalising 
constitutional and democratic behaviour, a culture of rule of law and respect for 
human rights.39 In other words, the experiences of  the exercise of power by the 
political class and conduct of  state institutions in transitioning polities (notably in 
post-authoritarian contexts), supports the view that the judiciary is well suited to 
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act as the stabilising agent, if not the direct purveyor, of representative 
democracy.      
   In articulating the transformative potentials of law at times of significant social 
and political change, Teitel40argues that the role of law undergoes ‘normative 
shifts’ which distinguishes it from the conception and understanding of law in 
‘ordinary times.’ 41 In other words, there is a paradigm shift in the understanding 
of the workings of law and its place in a society in transition. This phenomenon is 
what Teitel called, ‘transitional jurisprudence.’42 In the context of political 
change, the transitional judiciary, due partly to institutional fragility of the 
political branch, is usually faced with deciding difficult, time-bound important 
cases. Such cases usually have direct bearing on the process of transition. Thus, 
the judiciary is faced with what Teitel refers to as the ‘ambivalent directionality of 
law.’43 Teitel’s analysis of transitional jurisprudence as being a distinctive and 
legitimate conceptualisation of law in society is relevant to this study of the 
judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court in the context of the political transition 
in Nigeria.  
   Dyzenhaus’ discussion of legality in times of emergency in his book, The 
Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency provides further support for 
this view. He suggests that constituting the rule of law in times of emergency 
involves a ‘rule of law project’ conducted through institutional dialogue between 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The three branches engage in this 
dialogue for the realisation of fundamental constitutional values.44 This 
cooperative model accords an important role to the judiciary even as it recognises 
the important place of the political branches in the institutionalisation or 
restoration of the rule of law. 
  In sum, there is much in support of the proposition that there is a need for 
reassessing objections to the legitimacy of active judicial participation in 
governance. Despite conventional wisdom in political and constitutional thought, 
the view that the ability of the judiciary to alter the exercise of political power by 
elected representatives as being antithetical to ‘democratic values,’45 lacks 
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universal validity in transitional contexts. The political and constitutional 
experiences of transitional societies, suggest the need for a reappraisal of the 
‘counter-majoritarian’ view of the place of the judiciary in a democratic society. 
An assessment of the Nigerian experience of the judicialisation of politics, 
examined in Chapter Six, provides opportunity for further explication of the 
position. At this point, it serves to set out the broad outlines of the concept itself 
for clarity of further discussion. 
 
4. JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
   The definition of judicialisation of politics proffered by Sweet goes to the heart 
of the judicial role in transitioning societies. He defines it as the ‘process by 
which triadic law-making progressively shapes the strategic behaviour of political 
actors engaged in interactions with one another.’46 Hirschl for his part maintains 
that the phenomenon is ‘multi-faceted.’ 47 He defines it as ‘the ever accelerating 
reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, 
public policy questions and political controversies.’48 
  
 These are no doubt perceptive definitions of the judicialisation of politics. 
However, definitions can be normatively constrictive. Further, there is the view 
that judicialisation of politics extends beyond noticeable judicial control of policy, 
to the internalisation of the formal procedures and language of courts by non-
judicial decision-making forums.49 Thus, the conceptualisation of the outlines of 
judicialisation of politics in democratic and democratising polities provides an 
analytical template on which to conduct an evaluative study of the impact and 
significance of the phenomenon. This section focuses on that objective. 
   Perhaps the most discernible feature of judicialisation of politics is the extension 
of the scope of ‘judge-made’ law. This refers to the situation where judges play an 
active, if not dominating role in shaping state policy across a range of spheres. 
Such active role derives from an increasing resort by the other branches (and 
sometimes levels) of government as well as individuals to judicial resolution of 
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political disputes.50 For politics and political players alike, a direct consequence of 
judicialisation of politics in this way, is an increased awareness of and attention to 
how the powers of judges impact policy decisions.51 It is also identifiable in the 
resolution of tension emerging from deficient institutional arrangements and 
design (as we shall see later in the case of Nigeria), possible hallmarks sometimes 
of un-negotiated political transitions.     
   Between individuals or groups inter se, or individuals in claims against the state, 
judicialisation may be reflected by an exponential increase in the claims for the 
judicial recognition of sometimes untested, newly legislated, or even otherwise 
non-justiciable rights contained in some constitutions52 like social and economic 
rights contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This 
is easily the case where access to the courts has been liberalised from legal 
constraints like narrow rules of legal standing to sue, particularly in societies 
recovering from some form of conflict or the other. Judicialisation of politics in 
this regard is enhanced by the complicity of state institutions (including the 
judiciary itself) for deprivation of the rights of a segment of society at some 
period past which has been disavowed in the democratisation process.  
   Availability of legal aid alongside social and legal mobilisation in the wake of 
constitutionalisation of civil liberties and other rights, promotes judicial shaping 
of policy. Reflections on this aspect of judicialisation of politics have recognised 
that the judiciary in transitioning polities- usually confronted with fragile or 
lopsided economic structures- faces the daunting task of balancing centrifugal 
forces struggling for control of state and society. In that dynamic, the judiciary is 
called upon to determine the duty of the state to implement competing claims of 
constitutional rights (often-times of a socio-economic nature), intra-government 
disputes and claims, state-society obligations and a host of divergent, yet 
competing claims.  
   But the task of judges in governance in the present ‘Age of Democracy’53 is 
decidedly complicated. Normatively, judges are required to uphold the letter and 
spirit of newly legislated or revived bills of rights and certain understandings of 
the rule of law, for which they are arguably well-prepared. Yet, they are 
challenged by formidable arguments of their lack of specialised expertise on the 
multi-layered, multi-dimensional effects of policy-prioritisation and 
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implementation, a function, purists insist, is exclusive to the executive and 
legislative branches of government.  Against judicial intervention in this situation, 
it is argued that even if the lack of expertise is not conceded on the part of judges, 
it is still a strong point that social rights require policy decisions across the board 
for reasonable balancing of priorities, something the case-by-case judicial 
approach misses.  
   Justice Albie Sachs of the South Africa Constitutional Court clearly articulates 
the judicial dilemma in such societies in his reflections on the Grootboom Case.54 
He noted of the central issue in the case; evaluating the duty of a local authority’s 
legal obligation to house thousands of displaced persons against the background 
of their trespass on private property55 
               If we insist on money being provided for Mrs Grootboom’s community,  
              this requires taking money away from other items in the budget. Is that  
               not what parliament should be doing?... We have millions of homeless  
               people. When do we intervene, if at all, and force what could be massive   
               redirection of funds on the legislature and the executive?56 
    
 In this regard, Sieder, Schojlden and Angell have made the important point that 
judicialisation of politics extends beyond constitutional powers of judicial review. 
Rather, the increased visibility of the judiciary is noticeable in the ‘resolution of 
political, social or state-society conflicts.’57 
   There is something of a paradox in the increased visibility of judicial power in 
governance, considering the concept of separation of powers, and the inclination 
of political players to jealously guide their spheres of influence. Certainly, many 
of the political questions that have been judicialised had the tacit, if not express, 
support of the political class for that course of action.58 If it is true that ‘the first 
instinct of power is the retention of power,’59 what then drives the ceding of the 
power-space by the political branches of government to the apolitical judicial 
branch? In this regard Tushnet, in evaluating the relational dynamics of political 
and judicial power around the world has noted that the ceding of powers by the 
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political to the judicial branch has not always proceeded as a matter of deliberate 
choice on the part of the respective institutions.60 This observation applies to the 
Nigerian experience too. As mentioned above, it has been deliberate in certain 
instances. At other times, it has been decidedly outwith the control of either party. 
   It has been argued that quiescence, if not outright deference of the executive and 
legislature to judicialisation of politics may have its roots in a desire to secure 
‘regime legitimization.’ 61 This is especially the case in the context of 
democratising polities where reinstitution of the rule of law is a key issue in the 
transition. Equally so is the desire to obtain legitimacy in times of crisis where 
there is a legitimacy deficit, deriving from any of a number of dynamics (not least 
sham elections), of the political branches of government. I will argue later that 
legitimacy-deficit, as a propelling factor for judicialisation of politics, is germane 
to the Nigerian transition experience.  
   Related to the foregoing is the vacillation of the political branches to take 
decisive action on topical and sensitive issues in both matured and transitioning 
democracies. Pildes cites as an instance, the need for a legal framework to deal 
with terrorism in the United States and the attitude of the Bush administration to 
it. Despite its relational significance to ‘security, liberty and international 
relations,’ Pildes notes of the attitude of the Bush administration on the issue that 
               …the executive branch did not seek to force Congress to share  
               responsibility for these difficult judgments, nor did Congress show any       
               interest in asserting such responsibility itself. 62 
 
Gaps in crucial decision-making of this nature may derive primarily from attempts 
to avoid responsibility for decisions that may influence voters in an election year 
for instance. Despite the obvious institutional distortions in governance that 
results, the political branches may be content to cede decision-making power and 
shift responsibility for potentially unpopular decisions away from themselves. 
Through such subterfuge, they turn away public displeasure towards the judiciary, 
making the courts a ‘convenient scapegoat’63 for policy misadventures, while at 
the same time abdicating the very responsibility for which they are elected.  
   However, it is also the case that concessions of power to the judicial branch may 
be involuntary. It may result from the inability of elites to resolve contestations, 
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usually of a political nature amongst themselves. As the account of the Nigerian 
experience shows, this latter dimension may be quite significant in shaping the 
incidence of judicialisation of politics in democratising polities.   
   Moreover, in the nature of transitional experiences, gaps in political decision-
making may follow on obvious or perceived fragility of a polity yet recovering 
from a fractured existence arising from severe forms of authoritarianism or war. 
This dynamic as a propelling force for judicialisation of politics characterised the 
approach of the Obasanjo administration’s initial preference for referring claims 
for wider control of the country’s oil resources by the oil-producing areas of the 
country to the judiciary for resolution. It is instructive that the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the case in point, Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney 
General of Abia State and 35 Others 64 came to be viewed as having created more 
problems than it solved. It generated social tensions and a political stalemate in 
the country that provoked calls for a political approach to the contestations in the 
case. 65 The crucial point remains that in the thick of the agitation for increased 
control of territorial resources between the federal and (littoral) state 
governments, the former, wary of the groundswell of opinion towards greater 
devolution of its control of such resources, consciously deflected an issue 
essentially for political resolution towards the judiciary. It thus played safe while 
simultaneously advancing an image of a democratic, rule-of-law-abiding 
government. 
   In sum, judicialisation of politics essentially presupposes a more visible 
presence of the judiciary in political and social life. The incidence of 
judicialisation of politics results in the transformation of the legal and political 
culture in a polity. The courts emerge in the social milieu as the forum of choice 
for ‘social redress and rights claims.’66 This has been singularly noticeable 
phenomenon in transitions to democracy in post authoritarian societies of South-
East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. 
   
5.  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES  
   In a study of the establishment and working of constitutional courts in political 
transitions from authoritarian (one-party), communist or military rule in four 
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countries in South-East Asia, Ginsburg observed the dramatic rise of judicial 
review of legislative and executive action.67 There is increasing judicial restraint 
on the exercise of political power in Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia and Thailand. All 
of these in a region reputed for the near-total absence of effective judicial review 
on the actions of powerful executives.68 In the aftermath of transition to 
democratic rule in these countries, the (constitutional) courts have become 
‘important sites of political contestation…to achieve social change.’69  
    Judicial intervention and activity on various fronts have had deep resonance for 
governance in the region. The courts have struck at ‘elements of the old system,’ 
including corruption, while providing a platform for the resolution of conflict 
among political players. In the political transition of these countries, courts and 
judges have played a significant role ‘underpinning and facilitating 
democratisation.’70 They have thus become active participants in the 
democratisation project.71 
  In Central and Eastern Europe, constitutional courts have taken on head long, 
some of the most vexed social and political challenges confronting the liberal 
democratisation process in those countries. They have intervened in and 
moderated the course of post-totalitarian transitional justice measures like 
prosecution of alleged violators of human rights and lustrations,72 all with 
considerable resonance for politics and governance in the so-called ‘velvet 
revolutions’ of Central and Eastern Europe.73 Thus, the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary ruled in the Zetenyi Law Case,74 that the law passed by parliament for 
the prosecution of communist political crimes was unconstitutional. It held that 
the Zetenyi Law was retrospective and in violation of the principle of legal 
security, one of the cornerstones of the rule of law. 75 The decision effectively 
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blocked the prosecution of serious crimes committed during the communist era 
for been inconsistent with the newly amended Hungarian Constitution.76  
   As Priban further notes, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in 
contrast, upheld the legitimacy of similar legislation in its review of the “Act on 
Lawlessness of the Communist Regime and the Resistance Against It,” 
presumably in a manner that sought to balance the tension between impunity and 
retrospectivity.77 More than that, the Czech Constitutional Court has played ‘an 
enormous role’ in the ‘re-modernisation’ of Czech society.78 According to him 
‘The moralist and political vocabulary of the Court’s judgment’ has gone ‘beyond 
the usual limits’ employed by similar courts in liberal, well established 
democracies.79 The Court extended its purview beyond strictly legal contexts to 
explication of moral and political requisites for a society based on law and 
democracy.80 The trend has been replicated in Poland and Unified Germany.81   
   Teitel agrees with Priban that the jurisprudence of the constitutional courts in 
Central Eastern Europe have extended the traditional realms of judicial review. 82 
She states that in the process, the courts have gone on to establish a ‘newfound 
source of political legitimacy.’83 The legitimating function derives from the liberal 
locus afforded to individuals (and presumably groups) to actively challenge 
political action, signalling a ‘new governmental openness.’84 The constitutional 
courts have changed the ‘constitutional culture’85 by limiting hitherto unbridled 
state power.  I will argue in Chapter 6 that despite scholarly scepticism on the 
democratic credentials of the activist judicial approach (based partly on its 
perceived potential of fostering legislative irresponsibility),86 the judiciary in 
Nigeria’s fragile transition is recognised to have taken on this role ascribed by 
Teitel to the constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe with significant 
impact on democratisation and governance in the country. 
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   The propriety of judicial review of rights and policy issues or in the language of 
this discourse, the judicialisation of politics, has been viewed with much 
scepticism by scholars like Sadurski.87 But there is hardly any contention that 
constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe have generally given force to 
some rights provisions which for decades had not been worth the paper they were 
written on.88 They have also limited parliamentary action, striking down 
legislation and policies they deemed out of tune with constitutional provisions.89 
The courts have actively participated or sometimes taken the lead in setting an 
agenda of liberalism for the new government.90  
   Not surprisingly, varying responses from the political branches of government 
and the public, have trailed the exercise of wide ranging powers of constitutional 
judicial review. The responses have ranged from grudging compliance, to 
considerable resistance and emergence of serious tensions between the judiciary 
and the political branches. The Mongolian experience demonstrates this 
reasonably well.91  
      In Latin America, judicialisation of politics in the region’s democratic 
transitions (from authoritarianism) has become one of the most important features 
of politics in the region.92  From the 1980s onwards, the judiciaries of Latin 
America have become more visible and relevant participants in the determination 
of policy issues of a political, economic and social nature. Courts have 
increasingly been called upon to decide matters that were previously reserved for 
the political domain.93 In Mexico for instance, the Supreme Court has been drawn 
into adjudication of political and economic policy cases.    
   Increased judicial participation in determination of policy has tracked (even if 
initially at a slow pace) the 1994 constitutional reforms which granted the 
Mexican Supreme Court more independence and expanded powers of judicial 
review. It has since boldly taken on a more public role.94 In the process, the 
Supreme Court has made a noticeable shift away from over seven decades of 
reticence in governance in which it had more or less functioned as an extension of 
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the ruling party.95 The judiciary in Brazil has similarly stamped its imprint on 
decisions on matters of policy in the country’s democratisation process. In view of 
the prominent position of the two countries as the largest in Latin America, 
analysts have expressed the view that it is necessary to take cognisance of judicial 
activities in accounts of ‘politics and policy reform’ in the region.96  
   On the comparative front, the Constitutional Court of South Africa is unique. 
While similar courts elsewhere have been actively involved in shaping policy and 
governance in transitioning polities, it played a cardinal role in the constitutive 
process of transition from apartheid to popular democracy in the rainbow nation.97 
With a view to address the inverse concerns of the parties that negotiated the 
South Africa transition through an institutionalised and independent forum, the 
Constitutional Court was vested powers that ‘had never before been imparted on 
any court.’98 The Constitutional Court played an important role in the institutional 
design of a new nation by its thorough scrutiny and initial rejection of the 
proposed provisions of the permanent constitution for South Africa.99 It rejected 
attempts at limiting judicial review while it insisted on adequate safeguards for 
separation of powers as well as structural and fiscal federalism.100   
   The Constitutional Court further required the incorporation of international 
human rights standards in the new constitution and sought to maintain critical 
balance between majoritarian control and minority rights. It thus acted on the 
powers conferred on it by the Interim Constitution of South Africa, to ensure strict 
adherence to the principles agreed by the negotiating parties.101 Further, the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court on the Bill of Rights in the South-African 
constitution including those on economic and social rights as in Grootboom,102 
have had significant impact on policy and governance in a country struggling to 
come to terms with a harrowing past for the majority and forge an inclusive, 
egalitarian future for all. The South Africa Constitutional Court has been noted for 
                                                 
95
 J Rios-Figueroa “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in 
Mexico, 1994-2002 (2007) 49 (1) Latin American Politics and Society 31, 35-38.  
96
 Rios-Figueroa and Taylor note 94 supra at 765. 
97
 H Klug Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000). 
98
 Isaacharoff note 13 supra at 1874. 
99
 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [1996] ZACC 26; 
Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 
ZACC 24.  
100
 Isaacharoff note 13 at 1878-1879. 
101
 Ibid at. 1879. 
102
 Grootboom note 56 supra. 
 181 
holding a delicate balance between competing interests that could threaten the 
body politic.103    
   If the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been unique in its functioning, 
the impact of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, on socio-economic and 
political issues in the country, broke away from the received wisdom on a central 
feature of judicialisation of politics. Established by an authoritarian regime, it 
challenged the theoretical position that a democratic dispensation is sine qua non 
for judicialisation of politics.104 The authoritarian regime in Egypt established the 
constitutional court essentially with an economic, rather than a socio-political 
agenda. Confronted with economic depression at home, and international pressure 
from abroad, the government established the court to assure foreign investors of 
its commitment to economic liberalism and preservation of private property rights 
away from its historical record of nationalisation of private corporations and 
investments in the country. It hoped to achieve this through what would be 
regarded as an independent judicial review mechanism. 105  
   According to Moustafa, the Supreme Constitutional Court not only effectively 
assisted the government to push through its new liberalised economic vision 
through striking down socialist oriented legislations, it also provided an 
acceptable forum for the ventilation of hitherto repressed political opposition 
views. It has also played a key role in securing property and advancing political 
rights of individuals and groups,106 with the latter especially, to the discomfiture 
(sometimes outright consternation) of its authoritarian creators. Despite its rather 
moderate activism,107 its decisions opened up the space for the ventilation of 
opposition views on an institutional platform, with the court acting as an interface 
between state and society. 108 Its decisions on private property rights constituted a 
veritable outlet for policies desired by the government but from which it exercised 
considerable reticence in the apprehension of public outrage.109  
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   In testimony to the visible power of the Court over policy, the government later 
adopted various extra-legal measures to curb its progressive jurisprudence.110 
Notwithstanding these measures, the Court impacted significantly on the course of 
governance in the country. It substantially established its position as an institution 
not only for economic liberalisation as conceived by its creators, but the choice 
institution of resort for political emancipation.111   
   In summary, it can be fairly asserted that distrust for inherited, complicit, state 
institutions in transitioning polities, has played a significant role in the sometimes 
uncritical social approval of newly created ones. Constitutional courts, new 
institutions that they are, have arguably benefited immensely from what Teitel 
refers to as the ‘legitimacy of hope’ that surrounds institutions that offer fresh 
beginnings.112 An important point offered by a nuanced approach to this 
comparative analysis is the connection between the establishment of new courts 
and institutional accountability for the exercise of power in the pre-transition 
period. Although the various societies examined above did not directly engage 
with accountability of the judiciary for past governance as advanced in this thesis, 
the creation of powerful new judicial bodies signifies, at the least, considerable 
dissatisfaction with the existing judicial bodies.  
   Thus, behind the creation of these new courts is the desire to break away from 
the perceived or actual complicit judiciaries and the need for securing the 
legitimacy of an important institution to participate in rebuilding the various 
societies. Nothing furnishes support for this view more than the commonly 
reported cold relationship between the old and the new courts and the public 
interest and (usually) acclaim the work of the latter have generated within a 
relatively short time. However, it is pertinent to reflect further on the assumption 
that a new judicial institution is the only viable approach to ensuring judicial 
promotion and protection of democratic tenets and the rule of law in transitioning 
polities. The absence of such courts in Nigeria’s transition offers an opportunity 
for such reflection. 
 
6. A STILL-BORN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: LEGACY OF A FAILED TRANSITION AND 
JUDICIARY 
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   Unlike most of the democratic transitions in Latin America, South East Asia, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in Africa, the Nigerian transition to 
democracy did not lead to the establishment of a constitutional court. It is 
significant however that this was not due to the fact that the idea was never 
considered. It is remarkable that in 1995, General Sanni Abacha (the country’s 
military ruler at the time), as part of his suspect transition to civil democratic rule 
programme, toyed with the idea of establishing a Constitutional Court in the 
country. He was perhaps learning from Egypt, particularly since Nigeria was then 
in a similar socio-political and economic situation both at the national and 
international levels that surrounded the establishment of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt over a decade earlier.113  
   The dictator was conscious of public disenchantment with the discharge of the 
judicial function, especially with regard to important human rights and 
constitutional issues. Apart from the perceived failure of the judiciary, there was 
also the pariah status military authoritarianism finally earned the country under 
his jackboot-rule. He thus proposed the establishment of a constitutional court 
along the lines of the South African Constitutional Court. He went as far as 
presenting the country with draft legislation for the creation of the proposed court.  
   The Abacha regime’s plan for a constitutional court in the country however 
drew considerable opposition from the judiciary and some respected legal 
practitioners who felt it was at best, a subterfuge to deflect growing discontent 
with its ultra-authoritarian bent. The preference in those quarters was for 
restoration of independence to the institution as then constituted and return to 
democratic governance. It was felt that these were the essential elements for the 
restitution of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the country. Protagonists of 
the position argued that, the failings of the judiciary derived basically from 
military authoritarianism. Only the exit of the military from governance would 
ensure judicial transformation. Or so went the argument.  
   There is some merit in the opposition to the idea of a constitutional court in 
Nigeria. Considering the uninspiring record of purported military transition 
initiatives in the country, the proposal may have been a ploy to foster support for 
Abacha’s dubious political transition programme. But it is equally true that the 
idea of a constitutional court did attract considerable support from a spectrum of 
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the society. It was felt in some circles that such a court could provide a strong and 
legitimate forum for advancing human rights and moderating the political 
institutions in the exercise of their wide powers. The interest and support garnered 
by the proposal reinforces the growing recognition of the crucial role of courts in 
transitioning polities.   
   Whatever the merit of the opposing positions, the non-creation of a 
constitutional court is not sufficient to excuse judicial acquiescence to 
authoritarian rule and wide spread violations of human rights that took place 
during the period of authoritarian rule in the country. Rather, it can be argued that 
the non-establishment of a constitutional court to take on the important role of 
advancing human rights and transitional jurisprudence in the Nigerian context is 
particularly significant. It reinforces the normative argument for the imperative of 
accountability for the judiciary role in governance during the authoritarian period 
in the country as a requisite for future legitimacy of the judicial function in the 
polity.  
   If the dictator’s plans to establish a constitutional court had succeeded, it would 
have significantly altered the non-centralised system of constitutional judicial 
review in Nigeria. Post-independence, all courts of superior records in theory, 
maintained a constitutional power of judicial review which is general in its 
application. ‘In theory,’ for it is a matter of historical interest that successive 
military regimes variously resisted judicial review of their laws and executive 
actions. In the post-authoritarian period in Nigeria, the exercise of the power of 
judicial review has taken centre-stage within the polity even in the absence of new 
courts. Whether there are new constitutional courts with wide powers or 
rehabilitated ones with rejuvenated powers of judicial review, the incidence of 
court packing constitutes a source of concern on the exercise of judicial power 
and its role in governance in the modern state. 
 
7. COURT PACKING VERSUS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
   Constitutional law scholars have expressed concern about the implications of 
the power to appoint judges (usually) exercised by the executive. Apprehensions 
surrounding abuse of this power is captured in the constant refrain of ‘court-
packing,’ in scholarly evaluations of the doctrine of judicial independence. Plainly 
stated, the oft-repeated concern is that a political authority, usually, a president or 
a governor, may utilise the opportunity of constitutionally vested powers to 
appoint cronies, or at least, sympathetic individuals, into judicial office, 
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principally the highest hierarchically. The aim is to secure predictable judicial 
outcomes in the event of constitutional challenge of their policies.  
   According to Hirschl, hegemonic political elites, seeking to obtain advantage or 
security in new democratic settings through the judicialisation of politics, contend 
with the dilemma of judicial empowerment.114 He similarly identifies the 
opportunity to exercise ‘general control’ over the processes of legal education and 
appointment of judicial officers as key predisposing factors to judicialisation of 
politics.115 These are serious concerns. 
   No doubt, fears regarding abuse of appointive powers of the executive have in 
some cases been borne out by the experience in liberal and illiberal democracies, 
and more so in authoritarian societies at one time or the other. But, while ‘court-
packing’ remains a threat to the decisional independence of judges, empirical 
evidence of its impact on conduct of the judicial function remains inconclusive 
and mixed at best. The Nigerian experience furnishes a remarkable example. 
Court-packing as a measure of executive interference with the judicial function, 
features in a rather subtle, albeit potent, manner in the Nigerian judicial system. 
This was peculiarly true of the appointment of judges during the decades of 
authoritarian military rule.  
   The manifestation of executive interference with judicial independence at the 
time can be traced to the peculiar workings of military rule. The (theoretically) 
federal polity was mostly administered in a unitary fashion, a phenomenon that 
has generated inter-governmental tension in the post-authoritarian period. 
Notwithstanding the operation of a dual federal and state court system, the court 
system remains devoid of the structural parallelism characteristic of judiciaries in 
some other federal jurisdictions like the United States. The appellate jurisdiction 
is a purely federal affair. Appeals from both the federal high and state high courts 
proceed to the (federal) Court of Appeal and onwards to the (federal) Supreme 
Court. In terms of composition of the courts, judges were (and are still) usually 
appointed (promoted) from the federal and state high courts to the appellate courts 
by the Head of State (or president). This practice has assumed conventional status 
without constitutional or statutory moorings.  
   During the period of authoritarian military rule, appointments to the state 
judiciaries were made by state military administrators and at the federal level, by 
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the Head of State notionally on the recommendation (sometimes advice) of the 
appropriate judicial commission. The nomenclature of the commissions was 
typically, ‘Judicial Service Commissions’ with the implicit assertion of their 
independence and power in the judicial appointment process.  Depending on the 
respective regime however, they were also more candidly styled ‘Advisory 
Judicial Committee,’ making clear just how much respect the military had for any 
indication of judicial independence or liberalism in the important task of 
constituting a prospective contender for power in the polity. The latter creation 
was specific to the federal judiciary under the regime of General Sanni Abacha.  
   Beyond nomenclature, judicial appointments were, in practice, at the discretion 
and control of the respective military ruler. Predictably, it was abused. At the 
‘entry’ point into the superior courts system, the high courts, judges were 
appointed largely from the office of the respective Attorneys General, federal or 
state. Civil servants-turned-judges, trained in the bureaucratic tradition of 
deference to superiors, constituted the face of ‘court-packing’ in the appointment 
of judges in Nigeria. Court of Appeal justices are then appointed from the ranks of 
High Court judges. In turn, the Supreme Court justices are appointed from the 
Court of Appeal. 
   The tradition of appointing mainly civil servants from the executive branch of 
government (state law offices), attuned to an instrumentalist view of the rule of 
law, substantially influenced the dispensation of justice by the courts in the period 
of authoritarian rule. 116 A 2006 study commissioned by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) indicates that this attitude has persisted in 
the post-authoritarian period.117  
   It is reasonable to infer that the appointive tradition in the context of military 
regimes, arguably a subtle and incipient mode of court-packing, was a key factor 
in the judicial legitimisation of authoritarian rule in the country discussed 
earlier.118 The ambivalence that characterised judicial output, in the immediate 
years of the post-authoritarian transition in the country, as discussed in Chapter 
Four,119 can also be partly attributed to this style of court-packing. It is 
reminiscent of the instance in the hey-day of military rule, where a Chief Judge of 
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a state in open court, declared that the state military administrator, who was the 
defendant (in his official capacity) in a case before him was akin to a Kabiyesi.120  
   The marked turnaround and institutional independence lately discernible in the 
jurisprudence of the Nigerian Supreme Court (discussed in Chapter Six) presents 
a remarkable instance of the sometimes unpredictable results that may attend 
court-packing, notably in a transitional context. One of the least mentioned 
aspects of the Obasanjo administration in Nigeria121 in relation to the judiciary is 
that it has an unprecedented record of appointments to the Supreme Court.  Of the 
16 justices now on the bench of the court, President Olusegun Obasanjo, through 
the incidence of expired judicial terms,122 appointed 12 to succeed retired justices. 
The country’s first (and yet only) female Supreme Court justice, is included in 
that number.  
   Ultimately, as the various legal battles involving the federal government in the 
Obasanjo era demonstrated, the Supreme Court was highly involved in very 
political cases concerning the federal executive, headed by President Obasanjo. 
Cases went before the Supreme Court either as a court of original jurisdiction in 
disputes between the federation and the states, or as a court of last resort in final 
appeals.  In view of the varying complexities involved in individual cases, it may 
be rather simplistic to assert that the composition of the Court in this way 
substantially influenced its decisions one way or the other. The sheer number of 
the cases involved would require rather extensive empirical case-by case analysis, 
outside the purview of this study to make precise and definitive claims on this 
aspect of the matter.  
   What is certain is the fact that on the whole, the federal government lost more 
cases than it won in that dispensation, usually with serious implications for the 
political and policy decisions of the federal executive under the leadership of the 
president. It is thus fairly safe to say that the impact of the opportunity for the 
administration to appoint a large number of justices in Nigeria’s post-authoritarian 
transition has not been a decisive factor on the adjudicatory preferences of the 
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Supreme Court. This is then an instance that hardly bears out the trepidation on 
the power of the political branch to appoint judges.  
   Indeed, a regrettable result of the judicialisation of inter-governmental disputes 
was the resistance of President Obasanjo to implement a good number of the 
judgements of the Supreme Court against the federal government. Consequently, 
his administration came to gain notoriety for its intransigence to implementing 
judicial decisions not in tandem with his wishes and this disregard for the rule of 
law led to substantial loss of valuable political capital by the federal government. 
Obasanjo’s successor, President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, acutely aware of the 
prevailing discontent with the brazen disregard of the Obasanjo administration for 
enforcing unpalatable judgements, has not spared any effort to adumbrate his 
respect for the rule of law, especially with regard to complying with judicial 
decisions.123  
   Whether the new President’s proclaimed and (and so far relatively) 
demonstrated respect for the rule of law in this way is genuine, or a subterfuge to 
obtain legitimacy for his government in the light of the seriously flawed electoral 
process that brought him to power, is not clear.  What is certain is that his position 
on prompt compliance with judicial decisions has reflected quite positively on his 
administration. This development reinforces the position that judicialisation of 
politics, notably in the ‘new constitutionalism’,124 is driven and maintained by a 
matrix that includes (but by no means limited to) a political setting that is 
conducive.125 By new constitutionalism is meant the increased incidence of 
constitutionalisation of human rights and governance issues particularly in 
transitional contexts leading to the emergence of more powerful judiciaries. This 
is partly due to the adoption of new constitutions or constitutional reforms which 
provide for a range of rights and extensive powers of judiciary review.126    
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   According to Hirschl, ‘judicial empowerment’ presents a ‘dilemma’ to political 
elites.127 They desire to deflect criticism from themselves and probably secure or 
strengthen their legitimacy through the process of judicialisation of political 
issues. But importantly too, they harbour the hope that courts will reflect or 
promote their ideological preferences in the process. The judiciary, he asserts, 
does not disappoint the political class in this regard. In deliberations on overly 
political issues, judges, he claims, tend to subscribe to ‘prevalent worldviews, 
national meta-narratives, and the interests of influential elites.’128  
   Hirschl’s analysis draws on the readiness of courts to utilise judicial review for 
upholding political and civil rights, while maintaining a lukewarm (and 
sometimes even regressive) jurisprudence towards rights claims in the nature of 
social and economic rights and empowerment of the underprivileged in society, 
despite the constitutionalisation of those rights. While Hirschl’s views appear to 
be attractive propositions, it is useful to unpack them a bit in the light of the 
Nigerian transition experience of judicial activism in transition to assess their 
persuasiveness in this context.   
   First, the propositions are rather too sweeping in their reach. That courts may be 
influenced by the social realities of their environment may not necessarily be 
objectionable. It does not have to be regarded as pandering to the political elite, 
unless of course judicial decisions or even a particular decision is clearly perverse. 
A contrary approach can only imperil the relevance of judicial power as a whole 
and judicial review of political action especially.   
   Second, one can take issue with the assumption of determinability and 
commonality of elitist interests implicit in Hirschl’s position.  It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to conceive the convergence of elitist interests in a fragmented society 
like Nigeria, where the elite thrive on divisiveness and habitual resort to 
primordial sentiments to secure and preserve their hold on power.129 The political 
elite commonly appeal to ethnic, religious and other sectional allegiances to 
secure and maintain their hold on power as well as shield themselves from public 
accountability in governance. Thus, it is perhaps more accurate to assert the non-
existence of any previous shared narratives in the country’s experience of 
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statehood. It will be recalled that in Chapter Three, this latter point was earlier 
discussed in relation to identifying a basis for accountability of the judiciary.  
   Consequently, it is not easy to articulate to any reasonable degree of precision, 
what is to be regarded as ‘interests of influential elites’ as the different groups and 
even individual members of the ruling elite, economic or political (or even both) 
are constantly involved in contests for socio-economic and political control. 
Though driven by a common motivation of securing a hold on power, the means 
required to achieve their objectives are hardly shared. Similarly the nature of the 
(usually parochial) interests at stake is predictably divergent. In view of the 
complexity of the political contestations among the elite in Nigeria, the 
proposition that judicial decisions can satisfy or accord with divergent and 
sometimes, unwieldy interests of a class whose members are in constant struggles 
for ascendance and advantage over one another is, to say the least, problematic. 
    
CONCLUSION 
 
   All around the world, and especially in transitional societies, the judiciary is on 
the march of power. Judicialisation of hitherto conventional and sometimes, 
constitutionally entrenched exclusive zones of the political branches have 
witnessed decisive incursions from the judicial branch. The judicial force has 
shown no visible signals of dissipation, much less abatement. A gentle breeze, in 
all probability, is all that is required to blow into oblivion, the famous ‘weakest 
branch’ sticker, legal and political theorists have, for so long, hung on the walls of 
the judiciary. 
   The immense powers wielded by the judiciary over key policy aspects of 
governance, especially in the contemporary new constitutionalism, strongly 
advises closer and more systematised scrutiny of the judicial function. This is 
even more pertinent in transitioning polities contending with what can be regarded 
as reinvented centres of power, while simultaneously responding to the 
establishment of new judicial institutions which predictably attract considerable 
support from various publics.     
    In democratising and established liberal democratic societies alike, 
protestations of deficient democratic credentials have surprisingly been ineffectual 
in curbing the geometric increase in, and sometimes preference for, judicial 
determination and control of public policy as well as highly political and moral 
questions. If anything, it seems to fuel it.    
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   The impact of the judicial role in transitioning polities, from Central and Eastern 
Europe through to South East Asia, Latin America and Africa, briefly outlined 
above, commends the view that it is critical to the democratisation process that the 
judiciary be adequately positioned for the transition from an authoritarian past. It 
is only then that it can be expected to take on the serious challenges of definitive, 
purposeful judicial governance required for strengthening the democratising or 
transitional polity. 
   In the diverse regional experiences evaluated in this chapter, newly established 
constitutional courts have played (and mostly continue to play) the role of the 
guardian angel of democracy. In other words, the courts, through judicial 
activism, are securing the core values of the constitution, promoting democratic 
aspirations of the people and securing human rights. While the exception in Egypt 
supports the need for rethinking assumptions on the right political circumstance 
for viability of judicial activism in governance, it nonetheless reinforces the 
undeniably growing powers of judiciaries all around the world. The framework 
outlined in this chapter provides a template on which to conduct an evaluation of 
the judicialisation of politics in the context of the Nigerian transition to civil and 
democratic rule.   
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Chapter Six 
COURTS TO THE RESCUE? THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN 
NIGERIA 
   
INTRODUCTION    
   Nigeria’s political transition from three decades of authoritarian military rule to 
democracy constitutes a momentous aspect of the country’s political history. It is 
of moment for instance, that the country has witnessed its longest experience of 
civil ‘democratic' rule in its post-colonial history from the culmination of the 
handover of power by the military on 29 May 1999 till date, after a series of 
aborted political transition programmes launched by successive military regimes 
at various times during the period of authoritarian rule.  
   Equally epochal is the 2007 general elections in the country. It marked the first 
successful ‘civil-civil’ political transition. By the civil-civil transition is meant the 
transfer of power from one elected government to another devoid of military 
intervention in governance. Recognition of the salience of the elections is of 
course without prejudice to the fact that they have turned out to be the most 
contested in the country’s chequered electoral history. The widespread 
contestations are no doubt a fall-out of the very suspect democratic credentials of 
the elections. The level of concomitant judicialisation of politics electoral 
contestations have engendered, has contributed in no small measure to the 
exceptional expansion of judicial  power and its impact on governance in Nigeria, 
examined in this chapter.  
   However, by far the most remarkable feature of the transition from military 
authoritarianism is the judicialisation of ‘pure politics,’1 leading to the 
phenomenal rise of judicial power in the country’s transition experience in the 
post 2003 period. In this regard, one of Hirschl’s classifications of the multi-
dimensional facets of judicialisation of politics is relevant. He observes that the 
judicialisation of ‘mega-politics’ (or pure politics), as a type of judicialised 
politics, manifests in various forms. The manifestation of judicialisation of pure 
politics includes judicial monitoring of policies in economic planning, national 
security and other prerogatives of executive power under the rubric of the 
‘political question.’ Others relate to restorative justice measures, regime 
transformation and legitimation, as well as collective, fundamental existential and 
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identity questions of statehood. He further identifies in this category, the 
judicialisation of democratic electoral processes.2  
   In the Nigerian experience, judicialised politics3 has involved virtually every 
aspect of governance described above by Hirschl. The judicialisation of the 
process of democratisation, power contestation among the political elite, inter-
governmental policy and legislation issues, have all had profound impact on 
politics and governance. ‘Judicialisation of this type,’ Hirschl further observes, 
has resulted in the judiciary adjudicating and deciding ‘watershed political 
questions’ not expressly provided for in the constitutions of the respective 
countries.4 Our earlier discussion in Chapter Five has shown there is ample 
evidence in the literature that the phenomenon has become widespread across the 
spectrum of advanced, liberal, young and aspiring democratic polities alike.5 We 
also recall that even authoritarian societies are no longer completely left out from 
the incidence of the phenomenon.6   
   Critical evaluation of the phenomenon in Nigeria highlights public as well as 
institutional responses to the judicialisation of politics as it takes centre-stage in 
the country’s transition to democratic rule, after decades of authoritarian rule. The 
Nigerian experience, it is argued, provides contextual foundation for suggesting 
the need for more attention by legal theorists to the relevance of public opinion in 
theoretical analyses of the judicial function. Such closer attention, it is contended, 
can only enrich the legal academy. 
Significantly, there is a shift in the judicial approach at the apex of the system 
(considered here) to the resolution of disputes, particularly political ones, in the 
period under examination. This represents a relatively marked departure from the 
initial reticent and ambivalent judicial attitude to the political transition in the 
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country discussed in Chapter Four. The chapter concludes that the attempt to 
rescue a troubled transition can be a very challenging and potentially integrity-
eroding task for an untransformed judiciary with an unaccounted past. 
 
 
2.     DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS IN NIGERIA 
   It is significant that in a recent restatement of his objections to ‘strong’ forms of 
judicial review (discursively the precursor of judicialisation of politics) Waldron 
concludes on contingent and exceptionalist premises. He recognised that certain 
‘pathologies’ which include ‘dysfunctional legislative institutions’ and ‘corrupt 
political culture’ could constitute attenuating justifications for judicial review.7 
One can go on to extend this situational exceptionalism as valid, if not inevitable, 
justification for judicialisation of politics in transitioning societies.  
   Purist protestations notwithstanding, Waldron’s position here aligns with 
Teitel’s proposition that the extra-ordinary circumstances that usually characterise 
transitions conduce to ‘hyperpoliticized adjudication.’8 A substantive premise for 
this is that in such societies the institutional memory of the political branches has 
been weak largely as a result of the lack of opportunity to evolve into maturity or 
at least develop steadily due to intervention of the military or other forms of 
imposition of authoritarian rule. This is the experience in Nigeria where the 
military intervened barely five and a half years after independence. In other cases 
it may have been virtually obliterated as a result of high level conflict.  
   Hirschl has identified four key dimensions of judicial intervention in 
contemporary constitutionalism that delineates the course of judicialisation of 
politics around the world. These are namely in the area of ‘core executive 
prerogatives;’ ‘foundational “nation-building” processes;’ ‘fundamental 
restorative justice dilemmas;’ and ‘political transformation, regime change, and 
electoral disputes.’9 I argue in this section that critical evaluation of the 
democratic transition in Nigeria strongly suggests close affinity with Hirschl’s 
foregoing articulation of the directionality of judicial intervention in politics.  
2.1   The Judiciary in Institutional Reconstruction 
                                                 
7
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8
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   After more than four and half decades of its post-colonial existence, Nigeria 
remains one of a number of ‘divided societies.’10 In such societies, ‘constitutional 
design’ plays an important role in forging a ‘common political identity.’11 The 
reality of the fractious nature of the Nigerian state commends the need for 
institutional redesign that would facilitate the establishment of a cohesive society, 
utilising the much elusive transition moment. Thus, the judiciary, especially in the 
exercise of its powers of judicial review, has a pivotal role in the task of nation-
building in societies recovering from the vagaries of violent conflict or military 
authoritarian rule.  
   Hirschl has argued that most instances of judicialisation of politics in new 
constitutionalism countries (transitioning polities) are propelled by the actions of 
‘hegemonic’ groups apprehensive of losing out in the power game. His argument 
appeals to the idea that while a number of variables foster judicial activism and 
thus, judicialisation of politics, a political setting that is conducive to it is the 
decisive factor. In Chapter Five, I have tried to show how several other factors 
and forces are involved that suggest a complexity that this description does not 
capture. However, one feature worth pursuing at this point is that of a 
predisposing political environment.   
   The predisposing and conducive political environment for judicialised politics in 
Nigeria was provided in part by the enigmatic prevalence of democratically 
elected but authoritarian executive presidency. The phenomenon, referred to by 
Prempeh as the ‘imperial presidency,’12 which has continued to plague African 
countries, despite the ‘new wave’ democratic transition, found extensive 
expression in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. It has led to an unprecedented 
incidence of judicialisation of politics in the country. It is significant to note that 
the trend towards judicialisation of politics has yet to abate. Additional fodder for 
the phenomenon has been provided by the seriously flawed electoral process that 
hallmarked the country’s epoch-making ‘civil-civil’ transition.  
   In this regard, the 2007 elections in Nigeria brought out in sharp relief, just how 
critical the role of the judiciary could be in transitioning societies. The 
controversial electoral process has led to numerous litigations on the part of those 
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who felt handed the short end of the stick. Many observers, local and international 
called for wholesale cancellation of the elections. Others urged recourse to the 
judiciary for the resolution of the disputations arising from it. The option of 
recourse to the judicial process, as would be extensively discussed later in this 
chapter, was largely preferred by political players in the country.  The 
International Crisis Group brought the relevance of the expected judicial role in to 
focus when it noted that  
                Nigeria’s democracy has derailed. The April 2007 general elections were      
               supposed to consolidate the country’s evolution as a democracy,  
               facilitate the peaceful resolution of its many internal conflicts and  
               bolster its stature as a leading peacemaker and peacekeeper in Africa.  
               Instead, the conduct and outcome deepened long-running political crises,  
               pushed the country further down the road to failure as a democratic  
               state…The first step to defuse the tensions stirred by the elections is to  
               pursue electoral justice through the judicial tribunals provided for in the  
               Electoral Act. This will not be sufficient to restore government credibility  
               but is essential to give a clear sign of willingness to redress the irregularities  
               of the process.13  
 
 An untransformed judiciary will most likely fall short of the crucial mediating 
role expected of it in a democratic crisis of the nature that confronted Nigeria at 
the end of the April 2007 elections in the country (or any other) in a period of 
transition.  
   The Nigerian situation is further compounded by the view held by some 
respected individuals and groups (including the most renowned constitutional 
lawyer as well the country’s only Nobel Laureate) that the only viable solution to 
the flawed process is a complete nullification of the elections. Proponents of this 
position advocate a political rather than legal resolution of the debacle. They 
argue that a number of factors would incapacitate the courts from dispensing 
justice on the electoral petitions.14 
   The judiciary is no doubt acutely aware of the demanding situation. Perhaps 
nothing better reflects the awareness than the public statement of Justice James 
Ogebe, (then) Justice of Appeal, and Chairman of the Presidential Elections 
Tribunal sitting over several petitions for the annulment of the President 
Yar’Adua’s election at the 2007 general elections. While appealing to judicial 
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support staff on strike for better pay and conditions of service to call off the strike 
to enable the tribunal to conclude its work expeditiously, he said 
               The government is unstable now. You know that they have not been   
               able to do many things because of this case, and they will not be able  
               until they know their fate, so the longer it takes, the longer your matter  
               will linger. So, if we finish the case, they will know where they stand,  
               and will then be able to tackle many of the issues.15    
      
   One can conveniently cite over a dozen remarkable cases of judicialisation of 
politics in the country in the context of the democratic transition at the inter-
governmental level.16 A fairly topical representative survey would include 
Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia and 35 
Ors17dealing with disputed claims between the federal and littoral States for oil 
resources derivable from the continental shelf of the country. Attorney General of 
Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (the ICPC Case)18 
dealing with the establishment of a monolith anti-corruption agency in the 
federation; Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia and 35 
Ors (No.2)19 and Attorney General of Ogun State v Attorney General of the 
Federation20 both dealing (again) with fiscal federalism and allegations of illegal 
withholding of funds by the Federal government. 
    Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation21 centred 
on disputations over the propriety of inherited military legislation that confers 
ultimate planning powers on the federal government, possessed only of complete 
geo-political control over the federal capital territory. All the states of the 
federation challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of the Electoral Act 
(promulgated by the National Assembly), in as much as it sought to make 
provisions for elections into local (government) authorities in Attorney General of 
Abia and 35 Ors v Attorney General of the Federation.22   
   The disputations on the appropriate spheres of power and control in the country 
between the federal government on one hand, and the states on the other, were 
frequent. In the result, there was a seeming endless recourse to the judiciary for 
resolution. Customisation of this approach to governance and the extensive 
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judicialisation of politics it generated attracted judicial notice and obiter dicta of 
the Supreme Court, the judicial venue for their resolution. 
   In one of the later cases, Attorney General of Abia & 2 Ors v Attorney General 
of the Federation & 33 Ors 23 the Supreme Court observed that it was ‘yet another 
open quarrel between the State and Federal Government’ with which the Court 
had become ‘thoroughly familiar.’ 24 The Court noted that the cases revolved 
around federalism and unitarism from the constitutional and political stand-point. 
This is not surprising given the context of the country’s un-negotiated transition. 
The transition away from military authoritarianism has forced to the centre stage 
of governance, tensions arising from the country’s de jure federal status that has 
witnessed a transformation to a de facto unitary state. Inherent tensions between 
the two leanings were accentuated by a government at the centre, headed by a 
former military ruler who, despite his internationally recognised status as a 
dictator-turned-democrat, ‘defender of democracy,’25and African statesman, 
relapsed into entrenched authoritarian understandings of the rule of law and 
governance in the country.26  
   The conduct of governance at the centre in its interactions with the states and 
the tension it has generated is a stark reminder of the rather problematic operation 
of federalism in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. 27 As Adamolekun and 
Kincaid have noted, this derives not so much from the inadequacies of federalism, 
as from the botched attempts at democratic governance that has plagued post-
colonial Africa.28 
   The legal contestations which have arisen from the foregoing state of affairs 
reflect the judicialisation of politics through the mechanism of ‘structural judicial 
review.’ It is defined by Stone as the process, in federal polities with written 
constitutions, whereby judges interpret and enforce constitutional provisions that 
relate to the basic structure of government.29 They can be considered as arising 
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from the intersection of Stone’s structural and rights provisions30 in the Nigerian 
Constitution. This aspect of judicialisation of politics is no doubt very important 
in the Nigerian experience of the phenomenon. 
   However, our analytical focus here will be directed at another line of cases. 
They share the critical element of judicialisation of highly political issues with the 
foregoing, but with the crucial addition of their engagement with the rights of 
individuals in the democratisation process as they intersect with wider issues of 
socio-political rights and governance in the polity. This analytical preference 
provides opportunity for a more robust engagement with and reflection on the 
dimensions and nature of judicialisation of politics in the Nigerian transition.  
2.2   The Ladoja Case: The Godfather versus the People 
 2.2.1    The Socio-Political Background  
   The incidence of ‘Godfatherism,’ and here, I borrow a term that has become 
commonplace in political parlance in Nigeria, has been a major source of 
corruption with grave consequences for the delivery of basic infrastructure, social 
and economic facilities and services in the country.31 The trend is traceable to a 
culture of predation in governance instituted by successive military 
administrations and taken to new heights by the Babangida and Abacha regimes in 
the middle 80’s to the later part of the 90’s.32 
   The concept of the ‘Godfather’ in Nigerian politics, refers to the situation where 
an individual, usually deriving from his privileged financial position, initiates and 
or ‘bankrolls’ the candidature of another for elective office. In quid pro quo, the 
latter, when he gets into office is beholden to the godfather, who naturally claims 
a stake in the appointments and dispensation of patronages of the public officer. 
Public resentment of the phenomenon is high and the general opinion in the 
country is decidedly in favour of ridding the political system of it.  For instance, a 
recent survey on what the demise of a number of prominent ‘Godfathers’ in a 
section of the country portended for democracy found that it would enhance 
democratic consolidation in the polity.33         
                                                 
30
 Ibid. at 3-5. 
31
 Human Rights Watch Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria 
(2007) Volume 19 No 16 available at:  
http://hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/nigeria1007web.pdf (2nd January 2008). 
32
 Lewis note 26 supra at 238-245. 
33
 Independent Opinion Poll “The Demise of Some Top Yoruba's Political ‘Godfathers’ in Recent 
Time, Do You Consider this an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Democratic Consolidation in 
Western Nigeria?” Daily Independent (Lagos Tuesday 17 June 2008). 
 200 
   Godfatherism thrived in many parts of the country during the initial civil 
governance period that ran from 1999 to 2003. Despite public condemnation, it 
has abided in various degrees.34 However, the public outcry against it has, even if 
to a limited extent, emboldened some elected officers to throw off the yoke of 
their godfathers presumably to deliver on their mandates to the public. 
2.2.2.    Neither Impeachment nor Removal 
   In 2005, the malaise of Godfatherism in national life and governance came to 
the fore in Oyo State.35 The course of events that followed resulted in Hon. 
Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & 3Ors (the Ladoja 
Case).36 The Executive Governor, Senator Rasheed Ladoja, fell out of favour with 
his self-acclaimed godfather, Chief Lamidi Adedibu.37 The grouse of the 
godfather, who had barely rested his famed military apologist stance during 
decades of military authoritarianism in the country,38 was typical. Following his 
election in 2003, Governor Ladoja had failed to allow him dictate appointments of 
key officials of his cabinet. Two years on, and midway into the four-year tenure, 
Adedibu was not enjoying the measure of patronage he reckoned his position as 
political godfather of the governor entitled him. He publicly declared he would 
make the state ungovernable for his (now estranged) protégé.  
   He made good his threat and the perceived loyalists of the Governor, including 
the Speaker of the House of Assembly, the Deputy Speaker, 1st and 2nd 
Plaintiffs/Respondents (Respondents) and their families suffered physical attacks 
linked to the hatchet-men of Adedibu.39 Not satisfied with the unyielding stance 
of Governor Ladoja, Adedibu instigated the Defendants/Appellants (Appellants), 
18 of the 32 state legislators, to impeach40 the Governor.41 In a purported 
parliamentary session held by the Appellants on 13 December 2005 at a hotel in 
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the state capital, they suspended the procedural Rules of the House of Assembly. 
They subsequently passed a motion on 22nd December 2005 for the investigation 
of allegations against Governor Ladoja. These actions were taken without 
following the procedure stipulated by the Constitution. The Appellants 
subsequently swore in the Deputy Governor having purported to remove 
Governor Ladoja, 4th Defendant/Respondent. 
 2.2.3.     Courts and the Political Question 
   The trial high court rejected the complaint of the 1st- 3rd Respondents that 
Governor Ladoja (who at that point was not party to the suit) be reinstated. It held 
that impeachment was ‘a purely political matter’ over which the constitution 
granted exclusive powers to the legislature as part of its internal affairs. 
Impeachment proceedings were not justiciable. According to the court, the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary over such proceedings was ousted by section 188 of 
the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. The Respondent appealed.42 
   The Court of Appeal overturned the decision and its judgement was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court on a further appeal by the Appellants. The Supreme Court was 
provided with the first opportunity to pronounce on the ‘troublesome area of 
law’43 on the removal of governors in Nigeria’s jurisprudence.  Like the Court of 
Appeal, the Supreme Court faulted the action of the ‘Group of 18 legislators’ 
(Appellants) for non-compliance with the laid down procedures for instituting 
proceedings to remove Governor Ladoja, who had by then joined the suit as an 
interested party. It declared his purported removal referred to as ‘impeachment’ 
by the parties and lower courts, a nullity. It clarified that the former rather than the 
latter term was the language of the constitutional provisions on the matter. 
   The Supreme Court affirmed that the power of judicial review vested in the 
courts by section 6 (6) (b) of the Constitution (contrary to the holding of the trial 
court), extended to determining whether a body vested with the exercise of an 
exclusive power acted in accordance with the law conferring such power. The 
Court was definitive that the legislature (in this case, the Oyo State legislators), as 
custodian of the Constitution, abused its powers by engaging in ‘patent violation 
and breach’ of its provisions. The judiciary as the ‘custodian of the construction or 
interpretation’ of the Constitution should be alive to check all acts of violations 
and ‘indiscretions’ of the legislature. The Court stated further that society and the 
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people ought not to be left helpless in the face of such breach, but should be aided 
by the judiciary.44 
   The controversy in the Ladoja Case emanates from a pervasive but abnormal 
situation in an aspiring democracy. Critical to the evaluation here, it provided the 
judiciary with what can be regarded as the pace-setting case of judicialisation of 
politics in the country’s transition from decades of military authoritarian rule. The 
constitutional panel of the Supreme Court aptly seized the golden opportunity to 
intervene on the side of the rule of law and democracy in Nigeria’s political and 
constitutional history.  
   The Court’s approach in the Ladoja Case signals a movement away from a 
‘coordinating style of adjudication’ to a ‘redemptive’ one.45 It benchmarks 
judicial activism in the transitioning polity. In the nature of Ackerman’s analysis 
of redemptive adjudication, the decisions of the appellate courts explicitly 
converged with the expressed will of the people over that of narrow and parochial 
interests in the country.  
   Crucial for Nigerian jurisprudence as a whole and transition jurisprudence in 
particular, the Court did not shy away from the ‘political question.’ The Court 
acknowledged the political character of the matter. Thus, it asserted that 
               …American jurisprudence has so much developed the political question   
               doctrine in their case law, so much so that it has taken a very firm root in  
               their legal system. The political question doctrine is still in its embryonic  
               stage in Nigeria. Let us not push it too hard to avoid the possibility of a  
               still-birth. That would be bad both for Nigerian litigants and the legal  
               system.46 
 
   The ‘political question doctrine’ simply restated, is according to Hirschl, the 
principle of separation of powers that there are ‘certain types of political questions 
that a court ought to refuse to rule on’ for the reason that they fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the legislature and the executive.47 Here again, the Court 
alluded to the sometimes uncritical adoption of the American political and socio-
legal arrangements as the model for Nigeria’s legal system. Suffice it to say that 
                                                 
44
 Ladoja Case note 36 supra at 43. 
45
 B Ackerman “The Rise of World Constitutionalism” (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771, 794-
791. 
46
 Ladoja Case note 36supra at 20. Emphasis mine. 
47
 Hirschl note 9 supra at 193.  
 203 
even the American Supreme Court, despite its assumed commitment to upholding 
the political question doctrine, has been known to take it on in certain cases.48   
   Implied in the foregoing finding of the Court, is the position that the judiciary, 
through the instrumentality of constitutional judicial review, is set to take on the 
challenges of the stormy political scene in Nigeria’s democratic transition. As will 
become obvious below, the Court has adopted and is developing a jurisprudential 
tradition of judicialisation of politics.49 The judicial approach is essentially 
constituted by an increasing incidence of intervention in institutional design and 
maintenance of democratic political processes similar to what is happening in 
various parts of the world.50  
   It is significant that the Court unequivocally identified with the socio-political 
realities of Nigerian society at the material time. It decried, in no uncertain terms, 
the proclivity of legislative assemblies in various parts of the country for 
removing state governors. It is no doubt within the constitutional province of 
legislatures in most democracies to audit, monitor or censure executive action and 
this is also the case in Nigeria. However, observers of the Nigerian political scene 
would recognise the fact that the exercise of the prerogative by legislators has 
been mostly driven by parochial interests and conducted in defiance of 
constitutional process.  
   Removal proceedings against governors, usually for self-centred reasons on the 
part of legislators and in disregard for due process, had unduly heated the polity. 
The conduct of such proceedings constituted a cause for concern in the context of 
the country’s fragile political transition from authoritarian rule in 1999. The 
situation required an arbiter capable of intervening with equanimity in the 
emerging political power contestations and its deleterious effect on governance. 
Already, in Oyo State, locus of the Ladoja Case, many lives and properties had 
been lost in tensions generated by the flexing of political muscles. This had 
occurred in some other states caught in political crises too. 
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   In its decision, the Court restated its preference for substantial, rather than 
procedural justice, principally in matters that affect the stability of the country.  It 
said 
               The plethora of removal proceedings in respect of Governors is not only  
               frightening but is capable of affecting the stability of Nigeria. It is almost  
               like child’s play…Unless the situation is arrested, Nigerians will wake  
               up one morning and look for where their country is. That should worry  
              every good Nigerian.51 
 
The Court thus adopted a quintessential transition jurisprudence marked out by its 
engagement with institutional fortification, in recognition of the unique role of 
law in societies in transition. As discussed in Chapter Four, these were 
fundamental issues remarkable for their total absence or obscurity in the transition 
jurisprudence of the courts notably in the early period of the country’s transition 
from authoritarian rule.    
 2.2.4.     Checkmating Judicial Impunity       
   Another important feature of the Ladoja Case is the judicial attempt at 
deliberate reformation of the conduct of judicial proceedings by the courts in the 
absence of legislation. In Nigeria, the transplantation of the common law 
adversarial system in the absence of socio-cultural foundations supportive of the 
conduct of its litigation practices and ethics, had led to a culture of delayed 
justice. Control of the procedural aspects of trials was left (almost) entirely to 
counsel for the parties in litigation. A culture of instituting litigation to perpetuate 
impunity in the guise of preserving the sanctity of the judicial process had been 
perfected. The misuse of judicial process was prevalent amongst the privileged 
few who could afford the relatively exorbitant cost of legal services. It was 
unrelentingly employed to the discredit of legal process, and the courts as a proper 
resort for the resolution of disputes.  
   Instances abound of ongoing litigation that commenced with injunctive orders to 
stop all sorts of activities from university convocation ceremonies that involved 
the careers of thousands, commissioning of public utilities and services like roads 
and water projects, communal chieftaincy ceremonies, to probate and will 
disposition matters. And the injunctive orders, sometimes obtained ex parte, 
stayed in place for years. It was common practice for counsel, and or litigants to 
unscrupulously employ procedural or logistic ploys to delay cases, criminal and 
civil, without decisive judicial intervention. The situation was exacerbated by 
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years of neglect of the judicial institution and reluctant commitment to law reform 
by successive military regimes. In a sizeable number of cases, litigants were either 
frustrated in the pursuit of justice, or in some cases, enjoyment of the fruits of 
litigation. It was not unusual for litigation to last up to 15 years in the courts. The 
result was a predictable loss of confidence in judicial resolution of disputes, resort 
to self-help and impunity.  
   Given the foregoing state of litigation and resolution of disputes through the 
courts, it is quite significant for the rule of law and restoration of confidence in the 
judicial process that trial and appeals in the Ladoja Case were decided within a 
year. The decisive element was the determination of the courts to ensure 
expeditious hearing of the case. The conduct of the judiciary in the matter is 
certainly commendable considering the fact that it had to contend with the designs 
of the Appellants to delay the trial and appeals in the case. The Supreme Court 
determinedly saw its way through ‘the cocktail or harvest of motions’ deliberately 
filed by the Appellants to frustrate the hearing of the matter on the merits52 and 
‘frustrate the course of justice.’53 It also rejected the prayer of the Appellants to 
have the case sent back for trial in the high court. In this regard, the Supreme 
Court was right when it stated that  
               Although the judicial process is slow most of the time, almost taking a  
               snail’s pace, this, is one case which the judiciary must take the fast lane  
               in the relay race and has in fact, taken the fast lane.54  
 
   It is relevant to note here that delay in the determination of the case and 
effluxion of time held real promise of a fait accompli for the Appellants. 
Maintaining the status quo was entirely satisfactory to their designs. They had, 
after all, sworn in the deputy governor as a new governor under the guise of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. In this regard, the designs of the Appellants 
were not lost on the Court.  
   It rightly noted that acceding to the request to remit the case to the lower court 
would ensure the matter would not be concluded before 29 May 2007 when the 
office in contention was due to be filled through elections. All this was happening 
in the backdrop of public condemnation of the brazen subversion of democracy 
and the rule of law. The public violence that followed the inauguration of a new 
governor notwithstanding, the erring legislators further had the support of the 
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police who were complicit in the matter, acting ostensibly on ‘orders from 
above.’55     
   Despite its federal political arrangement, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), 
federally established and controlled, is the only police force in the country. The 
Inspector–General of Police is appointed by and takes orders from the President. 
In this case, it was no secret that then President, Olusegun Obasanjo was himself 
beholden to Chief Lamidi Adedibu, the estranged godfather. Following newspaper 
reports of the President’s failed intervention to settle the political differences 
between ‘father’ and ‘son’, he cast his lot behind the ‘father.’56 
   Thus, the ongoing litigation, rather than serving as a legitimate forum for 
resolution of the important constitutional questions in issue, was presented by a 
minority but powerful political clique as vindication for trampling on the will of 
the people and the rule of law. An unwary judiciary, especially in the nature of the 
Nigerian judiciary in the decades past, would have served to perpetuate this 
patently illegal design, further discrediting the judiciary, the legal process and the 
rule of law, in what can be regarded as a form of judicial impunity. 
 2.3    The Obi Tenure Case - Speaking Law to Power 
   If the Supreme Court in particular and the judiciary in general, had aspired to 
steer clear of the political process after the inevitable judicial intervention in the 
resolution of election petitions arising from the 2003 general elections, they soon 
found unfinished business in Peter Obi v Independent National Electoral 
Commission & 6 Ors ( Obi Tenure Case).57 The background to the suit is 
inextricably linked to another intriguing chapter in the annals of election 
manipulation in the country’s politics.  
   Peter Obi, Governor of Anambra State, filed a suit at the Federal High Court in 
a pre-emptive move to stop the planned gubernatorial polls by the 1st Defendant as 
part of the scheduled general elections all over the country. Emeka Ngige, 
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candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the party that had dominated 
the political landscape in the country since the inception of civil rule in 1999, had 
been wrongfully declared winner by the 1st Defendant and inaugurated as 
governor in a massively rigged election. The Plaintiff, candidate of the All 
Peoples Grand Alliance, (APGA), successfully challenged the action of the 1st 
Defendant in court and reclaimed his mandate.  His victory was reluctantly 
enforced by the PDP government at the centre, following exhaustion of the 
appellate process. Interestingly, the 1st Defendant issued him with a certificate (of 
victory at the polls) backdated to 2003. He was sworn in on 10 March 2006, three 
years after the elections in which he had received the majority of the lawfully cast 
votes.  
   Apparently relying on the certificate of returns, the 1st Defendant sought to 
organise fresh gubernatorial elections in the state, as part of the 2007 general 
elections in the country. In his summons filed on 28 February  2007, the Plaintiff 
sought declarative and injunctive reliefs that (a) his four year tenure as governor 
began to run from the date he was sworn in, 17 March 2006,  (b) the 1st Defendant 
could not conduct gubernatorial elections in the state proposed for 14 April 2007, 
as he was yet to run the course of the constitutionally stipulated four-year term, 
after taking the oath of office and (c) the 1st Defendant should not proceed with 
the proposed election since the office would not be vacant by that date. He relied 
heavily on section 180 (2) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999. The subsection is to the effect that the governor shall vacate office 
at the expiration of a period of four years commencing from the date the Oath of 
Office and Oath of Allegiance are administered. The other defendants applied to 
and were joined in the matter as interested parties.  
   The court of first instance, the Federal High Court declined jurisdiction on the 
matter on the premise that it was an election matter for which exclusive 
jurisdiction is vested in the Election Petition Tribunals. Meanwhile, the 1st 
Defendant proceeded to organise the election in contention despite the ongoing 
litigation. The Plaintiff further appealed to the Court of Appeal which delivered 
its judgement on 22nd May, 2007, seven days before the planned swearing in of 
Andy Uba of the PDP, who had purportedly been elected the incoming governor.  
   The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the 
Federal High Court. Peter Obi further appealed to the Supreme Court the same 
day. After the filing of the appeal, but before the hearing of the matter, the 
Supreme Court expressed displeasure that the 1st Defendant had, in disregard for 
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the judicial process, held elections for the office of governor in Anambra State. 
The Court warned that it would not hesitate to order that anyone sworn in as 
governor vacate the office immediately in the event it determined that the 
elections were wrongly held.    
   The constitutional panel of the Court (comprised of seven justices) delivered a 
unanimous verdict in favour of the Plaintiff on 14th June 2007, the same day it 
took arguments in the matter. The Court ordered that the new incumbent, sworn in 
on 29th May, 2007, Andy Uba, should vacate the office of governor and the 
Plaintiff be reinstated to continue in office until 17th March 2010, when his four 
year tenure will expire. The Court held that the purported election was in futility 
as there was no vacancy to be filled as at 14 April, 2007, when the election was 
held. It then adjourned to 13 July, 2007 to give full reasons for the judgment. In 
the lead judgement, the Court held that the fulcrum of the case was constitutional 
rather than electoral, a critical misdirection in law that led the trial court and the 
Court of Appeal to decline jurisdiction in the matter.  
2.3.1.     Towards a New Constitutionalism 
   The Obi Tenure Case has several implications for constitutionalism, policy and 
transition politics in the country. The most obvious for those familiar with 
Nigerian general election practices, is the fact that it re-configures the electoral 
landscape in the country. It is relevant to an understanding of the case to note that 
it has been the political convention in Nigeria for the gubernatorial elections, 
constitutionally organised by a national electoral body, to be held on the same day 
nationwide. This approach to electoral arrangements, supported by an unbroken 
chain of repetition, has taken on the semblance of an immutable convention. The 
contention in support of this position, call this the ‘truncation argument’, had 
included the need for uniformity, obviate chaos and save costs. All of these were 
in fact vigorously canvassed by counsel to the INEC, 1st Defendant in the matter.  
   In rejecting the truncation argument, the Court observed that holding elections 
at different times in a federation like Nigeria is an affirmation of, rather than 
anathema to the practice of federalism. The judgement furthered notions of 
reasonable independence of action and autonomy inherent in the concept. Thus, 
the Court affirmed that the convention is a product of expedience and imposition 
through the series of democratic transition programmes organised by various 
military regimes, rather than compliance with a constitutional requirement. It was 
this historicity, rather than a constitutional provision, that cloaked the practice 
with certain seeming inviolability. The Court went further to assert that any 
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positive provision for such uniformity of practice would be contrary to the 
principle of federalism, a pivot of the country’s political foundations.58 The 
judgement decisively took Anambra State out of the national electoral calendar, 
with the Court throwing overboard any possible advertence to fiduciary 
considerations or social expedience of uniformity, in preference for upholding the 
rule of law. More importantly, the decision rid the country of one more vestige of 
imposed unitarism, from a legion of authoritarian legacies.  
  2.3.2.      Timely Intervention  
  As one commentator observed, the timing of the decision in the Obi Tenure 
Case, expeditiously determined by the courts, constituted a signal to the society 
that the judiciary was primed to ensure justice in electoral matters in the 
country.59 The Court demonstrated commendable responsiveness to the need for 
timeliness in the matter, progressing a new direction away from delayed justice 
that hallmarked judicial activity in the country during the years of authoritarian 
rule.  
   The expedition deployed by the judiciary in the hearing of the case is 
commensurate with the critical need for preventing the breakdown of law and 
order that has remain a constant feature of elitist power wrangling in the country’s 
political transition. While there is a need for timely dispensation of justice in all 
manners of legal disputation, it takes on particular urgency where the resolution 
of such disputes directly impacts on the stability of the polity, the safety of lives 
and property, thus reinforcing one of the most important reasons for the existence 
of the modern state.  
   Considering the volatility of political related matters, delay on the part of the 
judiciary can only elicit further loss of confidence in an institution that had 
hitherto been viewed as complicit in the country’s chequered experience of 
democracy.  The judicial handling of the Ladoja Case and Obi Tenure Case along 
with a number of others that have followed them, have renewed public hope in 
the electoral and judicial process, while constituting a signal to the political class 
that impunity would not be tolerated in the democratic transition. 
 2.3.3      Checkmating Electoral Impunity  
   In the political realm, the Obi Tenure Case constitutes positive affirmation that 
the highest level of the judiciary is committed to deepening democratic ethos and 
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combating the scourge of electoral manipulation that has bedevilled the country’s 
political transition. This may be just as well. At no other time in the country’s 
limited history of elections, has it witnessed such undisguised manipulation and 
determination by a ruling party to foist a fait accompli on the political process.   
   No doubt invigorated by the attitude of the Supreme Court, the Electoral 
Petitions Tribunals in the country have displayed unusual boldness in their 
adjudication of electoral disputes arising from the much discredited 2007 general 
elections. At the last count, the elections of twelve governors had been nullified.60 
A number of legislators have gone the same way at both the state and national 
levels, the most prominent of which is the President of the Senate. His case was 
made more interesting by the fact that he stood to lose his prestigious number four 
position in the country.  Further, he was the third of the three senators from his 
state, to have their elections nullified by the National Assembly Elections 
Petitions Tribunal for gross electoral malpractices. 61  
   Fresh elections have been ordered all over the country, to the relief and acclaim 
of aggrieved political actors and the general public. This trend inevitably directs 
keen public attention at the judiciary. The development has put out the judiciary 
as the institution at the forefront of the social reconstruction of a society with 
debilitated institutional structures. The judiciary has engaged in the process 
through its insistence on procedural and substantive fairness by the political 
branches, in keeping within the ground rules they have laid for securing power 
and conduct of governance. 
   The situation that developed in Kogi, a north-central state in the country speaks 
loudly to the reaches of judicialisation of politics in Nigeria’s transition, 
engendered by unbridled struggle for power among the political elite. The Kogi 
State Governor was sacked by the Election Petitions Tribunal for gross procedural 
irregularities that attended his election, the most conspicuous being the exclusion 
of a leading opposition candidate. After he unsuccessfully exhausted the appeal 
process, he had to vacate office along with his deputy. In line with constitutional 
provisions, the Speaker of the House of Assembly assumed office as acting 
governor preparatory to holding another election to be held within 90 days of the 
decision.  
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   The unsettling aspect of the matter however, is the fact that at the time, the 
election of the Speaker had in fact been nullified too by the state election petitions 
tribunal. His continued stay in the legislature is only premised on his pending 
appeal at the Court of Appeal. In other words, his assumption of office was on a 
tenuous line of legitimacy sufficient enough to distract him from even the most 
basic affairs of governance. It is difficult to expect the acting governor would 
administer the state constructively in a situation that he could be thrown out of not 
just his acting position, but the house of legislature altogether, in the not unlikely 
event the decision against him was affirmed on appeal.62 The drama of the 
judicialisation of pure politics continued unabated even after the conduct of the 
first ever court-ordered gubernatorial election in the country’s electoral history. 
Following the declaration that the dismissed governor won the freshly conducted 
polls, his key opponent immediately returned to the Elections Petitions Tribunal 
to challenge the results.63 
   Related to the foregoing is the position of the Supreme Court that the illegality 
constituted by the three year tenure enjoyed by Chris Ngige should not be allowed 
to interfere with the right of the Plaintiff to hold office for the constitutionally 
stipulated tenure of four years though the former was sworn in on the day the 
latter ought to have come into office. On the face of it, this should be considered a 
logical consequence, flowing from the judgement of the Court that the Plaintiff’s 
tenure was illegally usurped by the swearing in of Chris Ngige in the first place. 
But the matter is more complicated when it is considered that Ngige is not a 
defendant in this case and the rights of a third party, the 5th Defendant, Andy Uba, 
elected governor while the case was in progress would be adversely affected. In 
this regard it is important to observe that notwithstanding the Supreme Court 
decision in the Obi Tenure Case, success in a claim for illegally abridged tenure 
does not automatically entitle the claimant to the effluxed period. Rather, whether 
the court on a decision of such a nature will grant a reclaim of the deprived term 
will depend on the specific facts of the case. And this is well demonstrated by the 
position of the Court in another tenure case decided by the same panel64 on the 
same day as the Obi Tenure Case.   
 2.4     Ladoja (No. 2) – Between Sympathy and the Law 
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   The decision of the Supreme Court in Senator Rashidi Adewolu Ladoja v 
Independent National Electoral Commission &3 Ors, (Ladoja No.2),65 a 
contemporaneous tenure matter with the Obi Tenure Case, could in a way, be 
regarded as a denouement of recent judicialisation of politics in Nigeria’s 
transition. It served to define the limits of perceived judicial activism in the 
adjudication of disputes, in the sometimes complicated terrain of transition 
politics in a democratising polity. The Court insisted on a rather conservative 
constitutionalism, demonstrated in this case by supposed judicial deference to the 
political branches. This is a jurisprudential custom the Supreme Court has 
continued to struggle with, even as it sometimes displays remarkable radical 
departures from a deeply-rooted juridical tradition.   
   The Plaintiff was illegally removed as governor in the in the Ladoja Case 
discussed above.66 Following his success at the Supreme Court, he was reinstated. 
Meanwhile, he had lost eleven months of his tenure during the forced vacation. 
Obviously following the lead of the Obi Tenure Case, the Plaintiff filed a suit at 
the Federal High Court urging it to determine whether the eleven months during 
which he was illegally removed from office formed part of his four-year term. He 
sought injunctive and declaratory orders restraining the 1st Defendant from 
holding gubernatorial elections in the state until he had completed uninterrupted 
four-year tenure. He similarly relied on section 180 of the Constitution. Again, 
like the Obi Tenure Case, he also lost his bid at the trial and Court of Appeal.  
 2.4.1      No to Tenure-Elongation - The Court is Plain   
   In a rather terse consideration of the claim which the Court considered a case for 
tenure-elongation, rather than completion of an interrupted term canvassed by the 
Plaintiff, the constitutional panel of the Court unanimously declared it 
unmeritorious. According to the Court, the Constitution did not confer a power on 
it to extend the four year tenure of a governor who had been improperly removed. 
While it was ‘in sympathy with Plaintiff/Appellant’s cause,’ acceding to his claim 
it reasoned, would ‘do much violence to the constitution,’67 because the 
circumstances of the case was not contemplated by the framers of the 
Constitution. Apparently justifying a distinction between this case and the Obi 
Tenure Case, the Court reasoned that 
               In awareness of the possibility that an occurrence may prevent a     
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               Governor from being sworn in on the same day as his counterparts in the  
               country, Section 180 (2) states that tenure be computed from the date the  
               oath of allegiance and oath of office is taken. There is no similar  
               provision to protect a Governor improperly impeached.68 
    
   The Court maintained that in the event the wording of the applicable section is 
clear, (as it found), it was only within the province of the legislature to alter them. 
Thus, the justices restated the role of the courts, as has been the wont of judges 
everywhere, (even when they arguably do actually legislate or create new laws), 
that their employment was ‘the singular task of deciding what the law is.’69  
   In sum, the position of the Court is essentially that the de jure effect of the 
Plaintiff’s removal was that it never occurred. In other words, he is deemed in law 
not to have left office for one day, notwithstanding the fact that his deputy had 
been sworn in and exercised executive powers in a substantive, rather than acting 
capacity during the period.70 The justices declined the invitation to read the words 
‘uninterrupted,’ four year term canvassed by the Plaintiff, into the provisions of 
section 180 (2) (a) of the Constitution. In that way, the Court maintained its 
customary preference for the literal interpretation of the Constitution and 
statutes.71 
 
3.       THE JUDGE IN THE COURT OF THE PEOPLE 
   Jurists are wary of advertence to public opinion in analyses of judicial activity.72 
A distinctive insularity characterises conventional legal analysis of law to the 
exclusion of other elements with a bearing on the shaping of social behaviour. It is 
commonly the case that there is little or no advertence to public opinion on 
judicial activity in the works of leading legal theorists. The general consensus 
would appear to be the propriety of inadvertence to public opinion since it is 
usually regarded as fluid rather than stable, political rather than legal in nature. 
The streams of the legal and the political, in the way it relates to the judicial 
function, must be kept apart. Although the commonly presented premise for the 
reserved attitude is the need for judicial integrity and independence, it is also 
                                                 
68
 Ladoja (No.2) note 65 at 13. 
69
 Ladoja (No.2) note 65 supra at 22. Emphasis in the text. 
70
 As stated in our discussion of the Ladoja Case note 31 supra, they were in fact at daggers drawn 
consequent upon the swearing in of the deputy as governor. 
71
 Ladoja (No.2) Case note 65 supra at 22. For a discussion of this jurisprudential attitude see H 
O Yusuf “The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique” (2007) 7 (3) Global 
Jurist (Advances Article) 1 (-47). 
72
 See for an interesting and incisive discussion of the place of public reaction in judicial decision-
making C R Sunstein “If People Would be Outraged by their Ruling, Should Judges Care” (2007) 
60 Stanford Law Review 155. 
 214 
possible to detect in it, certain deep-rooted arrogance that attaches to western 
notions of the institution of law and its place in society.  
   Lawyers everywhere have built and sustained an aura of uniqueness around the 
theory and practice of law. Consequently, the enterprise of law, lawyers and 
judges are variously held in awe, admiration, and sometimes, despised and 
condemned in society. Judges and courts, without doubt, are a major, if not the 
major expression of the nature of law and the legal institution in the public 
domain. Thus, guarding its integrity is a major, even self-preserving, 
preoccupation of those in the business of law. This is especially the case in an era 
of increased interaction between law and politics, with a corresponding increase in 
the power and relevance of lawyers in society.73 
   Granted it is desirable, even essential for legal analysts to insist on measures 
that protect the integrity of the judiciary. In part, this is a mechanism for 
reinforcing judicial fidelity to law and the decisional independence of judges. 
Admittedly too, it is the case that the institution of law is unique. But as Friedman 
counsels, it is not sufficient a premise on which to exclude the equally important 
force of politics.74 And this is even more the case with constitutional law which 
conditions and is in turn, conditioned by politics.  
   Public opinion is generically regarded as political but it is still relevant to accord 
it more recognition as a measure for assessing judicial performance. After all, 
governance at various levels (including the private sphere) in the contemporary 
period, is being continually subjected to increased democratic accountability 
measures of scrutiny, even in previously illiberal societies in Latin America, 
Europe, Africa and Asia. An exclusivist normative approach, characteristic of 
conventional legal analysis results in an impoverishment of scholarly analysis of 
judicial review in legal discourse.75 It also undermines the relevance of 
institutional accountability which is a topical socio-political issue in post-
authoritarian polities.   
    Empirical research conducted largely outside the legal academy strongly 
suggests judges, especially at the highest levels, pay considerable heed to public 
consensus on contentious cases before courts.76 Judges after all are not 
superhuman, assuming that is a desirable quality in the endeavour of adjudicating 
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the affairs of fallible beings. They live in society, are aware of events and 
opinions around them, and can be reasonably expected to be influenced by their 
environment.77 Ignoring all of these realities in analyses of judicial activity can 
hardly constitute scholarly virtue.   
   In all events, even if legal theorists are disposed to maintaining a demurred 
attitude towards public consensus as an important evaluative mechanism for 
judicial performance, there remains the peculiarity of constitutionalism in 
transitioning paradigms. Constitutionalism, at the core of which is the judicial 
function, can not productively ignore politics in the event (as is the case), that 
institutional redesign, viability and fortification constitute integral objectives of 
democratisation. Thus, evaluative considerations of the judicial function in 
transitioning polities in particular would be more productive with the adoption of 
a robust approach that integrates law with politics as suggested by ‘positive 
scholarship.’78 This is even more so if societies with well established democratic 
systems can only ignore political considerations in assessing judicial review at 
great costs.79  
   In the Nigerian context, there is ample evidence to suggest that the traditional 
approach of diffidence to public opinion that characterises juristic considerations 
of judicial activity may soon change. A plausible reason for this is the active 
involvement of legal practitioners, mainly (but not exclusively) counsel to 
political contenders in the power tussles, in making public statements and granting 
press interviews on decisions in the myriad of cases before the courts. Their 
colleagues in the academia may not now be so averse to adverting, at least in part, 
to public opinion in their analyses of the judicial function in Nigeria’s democratic 
transition. The current willingness of legal practitioners in the country to assess 
judicial performance in the transition period outside the narrow confines of legal 
fora, but rather, in the media, may soon extend into scholarly literature on judicial 
governance in the country. Already, reports indicate this trend. Law professors, 
respected constitutional lawyers, frontline legal practitioners and socio-legal 
commentators have joined the fray. 80 There has been a flurry of public 
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commentary by a cross-section of Nigerian society on the phenomenon of 
judicialisation of politics in the country’s transition to democracy.81 It has also 
been subject of interest abroad.  
   Ignoring public opinion in legal analyses of the activities of the judiciary, no 
matter the traditional normative objections, is arguably counterintuitive. This is 
especially the case in the context of transitioning polities with otherwise fragile 
legitimate and democratic political institutions. Taking the Nigerian experience as 
a reference, the judicialisation of politics has had a profound impact as an avenue 
for legitimating democratic transition. This has been virtually inevitable in a 
society made highly sceptical and suspicious of government intentions following 
on endless civil rule transition programmes, over which huge resources were 
purportedly expended.82 Public response to the conduct of judicial governance is 
thus very relevant to scrutiny of the transition process from both the legal and 
political perspective.  
   It is relevant to consider public evaluations and perceptions in the legal analysis 
of the judicial resolution of the disputations in the socio-political sphere, in 
Nigeria’s transition.83 The acuteness of the potential departure in a transitioning 
polity, from the socio-political norm in a liberal democratic setting, justifies this 
rather extensive quotation of the views of a commentator on the Nigerian 
experience 
               All over the country, most governors cannot govern because of their  
               precarious political positions. Their hold on power is very tenuous. To  
               survive, they are now hostage to invidious political forces. To survive,  
               they have opened the patrimony of the people to those who are  
               blackmailing them because they know that if they try to assert  
               themselves before the tribunals give their verdicts, those who rigged  
               them into power will tender  the same evidence in court… In which part  
               of Nigeria has there been any meaningful governance in the past nine  
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               months?84 
 
 In fact, the attempt to resist overtures of the nature mentioned above, has landed 
one governor in trouble at the election tribunal leading to the nullification of his 
mandate, no thanks to the damning evidence produced against him by his now 
aggrieved ‘godfather.’ The situation thrown up by the circumstances of 
transitioning societies on judicial review suggests the need for re-examining the 
normative parameters for evaluating judicial activity by legal theorists. 
   Even the Nigerian judiciary, nurtured and developed in the conservatism of the 
British legal system (a by-product the country’s colonial legacy), recently openly 
indicated its acknowledgement of the importance of public perceptions of the 
judicial role in a transitioning polity. The Presidential Elections Petitions Tribunal 
(the Tribunal) broke away from a long-standing tradition of prohibiting live media 
coverage of judicial proceedings in the country. In recognition of the intense 
public interest in judicial proceedings on the contentious 2007 general elections in 
the country and the petitions challenging the presidential elections in particular, it 
allowed live-coverage of legal proceedings. The Tribunal allowed national and 
international organisations in the print and electronic media to its verdict on the 
consolidated petitions challenging the victory of incumbent President, Umar 
Yar’Adua. The only limitation was the express condition that faces of the judges 
or their pictures must not be displayed in any report.  
   The Tribunal premised its decision for the innovative action on the need for 
Nigerians and the international community to have first hand, timely access to the 
verdict as well as demonstrate its transparency.85 This action on the part of the 
judiciary can be regarded as an unequivocal endorsement of the view that the 
judiciary, like the political branches, must demonstrate sensitivity to public 
yearnings without compromising institutional integrity. Palpable tension had built 
up in the wait for the decision all over the country. Shortly before delivery of the 
verdict, the Inspector General of Police, the country’s top cop, had in fact warned 
of an impending breakdown of law and order. Over 10,000 policemen had been 
deployed to volatile areas in the country.86 This was not surprising, as it was the 
first time in its history that the election of an incumbent president was under such 
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serious judicial challenge.87 Though a separate matter altogether, the 
administrative response on the part of the judiciary furnishes another reason for 
devoting more attention to the part played by public opinion in legal analysis of 
judicial activity. 
   In the light of the foregoing, it is worthy of note that the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has recently been nominated ‘Man of the Year’ by Daily Independent,88 a 
respected national daily, no doubt in recognition of its cardinal role in the 
stabilisation of a floundering political transition and upholding constitutionalism 
in the country. The Supreme Court, in particular, has received commendation 
from home89 and even unusual quarters abroad.  
   On the home front, the profile of Supreme Court in governance in the country 
has become widely writ in the public psyche like never before. As respected 
professor and former dean of law of one of the foremost law schools in the 
country put it, the Court has sent out a signal that it is the ‘sentinel…guard for 
democracy and good governance.’90 On the international scene, a number of 
observers including the United States Congress and the London based The 
Economist have applauded its demonstration of independence, redirecting the 
country’s democracy away from the precipice and upholding human rights.91  
  However, as will be adverted to shortly, just how much of a transformation has 
taken place in the country’s post-authoritarian transition remains highly debatable. 
But before consideration of that aspect of the discussion, it is germane to evaluate 
to the institutional arrangement for judicial reformation and accountability in the 
democratisation process in the country. It is quite instructive that the exiting 
military administration tacitly agreed to the urgent need to reform the judiciary 
during its long hold on power by including provisions for establishment of the 
National Judicial Council in the ‘transition’ constitution. 
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4.  INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION SANS ACCOUNTABILITY? THE CASE OF THE 
NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
      Given the rot that had bedevilled the Nigerian judiciary in the authoritarian 
period as discussed in Chapter 3, it is no surprise that the ‘transition’ Constitution 
of 1999 sought to make institutional arrangements for reforming the judiciary. 
This is captured in the establishment of the National Judicial Council (NJC), a 
centralised body for the appointment, discipline and promotion of judges in the 
country. The creation and activities of the NJC, particularly as it relates to the 
discipline of judicial officers, is relevant to the focus on accountability of the 
judiciary in this research. 
   Established as one of fourteen “Federal Executive Bodies” by section 153 of the 
Constitution, the NJC has very wide ranging powers on recommending judicial 
officers for appointment across the spectrum of the superior courts of records in 
Nigeria. It similarly has powers to recommend their removal from office. Further, 
it has full disciplinary powers over judicial officers of all superior courts of 
record. It also has powers to ‘deal with all other matters relating to broad issues of 
policy and administration’92 of the judiciary. 
   It is important to note that the constitutional listing of the body, headed by the 
Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), as a federal executive body can be quite 
misleading. The creation of the body has been traced to the recommendations of 
the Eso Panel of Inquiry set up in 1993 by the Abacha military regime on the 
reorganisation and reformation of the Nigerian judiciary referred to earlier.93 In 
terms of composition, sixteen of its twenty three members are judicial officers, 
judges and justices of the High Courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.94 
The other seven are legal practitioners of ‘high professional standing’. Of this 
latter group, five, nominated by the Nigerian Bar Association only participate in 
the deliberations regarding the recommendation of persons for judicial 
appointment.95 The other two members who are not ‘jurisdictionally’ restricted 
are nominated by the CJN. Thus, the pre-eminent body is essentially a judicial 
affair. 
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   In practice, the ‘recommendatory’ powers of the NJC have been potent, if not 
decisive, in the appointment and dismissal of judges. Its recommendations on 
judicial appointments have been the most important factor in nomination of 
judicial officers by the executive for screening and ratification by the legislature 
all over the country since the return to civil rule in 1999. It has been quite active 
in investigating complaints (petitions) of judicial misfeasance and recommending 
appropriate action on the part of the executive. On its recommendation, a large 
number of judges have been suspended or dismissed from office thus, within three 
years of its operation over 50 judicial officers had been investigated for corruption 
or other judicial misfeasance.96 By the end of 2005, more than a dozen had been 
dismissed as a result of its findings.97 And a couple of others have since been 
similarly dealt with. To date only justices of the Supreme Court have completely 
escaped the axe of the NJC.  
   However, the NJC has been criticised for high-handedness, failure to observe 
fair-hearing and selectivity in its recommendations. In some cases, its decisions 
have been challenged for eroding rather than affirming judicial independence.98 
Joseph Otteh, Director of Access to Justice, a leading NGO committed to an 
independent legal and judicial system in Nigeria made the point very well when 
he noted that  
               Although the Council is making an important difference in the fight to  
               control corruption in the judicial estate and strengthen the independence  
               of the judicial branch, many might believe that the signals coming from  
               the Council is now mixed, and that the Council is missing opportunities,  
               compromising consistency, and undermining its own authority.99   
 
Interestingly, save in one instance however, judicial challenges to its decisions 
have been unsuccessful.100  
   From the perspective of cohesion, the predominant composition of the body by 
judicial officers is one of the NJC’s strongest points. But it is easily one of its 
Achilles heels too. Despite its acclaimed role in sanitising the judiciary, leading 
members of the NJC, including the highest echelons of the judiciary, have 
                                                 
96
 O Oko “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and Failures of 
the Judiciary in Nigeria” (2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 9, 26.  
97
 Badejogbin note 93 supra. 
98
 Editorial “NJC and Oyo Judiciary Saga” Daily Independent Online Edition (Lagos Thursday 13 
2008)  
99
 J Otteh “Enugu Chief Judge Appointment Saga: How the NJC Shot itself in the Foot” (2005) 3 
Judicial Observatory Journal available at: http://www.accesstojustice-
ng.org/toj3enugu2.htm#Scene_1 (Last accessed 27 April 2008).  
100
 H O Yusuf “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial 
Accountability in Nigeria” (2008) 30 (2) Law & Policy 194, 219. 
 221 
themselves sometimes been mired in allegations of bribery and corruption.101 It is 
useful to recall in this regard that the judiciary, like all institutions of civil 
governance in the country, had suffered serious institutional decay. The 
administration of justice had come to disrepute from 30 years of authoritarian 
military rule.102 Virtually all the judicial officers on the membership of the NJC 
(all of whom are there by various statutory permutations, notably their specific 
headship of levels of courts), were appointed to the bench by one or the other 
previous military administration in the first place.  
   It is pertinent to reiterate that judicial officers were exempted from 
administrative lustration applied to some public office-holders. The last military 
regime headed by General Abdusalam Abubakar (July 1998-May 1999), had 
retired serving military and police officers in government who had held political 
positions, as part of the transition measures and the demands for a break with the 
past.103 Thus, the NJC, since its inauguration in 1999, has by default been securely 
in the hands of the ‘old-guard’ in the judiciary. This is a body of judicial officers 
who had held office during a part of the authoritarian period. The judiciary as an 
institution, it has been argued, bears complicity for political illegitimacy, 
corruption and misgovernance for which it was not brought to account in the 
transition to civil rule.104  
   Thus, not only the spectre of the unaccounted past, but well-founded 
apprehensions of unchanged ways foreshadows the work of the NJC. Not 
unexpectedly, critics have identified inconsistencies in its operational procedures 
as well as a lack of courage in its approach to some cases.105 All of these have cast 
a serious slur on the institutional accountability measure which the NJC represents 
(as far as its disciplinary powers are concerned) in the post-authoritarian period. 
The continued unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the rectitude of judicial 
officers takes us back to the thrust of the research, namely that a publicly 
accessible mechanism of accountability in the nature of a truth-commission is 
well-suited to institutional scrutiny of the judiciary in transitions.    
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  It is not the argument that the truth-seeking process discussed earlier106 should 
have taken the place of a body like the NJC. Nor is it the proposition that 
subjecting the judiciary to public accountability would have cured all its 
institutional short-comings. Rather, the contention is that ventilating the judicial 
role in the authoritarian period through the truth-seeking process would have 
facilitated acknowledgement of its role in the suffering that the authoritarian 
period brought on the Nigerian society.  Perhaps more importantly, it would have 
facilitated a robust public engagement with the judiciary in the critical task of 
institutional reconstruction which it has inevitably found itself. Surely, the 
incidence of widespread judicialisation of politics all over the world has dispelled 
any hitherto existing doubts as to the ramifications of the judicial function in 
society and its direct implications for governance in contemporary times. In the 
light of this reality, serious attention ought to be directed at the judicial function in 
societies in transition even in the same way as it is in liberal democracies. 
   As it is, the accountability gap on the institutional role of the judiciary in 
Nigeria during the country’s authoritarian period haunts the judicial function. It 
has continued to challenge its attempts at self-transformation and regulation 
constituted by the establishment of the NJC. The task of the NJC is not made any 
easier by the fact that it is a creation of a constitution foisted on the country 
through an un-negotiated transition. It is thus no surprise that the NJC, even with 
best intentions, falls short of transforming the judiciary to a transparent institution 
in the country.  
   At a level of evaluation, the operations of the NJC and its continued struggle to 
sanitise the judicial institution (a task which has continued to prove Herculean), 
has served as a constant reminder of the judicial accountability gap in the 
transition period in which the judiciary has been saddled with great 
expectations.107 The NJC’s apparent inability to curb the level of judicial 
misfeasance eight years after its establishment gives cause for concern. Just when 
public confidence in the judiciary had improved considerably with the judicial 
interventions in the run-up to the controversial 2007 elections, the NJC was 
saddled with investigating petitions on allegations of alarming sleaze on the part 
of some judges of the Electoral Petitions Tribunals in various parts of the 
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country.108 Of further significance to this study, keen observation of the Nigerian 
socio-legal scene suggests judicial misfeasance is sometimes a product of political 
interference and defective legal and political (structural) arrangements.109 These 
implicate the need for a holistic approach to judicial transformation. It has been 
previously argued that a publicly accessible accountability process is better 
adapted to that objective.  
   The claim made here on public accountability of the judiciary as part of the 
transitional measures is a relatively modest one. Essentially, it is a route which is 
unlikely to have waived or obviated the need for a body in the conceptual nature 
of the NJC. Rather, it concedes the relevance of the NJC, designed as a permanent 
body for the rigorous monitoring, accountability and administration of the 
judiciary. The truth-seeking process and the opportunity for public accountability 
it portends, would have provided a forum for constituting the NJC (or any such 
similar body), in a manner that would have better secured its potential for 
institutional transformation for which it is conceived. This would have been the 
case granted the benefit of a public-led inquiry into the judicial function in the 
past.  
   In sum, the NJC could, at the least, have been constituted as a more 
representative body along societal aspirations for social reconstruction. Such a 
body would arguably assist in better fortifying the judicial institution against the 
vagaries of judicialised politics which potentially challenges any judiciary, drawn 
as the Nigerian courts are, into mediating highly contested political choices and 
questions. A closer examination of how the judicial function has fared in the 
following circumstances serves to make clearer the point being made about 
accountability of the judiciary and proper positioning of the judiciary in 
transitions. 
 
5.      TURNING THE TABLES? POLITICISATION OF THE JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA 
   The purist ambition to insulate law from politics has largely been 
unsuccessful.110 The gravitation of power from the political branch has been 
accompanied by immense pressure on the judicial function. It is perhaps 
presumptuous to expect the political elite would not explore avenues to control a 
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visible contender for power like the judiciary. As Ferejohn observes, it is logical 
that the political branch, in the knowledge that judicial officers who they appoint 
could become not only their regulators in the public sphere, but in fact, determine 
their future personal status, would maintain more than a passing interest in the 
high stakes of judicial composition.111  
   The price the judiciary pays for its potential to control the fortunes of the 
political elite is the retention by the latter of the power to check judicial power 
through a number of measures including the naming of judges, control over 
legislation delimiting judicial jurisdiction as well as the enforcement of 
judgements.112 On a related note, Domingo has observed that the judicialisation of 
politics can in turn rebound with dire consequences for the rule of law. 113 In the 
main, it can result in the politicisation of the judiciary with serious impact on its 
decisional independence.  
   The Nigerian judiciary, not atypical of accounts of contemporary transitioning 
experiences witnessing judicialisation of politics, faces the challenges of the other 
side of the dynamic, politicisation of the judiciary. It is to be expected that the 
political branch, having lost or voluntarily conceded some hitherto coveted power 
to the judiciary, will be keen on obtaining reasonable control of the latter to 
protect its institutional interests in governance.    
   One of the forms politicisation of the judiciary can take is the abuse, or 
perceived abuse, of appointive judicial power as a mechanism for obtaining 
desirable political results from the judicialisation of politics by the ruling elite. 
The disquiet that results from this dynamic and its potential for eroding 
confidence in judicial independence, featured prominently in the controversy 
generated by the recent nomination of the Chairman of the Presidential Election 
Petitions Tribunal (the Tribunal) to the Supreme Court by President Umar 
Yar’Adua.  The nomination of Justice James Ogebe of the Court of Appeal was 
submitted by the presidency to the Senate for confirmation only hours before the 
Tribunal announced the one week date for delivery of its verdict in the 
presidential election petitions challenging the victory of President Yar’Adua. His 
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predecessor had done the same under similar circumstances and the Tribunal ruled 
in his favour.  
   Not unexpectedly, the opposition cried foul.114 His nomination, along with that 
of another Court of Appeal Justice, to the Supreme Court, was on the 
recommendation of the NJC. Reports indicate the nomination had been submitted 
by the NJC to the President over two months earlier. It nonetheless raised serious 
concern and fuelled conspiracy theories, particularly in view of the fact that the 
Senate, dominated by the ruling party of the President, referred the matter for 
consideration of the relevant committee on the day the Tribunal was delivering its 
verdict.115 The situation was further compounded by the judgement of the 
Presidential Election Petitions Tribunal in favour of President Yar’Adua. From 
whatever perspective this is viewed, the timing of the announcement echoes 
apprehensions on the effect of the power of the political branch to appoint judges.  
   In general, concerns have been raised over the impact of the power on the 
decisional independence and integrity of judicial officers. In Nigeria, the most 
prominent of the concerns centres on judicial ineptitude and corruption (or simply 
apprehensions of it), especially in the lower courts and throughout the system.116 
It is instructive that the recent decision of the Presidential Elections Petition 
Tribunal has not escaped the allegations of corruption that dogged the steps and 
seriously compromised the adjudication of the 2003 elections in the country. 
There are serious allegations from certain quarters that the five-man panel that sat 
over the Presidential Election Petitions had been severely compromised through 
financial inducement.117 This is quite apart from the rather untidy timing of the 
elevation of the Chairman of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court discussed above.  
   While the veracity of such damaging claims of judicial ineptitude remains in 
doubt, the opposition parties decried the Tribunal’s decision for being perverse.118 
In agreement, the leadership of the Transition Monitoring Group, a national 
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coalition of some leading non-governmental organisations that monitored the 
elections alongside international observers, dismissed it as ‘A Charter for 
Dishonest Elections.’119 The persistence of real or imagined corruption in the 
judiciary is a product of the existential continuity of the institution in the 
transition process.  
   Not unrelated to deep-seated public distrust for the judiciary, especially at the 
lower levels, is the preference for ‘appellate justice.’ By this is meant the high 
tendency to appeal unsatisfactory judgements by a party in litigation. Litigants 
commonly treat the trial courts as ‘clearance houses’ for obtaining justice through 
the judicial process. It is typical to find the response to a ruling by an unsatisfied 
party expressed in similar refrain to that of a party chieftain recently that ‘The 
beauty of this whole thing is that the ruling ignites the appeal process.’120 In 
recent times, this propensity has led to an attendant high volume of appeals in the 
appellate dockets in the country.  
   The attitude is generally that it is easier to influence the court of first instance 
almost invariably presided by a single judge. Even in cases like the electoral 
petitions matters composed of 3 or 5 member-panels, the attitude was the same. It 
has for instance been the position of all parties to the consolidated presidential 
elections petition that irrespective of the outcome, there will be ultimate appeals 
to the Supreme Court. This is despite the composition of the Tribunal by 5 Justice 
of the Court of Appeal. And it was no surprise that the Petitioners immediately 
appealed the decision.121 Thus the Supreme Court appears to be the lone judicial 
institution that currently enjoys the new-found confidence in the judiciary in 
Nigeria’s transition. 
   However, public confidence in the integrity of even the Supreme Court itself 
must not be overstated. Apart from the relative infancy of such confidence, the 
Supreme Court itself has not been spared the vagaries of adjudicating politically 
charged cases. It was nearly brought into disrepute in its upholding of the Court of 
Appeal findings that a then serving-governor, James Onanefe Ibori, was not an ex-
convict in the Ibori Case. This was a very controversial case which centred on 
serious allegations that a serving governor was an ex-convict, and was thus unfit 
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to hold office in line with constitutional provisions. Critics of the decision were 
aggrieved that the Supreme Court upheld the finding that there was not enough 
proof in the case to support the claim that the governor was an ex-convict. It was 
criticised for ignoring the fact that the judge who convicted him had given 
evidence at the trial of the matter and positively identified that Governor Ibori was 
the accused he convicted some years back. It was generally believed that the 
Court had been improperly influenced by the Presidency who supported the 
governor against all odds.  
   It was further alleged by the complainant in the case that the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria who presided over the case and some of the other justices who sat on the 
panel, had collected a bribe from the governor.122 Surprisingly, the disturbing 
allegation made in open court, did not earn him a citation for contempt. Rather, 
the Court invited Interpol to investigate the matter but nothing untoward was 
discovered against the justices.123 This particular case still hounds the Court as it 
recently emerged that the ex-governor as well as his wife had in fact been 
convicted of similar crimes alleged by at least two other courts in the United 
Kingdom.124 
   Again, the Court has become an unwitting victim of the intrigues that sometimes 
characterise the conduct of the political process which renders adjudication of 
cases from it, a daunting task for even the highest levels of the judiciary. 
Recently, some justices of the Court became defendants in a suit before the high 
court for alleged unfair conduct and verbal attack (in open court), on a party in 
Re: Peter Obi vs. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & 7Ors 
(Re: Peter Obi).125 The case challenges the decision of the Court in the Obi 
Tenure Case discussed above. It came to light through depositions before the 
Court that one of the Appellants had collected a substantial amount of money 
from the Respondent to abandon his claims but failed to do so. Irked by this 
development, he was called out at the hearing for identification and berated as an 
opportunistic individual who had perfected the art of making money through 
contesting elections, challenging the winner through litigation after losing and 
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receiving gratification for withdrawing his case. The Court then struck out his 
application. Aggrieved at the ‘unguarded statements’ of the justices, he 
approached a high court claiming huge damages for denial of fair hearing, and 
bias on the part of the Supreme Court Justices.126 The implications of a case like 
this on judicial authority is better appreciated in the light of the fact that it would 
likely end up for final determination in the same Supreme Court, presumably by 
another panel of the Court. Will the Court find itself in breach of the principles of 
fair-hearing? This would be an interesting test-case. 
   At the state level, executive and political interference with the judicial process 
has given cause for concern as to the sustainability of judicial independence. 
Governors have been known to remove judges who they perceived independent 
and non-deferential to the executive.127 Take the example of political indiscretion, 
again in Kogi State referred to above. Recently, the Chief Judge was purportedly 
removed by the acting governor following a resolution of the legislature. He had 
delivered a judgment in which he declared the political arrangements made by 
state executive for the scheduled local government councils’ elections illegal in a 
suit filed by the political opposition. His hurried removal on widely believed 
trumped up charges of financial misappropriation was accompanied by executive 
rebuff of his ruling. The state bar, thoroughly miffed by the unbridled abuse of 
political power, insisted on his reinstatement and vowed to boycott the courts.128 
He was reinstated three days later.129  
   In certain vindication of critics of judicial involvement in overly political 
processes, there are indications that public reaction to judicial decisions on 
electoral cases is placing a lot of undue pressure on the judiciary. It will be 
recalled that the 2007 general elections in the country had led to unparalleled 
levels of litigation on electoral matters in the country. As stated earlier, this is 
traceable to the widespread discontent with the election considered to be the worst 
in the country’s history. It is thus no surprise that the courts to which recourse 
have been had for resolving the disputes arising from the elections will be the 
focus of intense public attention. But this focus sometimes presents a dilemma for 
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the judiciary. The public response to the judicial handling of these cases may be 
lacking in objectivity. As one observer succinctly puts it 
               …most judges… are increasingly being labelled not according to the   
               erudition of their judgements but whether, in the perception of  
               Nigerians, their verdicts affirm the vote of no confidence which they had  
               already passed on Obasanjo’s eight year misrule. Thus whenever the  
               tribunals uphold any election, it attracts condemnation while annulments  
               attract spontaneous  applause.130 
                
Thus, there is the potential for the widespread judicialisation of the electoral 
process to result in the undermining of judicial authority, the very antithesis of 
seeking judicial intervention in the first place.            
   In sum, the foregoing instantiations of political interventions in and public focus 
on the judicial process draws attention to the fault lines of the country’s judicial 
institutional design. These have become accentuated by factors relating to an 
accountability gap (both judicial and administrative) of its governance in the 
period of authoritarian rule. Institutional positioning of the Nigerian judiciary, in 
the context of a volatile democratisation process, leaves it quite predisposed to 
politicisation. Further, the persistence of real or imagined corruption in the 
judiciary is a product of the existential continuity of the institution in the 
transition process. This will arguably remain the case as long as the matter of 
accountability of the judiciary for complicity in misgovernance during the 
country’s authoritarian past remains completely ignored or under-addressed at 
best.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The cases analysed here demonstrate how political players, in a struggle for 
hegemony, ascendance and control of power, encourage or even actively initiate 
the process of judicialisation of politics. They reinforce an important feature of 
judicialisation of politics in the new constitutionalism, the predilection of political 
branches of government in matured and young democracies alike for ceding 
political decisions to the judiciary for varying strategic reasons.  
   The discussion above suggests the Nigerian Supreme Court in particular has 
taken a strategic position in the task of democratic institutional building and the 
reinstitution of the rule of law in the country to the acclaim of the public in the 
country. The account also discloses that the judiciary, in the course of its 
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numerous interventions, has not only been drawn into overly political disputes 
that overreach its jurisprudential preferences, but  is itself still challenged by the 
institutional dysfunctions carried over from the authoritarian era.  
   It emerges from the analyses of the Nigerian experience that the tentative lines 
of the direction of judicial activity in the country can be drawn from the position 
of the Supreme Court. It would however be simply misleading to consider its 
position as representative of the current state of the judiciary as a whole. Despite a 
few commendable handling of critical and overly political matters, the manner of 
adjudication and independence of the lower courts remain quite unsatisfactory. In 
particular, the lower courts have yet to catch on to a consistently progressive role 
in the country’s political transition. The Supreme Court itself is still enmeshed in 
controversies that speak to the dilemma of an unscrutinised past, a feature of 
transitional justice in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
  The Nigerian experience also indicates that a number of situational dynamics, 
prominent among which is the ceding of power to the judicial branch by political 
actors for strategic reasons, situates the judiciary as a powerful force for social 
reconstruction, entrenchment and stabilisation of democratic ethos in post-
authoritarian transitions. But the culmination of the dynamics leads back to the 
need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional societies. 
   Accounts of the Nigerian experience of the judicialisation of politics suggest the 
need to devote more attention to the role of public opinion in analytic 
considerations of the judicial function. While it is crucial to protect the 
institutional integrity of the judiciary, public opinion along with other political 
considerations which, in practice, significantly impact on judicial activity, ought 
to be given more detailed and systematised consideration by the legal academy in 
evaluations of the judicial function. The keen public focus on and preference for 
the judicial resolution of power contestations among the political elite; itself 
deriving mainly from the divisions within their ranks or the need to secure 
legitimacy for the exercise of power secured through deficient democratic 
processes, commends the view that the insufficient attention to public opinion in 
legal analysis, provides an incomplete empirical account of the role of judicial 
review. Incidentally, this thesis also omits a complete empirical account on the 
Nigerian experience. Nonetheless, legal theory will be more in tune with socio-
political reality and enriched by the adoption of a robust approach to analysis of 
the judicial function in general. 
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   The judiciary in transitional societies, and even in well established democracies, 
is certainly on the march of power. But the political branches which voluntarily or 
unwittingly ceded some of the powers to it may fight back. The voluntary ceding 
of critical policy-making powers is usually a strategic move to achieve certain 
advantages like legitimacy or deflection of public disaffection for unpopular 
policies. Consequently, while the political branches may facilitate or at least 
support the judicialisation of politics, an alteration of the balance of power which 
may result, is usually not welcome.  
   Institutional distortions may result from the response of the political branches to 
the active participation of the judiciary in determining highly political matters. 
These tend to jeopardize the very foundations of the rule of law, ordinarily 
consolidated by judicial activism. In the event that the judiciary, deriving from its 
institutional nature, lacks both the power of the sword and the purse, political 
power-resurgence of this nature challenges the propriety of devolving so much 
governmental power on the most unlikely branch. From experiential accounts, 
aspiration of judicial rescue of a troubled transition and consolidation of 
democracy is a daunting yet vital task.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
   Utilising the specific experience of political transition in Nigeria, this study 
identified an important but mostly neglected aspect of transitional justice: the 
need to scrutinise the role of the judiciary in misgovernance. Specifically, the 
thesis focused on the need for institutional accountability for the judicial role in 
upholding and legitimising authoritarian rule as part of transitional justice 
arrangements in the post-authoritarian, democratising polity. The position was 
canvassed that neglect or failure to include the judiciary, a major actor in the 
exercise of state power, in the process of accountability for misgovernance and 
gross violations of human rights, leaves a major gap in accountability for the past. 
This has potentially wide ramifications for the present and the future.  
 The study raised normative questions about the propriety of the accountability 
gap that is thus created. Perhaps more importantly, it argued that this failure also 
threatens the transformation of the state and its hitherto complicit institutions. 
This latter point is the case, it was argued, because the judiciary served, even if 
unwittingly, as an instrument of oppression in the period of authoritarian rule. 
Yet, as shown by various accounts of the contemporary experience of governance, 
the judiciary has come to assume an important position in the determination of 
rights claims, government policy and socio-political reforms instituted by 
countries in transition.  
   The assumption by the judiciary of a strategic institutional role in governance in 
post-authoritarian societies is usually externally-driven. The ascendance of 
judicial power in governance in such contexts is usually facilitated by the need for 
the resolution of emergent, sometimes novel, disputes and contestations within the 
political branch of government. In many cases, the judiciary becomes the forum 
for the resolution of key political disputes and moral questions generated partly by 
the chequered institutional memory and experience of the political branch. In light 
of this situation, it is reasonable to assert that there is merit in paying more 
attention to the salience of accountability of the judiciary in post-authoritarian 
societies in particular and transitional contexts in general. Thus the current neglect 
of critical perspectives on accountability of the judiciary is at the least, an 
undesirable gap in transitional justice theory and practice.  
   It was intended to demonstrate that public accountability for the previous 
judicial role in governance is crucial during transition moments in a society. It 
was argued that in transitional societies, such accountability can be legitimately 
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and viably pursued through the mechanism of the truth-seeking process as part of 
a holistic approach to taking stock of the past. Such a public process is easily 
accessible and accords with certain understandings of the rule of law. The primary 
advantage of the public accountability process as represented by the truth-seeking 
mechanism in the context of a transitioning society is the opportunity it provides 
for securing comprehensive accountability of governance during a period of 
authoritarianism.  
   The argument has been made in this thesis that there is something seriously 
disturbing to find that judges who swore an oath to defend the Constitution going 
against that oath. The violation of the judicial oath to defend the Constitution 
includes the act of legitimating unconstitutional (military) governments as in the 
case of Nigeria. The same goes for according recognition to, and upholding of 
laws imposed by military usurpers. At the least, the question of the source of 
judicial power to act comes up for scrutiny in the circumstance that military 
usurpation of power somehow overturns the very Constitution which presumably 
grants such powers. Worse still is the realisation that the military, in the exercise 
of usurped powers legitimised by the judiciary, commit gross human rights 
violations over a considerable period of time as is the case in Nigeria. With such a 
record, the judiciary undermines its own institutional integrity. On this view, the 
judiciary ought, as a matter of principle, to be made to give an account of its 
stewardship to the society.  
   Accountability of the judiciary for its past role in governance is an important 
task that has to be undertaken in the short term before collective amnesia 
develops. The judiciary should not be allowed to seek protection from 
accountability through reliance on traditional normative doctrines of institutional 
independence or immunity for at least three reasons. First, these doctrines are 
generally conceived within the construct of settled, democratic societies. Second, 
there is the need for comprehensive accountability to fulfil the obligation of the 
right of the society to know what went wrong in the past. Third, institutional 
accountability for the past facilitates transformation, one of the key aspirations of 
transitioning societies. Thus, where a mechanism like the truth-seeking process is 
available, the judiciary, like the other two branches of governance, ought to go 
through it. 
   A key foundational premise for institutional accountability as advanced in this 
study is that the role of the judiciary is of a critical nature as the third estate of the 
realm at all times. It is fast becoming counter-intuitive, if not indeed, a flight from 
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experiential accounts, to regard the judicial branch as the weakest arm of 
government. The wave of judicialisation in contemporary times has opened up 
new thinking about situating the judiciary in the constellation of power in the 
modern state. The experience in democratising polities has similarly reinforced 
and in some cases, directly suggested the judiciary now exercises immense 
powers on political matters. These all point in the direction of a need to pay more 
attention to the role of the judiciary in governance and corresponding 
accountability for its exercise of powers at all times. This, as argued earlier, is 
even more the case in democratic societies.  
   It has been shown that the gap in the accountability for the judicial role in a 
society’s past is one that ought to be addressed. This is in view of the centrality of 
the judiciary both in authoritarian and post-authoritarian societies in particular and 
post-conflict contexts in general. It is now imperative that transitional justice 
processes accord an important place to accountability of the judiciary for its role 
in the past. As revealed by the consideration of the role of the judiciary in the 
authoritarian and post-authoritarian period in Nigeria, the significance of 
accountability of the judiciary in transitional societies can not be overstated. This 
stems from critical analysis of specific cases reflecting the sometimes decisive 
role the judicial institution plays in governance in contemporary society. The 
situation can hardly be otherwise. The judiciary is after all, the third in the 
conventional legal and political conceptions of state institutions.  
  The prevalent phenomenon of judicialisation of politics in liberal, advanced 
democratic societies as well as democratising polities sharply draws attention to 
the need for more scholarly scrutiny on the judicial function. The need for 
accountability of the judiciary for its role in past governance takes on an even 
more urgent imperative in post-authoritarian contexts where, as is wont to be the 
case, it bears institutional complicity for gross violations of human rights and 
impunity. The burden it carries from the past affects its performance and raises 
concern on the legitimacy of its exercise of power in the present and future.  
   This research highlights that a notable feature of the judicialisation of politics is 
the ability and willingness of courts to limit legislative action according to 
constitutional principles and the values of the rule of law. While the Nigerian 
experience has not significantly diverged from this paradigm, the account of the 
judicialisation of politics in the country discloses it has had more profound 
resonance for governance in the way it has impacted upon executive actions in 
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governance. The phenomenon has been distinctly discernible in adjudication of 
disputes on the intersection of individual rights with public interests in a troubled 
transition from authoritarianism.  
   The impact of the  judicial role in transitioning polities, from Central and 
Eastern Europe through to South East Asia , Latin America and Africa, outlined in 
this study, supports the position that it is critical to the democratisation process to 
ensure the judiciary is properly positioned for the transition from an authoritarian  
past. It is noteworthy that in virtually all of these cases, new courts were 
established to take on various socio-political and other challenges of diverse 
transitional societies. While the creation of such courts at first blush appears to 
elide the need for accountability of the judiciary, it can be argued that it actually 
speaks to recognition of the questionable role of the judiciary in past governance. 
In other words, the creation of new constitutional courts signals the need for a 
mediator unburdened by a complicit institutional past. The recognition of 
perceived or actual institutional complicity of inherited judicial structures would 
appear partly responsible for the usually uneasy relationship between them and 
the newly created courts.  
   In societies like Nigeria where new courts were not created, the case for 
accountability of the judiciary for the past is even more compelling. The judiciary 
ought to be made to give an account of its role in past governance as part of 
transitional justice measures to achieve comprehensive accountability and 
institutional transformation. It is only then that it can be expected to take on the 
serious challenges of definitive, purposeful judicial governance required for 
strengthening the democratising transitioning polity.  
   With respect to the Nigerian experience, the research discloses that the tentative 
lines of the course of judicialisation of politics in the country can be drawn from 
the position of the Supreme Court, considering its pride of place in the judicial 
system. But it would be simply misleading to read off it, the current state of the 
judiciary in the country as a whole. The outline of the judicialisation of politics in 
the Supreme Court differs from what is seen in the courts below. Despite some 
commendable handling of critical and overly political matters, the manner of 
adjudication and independence of the lower courts continue to give cause for 
concern. The Supreme Court itself is still enmeshed in controversies as to its 
integrity and its jurisprudence remains ambivalent at critical moments. All these 
speak to the dilemma of an unscrutinised institutional past, a feature of 
transitional justice with regards to the judicial function in Nigeria and elsewhere. 
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   In democratising as well as established liberal democratic societies, 
protestations of deficient democratic credentials have surprisingly been ineffectual 
in curbing the geometric increase in, and sometimes preference for, judicial 
determination and control of public policy as well as highly political and moral 
questions. The immense powers wielded by the judiciary over key policy aspects 
of governance, especially in the contemporary new constitutionalism, strongly 
suggests the need for closer and more systematised scrutiny of the judicial 
function.  
   Experiential accounts strongly suggest that newly established constitutional 
courts have played a significant role in deepening democracy. The courts, through 
a particular form of judicial activism and sometimes very controversial 
jurisprudential preferences, are securing the core values of the constitution and 
securing human rights in transitioning polities. Courts have played (and continue 
to play) a central role in shaping the direction of key political and moral issues 
which go to the foundations of the existence of their societies.  In the Nigerian 
case, the judicialisation of politics has taken on remarkable prominence in 
governance. The voluntary (and sometimes involuntary) ceding of powers by the 
political branches has witnessed the judiciary becoming the choice mechanism for 
resolving the debacles arising from a legacy of a dysfunctional system created in 
the course of almost three decades of military authoritarianism. And yet, the 
judicial institution itself has been hitherto under-scrutinised in terms of its role in 
the past and its position in the transition to democracy. This thesis has 
endeavoured to begin to rectify that gap. But given the high stakes involved in the 
Nigerian polity, it has been argued here that more remained and remains to be 
done.     
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